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MULES, FUELS, AND FUSION: ENERGY, ENTROPY, AND THE CROSSING OF THE 
PANAMANIAN TRANSIT ZONE, 1848-1990 
By 
Jordan Coulombe 
University of New Hampshire 
 
 
Between 1848 and 1990 Americans attempted to construct numerous infrastructural 
projects in Panama in hopes of bridging the Isthmus and connecting the seas. These schemes ran 
the gamut from the creation of the Panama railroad in the early 1850s through attempts to 
detonate nuclear explosives to create a sea-level canal in the 1960s. While these projects seem 
quite alien to one another, these two plans, and other attempts to cross the Isthmus, were unified 
by their shared reliance on energy’s capacity to overcome the entropy of the Panamanian 
environment. In order to reshape Isthmian landscapes, American engineers, scientists, and 
policymakers had to first harness and unleash a variety of energy sources that could do the work 
of moving earth, constructing structures, and imposing order on the Panamanian landscape. Their 
efficacy was always mediated by entropy, the environment’s tendency to trend towards disorder. 
Without constant injections of energy, the fluid Panamanian landscape would shift and move, 
destabilizing the landscape and wrecking human altered landscapes. This contentious 
relationship between energy and entropy catalyzed an energetic arms race in which Americans 
looked towards increasingly powerful sources of energy to hold entropy at bay. Ultimately this 
proved a double-edged sword. By altering the environment in increasingly complex ways, they 




loop forced humans to consume more energy to contain entropy, thus restarting the cycle of 
energetic and entropic growth. 
This project tracks this process starting with the creation of the railroad and follows it 
through the creation of the Panama Canal in the first two decades of the 1900s, initial attempts to 
restructure the Canal during the interwar years, the attempt to build a new canal through the use 
of nuclear excavation, and finally attempts to use the Isthmus to facilitate the transportation of 
Alaska North Slope oil during the 1970s and 1980s. Along the way, the project tracks how new 
energy sources provided new opportunities to reshape Panama, and the unforeseen consequences 
that accompanied these processes. Ultimately, the unrelenting presence of entropy suggests that 
while energy granted Americans the illusion of control over the natural landscape, their authority 





Maps of Panama 
 
“Map of the Isthmus of Panama, Showing the Route of the Railroad from Aspinwall to Panama,” ca. 1858, located 
in Mitchell’s School Atlas, (Philadelphia: E.H. Bunker & Co., 1863), retrieved from Florida Center for Instructional 





“The Panama Canal Zone” from Albert Perry Brigham and Charles MacFarlane, Essentials of Geography (New 





INTRODUCTION: Energy and Entropy: An Environmental Arms Race 
In a speech before the American Legion in August of 1977, Ambassador Sol Linowitz 
attempted to sum up the deep cultural attachment Americans felt for the Panama Canal: “It was 
in a very real sense our moonshot of the early 1900s.”1 Linowitz’s comment reflected both the 
ingenuity and persistence required to gouge the Canal out of the Panamanian landscape, as well 
as the technological leaps that made such an ambitious project possible. Perhaps more than 
anything else it reflected the civic pride Americans felt for the monumental accomplishment. 
And while Linowitz might not have intended it, it also reflected the energetic demands of both 
projects. The Apollo project required the generation of unprecedented amounts of force to tear 
asunder the shackles of gravity and escape from the terrestrial prison that had confined humanity 
for hundreds of thousands of years. The Canal required a comparable, if more diffused, 
application of energy to realize the centuries-long quest to divide the Isthmus and unite the 
world.  
My dissertation, “Mules, Fuels, and Fusion: Energy, Entropy and the Crossing of the 
Panamanian Transit Zone, 1848-1990,” expands on Linowitz’s observation by arguing that 
historians cannot understand attempts to traverse the Isthmus without emphasizing the 
importance of energy, a concept that historian Richard White has defined simply as “the capacity 
to do work.” 2  The history of American infrastructural construction in Panama has been defined 
by the dynamic relationships between muscles, motors, and movers, and the environmental 
                                                           
1 Linowitz, Sol Address in Favor of Treaties speech before the American Legion Convention, Denver Colorado. 
August 19, 1977, located in “The Meaning of the Panama Canal Treaties.” US Department of State, September 
1977, US National Archives at College Park (hereafter USNA), Record Group 185 (hereafter RG 185), Collection: UD 
UP 30: Treaty Implementation Records, Box 4: Folder: State Department Texts of Treaties Relating to the Panama 
Canal No. 6, 6A, 6B, 6C, pg. 11. 




alteration they enabled in the Panamanian Transit Zone over a one hundred and fifty year 
period.3 Ultimately, energy provides environmental historians with the capacity to view 
connections between seemingly disparate developments. Traditional histories of Americans in 
Panama silo their stories into discrete events such as the creation of the railroad, the creation of 
the canal, or the proposal for a nuclear canal. A focus on energy provides continuity by 
suggesting that the differences between these developments was quantitative rather than 
qualitative. The creation of the Panama Railroad in the 1850s may seem alien to the proposed 
nuclear canal of the 1960s, but both projects were predicated on the need to control and deploy 
remarkable volumes of energy, as well as tap new sources of energy. Thus, energy allows 
historians to cut through narrow perspectives of the Panamanian past and recognize the energy 
proliferation that defined all American attempts to create transportation networks in Panama. 
While Linowitz’s comment reflects a single moment, the human desire to harness energy 
to transport materials across Panama spans centuries. From the mules that helped laborers build 
the Panama railroad in the 1840s and 1850s to the proposed detonation of nuclear explosives to 
create a new sea level canal in the 1960s, animals, chemicals, and atoms provided the energy to 
convey people and goods across the Isthmus. Ultimately, the efficacy of these energy sources 
proved a double-edged sword. Because energy allowed humans to dig up, dredge out, and 
detonate Isthmian landscapes, it generated an unfounded sense of control over the Panamanian 
environment. Consequently, for much of the 20th century, the story of the Panama Canal was a 
triumphantalist narrative in which shrewd American engineers relied on technical prowess, a 
                                                           
3 The idea of thinking of Panama as a “Transit Zone” is a particularly useful concept as it implies that the Panama 
Canal is not the only significant route through Panama, but rather one of several infrastructures created to cross 
the Isthmus. This allows historians to establish more continuity between events both before and after the 
construction of an American canal. Aims McGuiness’s study of the Panama Railroad uses this concept to great 
effect in, Aims McGuinness, Path of Empire: Panama and the California Gold Rush, The United States in the World 




can-do attitude, and American ingenuity to conquer a hostile environment and create one of the 
largest manmade structures in history.4 A British Ambassador to the United States, James Bryce, 
went as far as to call the Panama Canal, “the greatest liberty that man has ever taken with 
nature.”5 Environmental and energy histories, however, suggest that this sentiment belies a 
simple truth; energy’s capacity to alter landscapes in the Transit Zone often was accompanied by 
unforeseen consequences.  
At the root of the tension between environmental alteration and control is the intimate 
relationship between energy and entropy. While the concept of energy is familiar enough to 
historians at this point in time, entropy may be less so. First coined in an 1865 paper by the 
German theoretical physicist Rudolf Clausius, entropy measures the degree of disorder in a 
closed system and is closely tied to the concept of energy—in short, entropy can undo the work 
done by energy. Clausius also defined the second law of thermodynamics, stating that entropy in 
the universe constantly expands. By extension, this principle means that available energy in a 
closed system can only ever decline.6 Although they probably never used the word “entropy,” its 
existence created an obstacle for the human actors attempting to create transportation networks 
on the Isthmus. Energy consumption flowed in one direction. After initial large-scale 
investments of energy, the capacity to do work became scarce. To counter this development 
Americans had to acquire and deploy constantly increasing amounts of energy to keep Isthmian 
transportation networks functioning. 
                                                           
4 This school of thought began even as the canal was being completed with Frederic J Haskin, The Panama Canal 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1913), and continues into the 21st century with Matthew Parker, 
Panama Fever: The Epic Story of One of the Greatest Human Achievements of All Time--the Building of the Panama 
Canal. (New York: Doubleday, 2007.). 
5 David G. McCullough, The Path between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914 (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1977), pg. 543. 




Fortunately for them, Panama was by no means a closed system. Americans imported 
energies in the form of human bodies, animals, coal, oil, and even radionuclides in hopes of 
providing enough energy to alter and stabilize the environment. While people could use these 
energies to alter the environment radically over the short-term, they struggled to counter the 
entropy that threatened to undermine what they had wrought. It was here that entropy became 
most problematic. If energy in a closed system is in a constant state of decline, the natural 
question would be: how do humans do the work of maintaining environments after they alter 
them? Theoretically, this was merely a matter of obtaining more energy. In practice, maintenance 
proved far more vexing. Financially, short term acquisitions of energy, while extensive, were 
justified on the grounds that they were one-time investments. The long-term impetus needed to 
overcome entropy was much less alluring. As a result, the demands of maintaining transportation 
networks in Panama always existed in tension with Americans’ desires to expand and adapt the 
waterway to meet the needs of new technologies and energies. 
More importantly, as humans used energy to alter the environment in increasingly 
dramatic ways, they also required increasing volumes of energy to maintain permanence in a 
dynamic environment. Landslides are a natural occurrence in Panama. And yet, as Americans 
dug the Canal and steepened the slopes of the Cut, slides grew both more frequent and more 
pronounced. Human energy consumption and landscape alteration exacerbated the potential for 
landslides to disrupt the Canal, and entropy mandated that the only way to maintain the canal in 
the face of such instability was to apply more energy from external sources.  
The rub is that as time goes on, and as human attempts to alter landscapes grow 
increasingly more complex, the potential for entropy to prevent these landscapes from operating 




The result is a sort of an entropic arms race in which humans, gaining access to new and more 
powerful sources of energy, alter their environment in more complex and, consequently, unstable 
ways, increasing the energetic cost of maintenance. In order to overcome entropy and add energy 
to the system, they consume even more energy, thus creating a positive feedback loop in which 
energy consumption grows rapidly. I believe that this trend is true of almost any environment. Be 
it urban or rural, large or small, the mandates of energy, landscape alteration, and entropy dictate 
an ever-increasing reliance on energy in order to maintain human altered landscapes.  
Climactic and geographic forces directly impact this relationship easily, particularly 
when environmental realities combine with culturally generated assumptions about how 
landscapes should operate. Panama exemplifies this phenomenon. The tiny land bridge that splits 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans is just about 50 miles wide at its narrowest point. Those 50 miles 
vary wildly from the lowland swamps that dot the coast to the thousand-foot mountains of the 
Continental Divide that run through the heart of the Isthmus. These environmental realities 
generate a unique climate defined more than anything else by the presence of water. Panama has 
two seasons, a wet season running from May to December and a dry season running from 
January to April. During the wet season, massive deluges wash away soil, cause landslides, and 
often wreak havoc with manmade infrastructural networks.7 Towards the coasts it was the highly 
viscous muds that complicated manmade infrastructural networks. While not as dramatic as 
landslides, shifting silts could prove just as problematic and required considerable volumes of 
energy to counter. American engineers, often unfamiliar with the Panamanian environment, 
                                                           
7 The challenges faced by American infrastructure and state planning in fluid environments has been well 
established by David Biggs in Quagmire: Nation Building and Nature in the Mekong Delta, (Seattle, University of 
Washington Press, 2012) in which Biggs describes how the canals, and swamps of the Mekong Delta wreaked 




struggled to deal with these realities. In this sense, entropy combined energetic realities with 
environmental conditions and cultural assumptions about landscape stability to define American 
attempts to reshape Panama by their incessant demand for access to energy. 
This dissertation uses the thermodynamic definition of entropy in a literal sense to 
describe the central tension between the need for increasing volumes of energy and the 
consequences that stem from that process. As an exercise it also deploys “entropy” as a metaphor 
by using the more popular definition of the concept: the tendency of the natural world to trend 
towards disorder. This more liberal interpretation uses the effective operation of the Canal itself 
as a measure of “order,” suggesting that from the perspective of American administrators, this 
objective was paramount. Entropy then encapsulates those actors, be they human or natural, that 
prevent the Canal from working as intended. It’s worth noting that, despite the negative 
connotations entropy is associated with in contemporary society, this dissertation does not 
assume that entropy is a negative force. Instead the term is only used to describe a shift from one 
state of being to another. While the metaphorical use of “entropy” does have shortcomings, I am 
intrigued by the concept’s ability to reflect similarities between seemingly divergent forces, be 
they diplomatic, environmental, financial, or anthropogenic in nature. 
At its most fundamental level, entropy provides a means of differentiating between short-
term and long-term uses of energy. Substantive landscape engineering- like the construction of 
an interoceanic canal for instance- tends to rely on short, intensive injections of energy. 
Maintenance of landscapes, on the other hand, relies on more diffused applications of energy. 
Entropy allows historians to cut through the distinction between alteration and maintenance by 
identifying the ways in which energy, or a lack thereof, dictated both processes. In this 




stable transportation network, and I will use “entropy” to denote forces that tended to undermine 
the functioning of the transit networks in the zone. 
Environmental and energy history are well suited to deal with the questions raised by 
efforts to transit Panama. Because the story of Americans in Panama is the story of humans 
attempting to harness and unleash energy to overcome entropy and restructure the environment 
of Panama, insights from environmental and energy histories are essential to understanding the 
history of the Isthmus. Yet this is not a story of energy determinism. While the human capacity 
to control and deploy energy developed rapidly over the 19th and 20th centuries, this in and of 
itself did not yield infrastructural networks. Decisions about when and where to deploy energy 
were just as important as energy sources themselves. The decision to adopt electrical energy in 
the later years of Panama Canal construction and the decision not to use nuclear energy to 
construct a new canal in the 1960s both were accompanied by significant repercussions. To fully 
understand the way energy impacted the Isthmian Transit Zone we need to think of energy not as 
a monolithic wellspring for progress, but rather as a purveyor of possibilities. The chemical 
processes that generated energy presented humans with countless opportunities, yet it was human 
decision and technology, cultural forces, that actualized this potential. 
The story of American energy in Panama then is a complex one which combines human 
actors, natural forces, and the energy that mediated their interactions. My dissertation will 
examine the promise of energy as a tool to mitigate entropy and shape landscapes to human ends, 
and the challenges that resulted from its application. Ultimately, I argue that Panama offers 




keeping the entropy that vexed the maintenance of permanent structures at bay. 8 And yet, this 
process was never absolute. As humans adopted new, more powerful energy sources they often 
unleashed as much entropy as they contained, ushering in an incessant clash between energy and 
entropy that defined American attempts to cross the Isthmus for nearly 150 years. 
Remembering Panama 
 Literature on Americans in Panama is nearly as voluminous as the spoil removed from 
the Culebra Cut. The herculean efforts to cross and later divide Panama have attracted the 
attention of numerous historians, resulting in economic, racial, political, intellectual, and labor 
histories of the Isthmus.9 Despite this attention, historians have only begun to use environmental 
history (and have yet to use the growing scholarship on energy) to better understand Panama.10 
                                                           
8 The term “hybrid landscapes” sums up the ideas of a variety of scholars who by the early 1990’s were trying to 
emphasize the interconnections between natural and cultural forces. William Cronon’s article “The Trouble with 
Wilderness” in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co., 1995), 69-90, controversially pointed out that our idea of wilderness was itself a cultural construct. 
Similarly Richard White’s Organic Machine emphasizes the Columbia River as a manifestation of the combination 
of human actions and natural forces. The term also bears distinct similarities to “Second Nature” or human 
constructed nature an idea that Cronon introduced in, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1991). 
9 While Frederic Haskin, The Panama Canal, was among the first to give Americans insight into the Canal he was by 
no means the last. Soon personal memoirs such as Mrs. Ernest von Muenchow, ed., The American Woman on the 
Panama Canal (Balboa Heights, Panama: Star and Herald, 1916), http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00013480/00001; and 
Harry Franck, Zone Policeman 88 (New York: The Century Company, 1920), made their way north from the 
Isthmus. Interest in the Canal was renewed in the late 1970s thanks in large part to the Carter-Torrijos treaties. 
Books such as McCullough’s The Path between the Seas, and Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal: A Crisis in 
Historical Perspective (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977), soon came to provide Americans with an updated 
account of the Isthmus. The 1980’s saw increased attention paid to the experiences of silver laborers with works 
such as Michael L. Conniff, Black Labor on a White Canal: Panama, 1904-1981, (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1985); and Bonham C. Richardson, Panama Money in Barbados, 1900-1920 (Knoxville: University 
of Tennessee Press, 1985). In more recent years studies have become even more divergent with Panamanian 
perspectives, Ovidio Diaz Espino, How Wall Street Created a Nation: J.P. Morgan, Teddy Roosevelt, and the 
Panama Canal (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2001), labor histories, Julie Greene, The Canal Builders: 
Making America’s Empire at the Panama Canal, (New York: Penguin Press, 2009); and economic studies, Noel 
Maurer and Carlos Yu, The Big Ditch: How America Took, Built, Ran, and Ultimately Gave Away the Panama Canal 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
10 As of this moment the only monographic environmental history of the Panama is Ashley Carse, Beyond the Big 
Ditch: Politics, Ecology and Infrastructure and the Panama Canal (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2014). Despite 
this, interest in the environmental history of Panama seems to be growing. A recent issue of Environmental History 




This project combines several recent trends in these fields to better understand the creation and 
maintenance of Isthmian landscapes and the energy regimes that made them possible. 
My focus on energy marks a departure from existing literature on Panama in several 
ways. First, energy challenges the triumphantilist narrative exemplified by David McCullough’s 
The Path Between the Seas. Despite the lasting value of this monograph, McCullough’s 
celebration of American ingenuity lends itself to a story arc that begins with the failed French 
attempt to build a canal and concludes in 1914 when the first ships steamed between the canal’s 
massive locks. While fulfilling, McCullough’s work implies that the landscape remained static 
from 1914 on. The continual presence of entropy in Panama challenges this assumption. Ashley 
Carse first voiced this concern in Beyond the Big Ditch, arguing that the Canal’s reliance on a 
steady supply of water (the average ship requires 52 million gallons of Gatun Lake water per 
trip) suggests that the story of the Panama Canal is not one of human conquest of nature, but 
rather the construction of an infrastructural system which requires constant maintenance.11 I 
believe that Carse’s argument is reflective not only of the hydrological demands of the Canal, but 
also its energetic needs as well. Coal, oil and human bodies did not stop coming to the Transit 
Zone after 1914, suggesting that just like water, energy continued to play an integral role in the 
management of the local environment. 
Concerns regarding energy dominated the Isthmus long before a canal was built and long 
after it was completed. Consequently, I also examine the creation of the Panama Railroad, which 
shaped Panama in the decades prior to canal construction and the discussions about alterations to 
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the Canal that pestered the waterway throughout its existence.12 My hope is that energy provides 
a continuity between the pre and post-canal eras and suggests that the Canal, while essential to 
Panama’s history, is merely a single manifestation of several attempts to utilize energy to alter 
the environment and cross the Isthmus. My project then is not on the Panama Canal, but rather 
the Panama “Transit Zone,” both a physical place which has roughly the same geographical 
borders of the Canal Zone, and an ideological construct which represents the cultural ideal of 
minimizing travel time to expedite the movement of goods and peoples.  
It’s worth mentioning that in addition to focusing specifically on the “Transit Zone” this 
dissertation also focuses primarily on the experiences of Americans in Panama. As a result, it 
mentions the pre-colonial, Spanish colonial, and French construction eras of the Transit Zone 
only in passing. This is certainly a limitation in some ways, as it overlooks the contributions that 
indigenous Panamanians, the Spanish, and the French made to development of Panama as a site 
of transportation. Despite this fact, a focus exclusively on American perspectives provides a 
degree of unity for the dissertation and also indicates a continuity in cultural assumptions about 
energy and environment. As this project develops past the dissertation stage it will grow more 
inclusive, encompassing the French, Spanish, and Panamanian perspectives that it currently 
lacks. 
My focus on energy regimes is drawn from the developing field of energy history. My 
conceptualization of energy relies on Richard White’s The Organic Machine. While White’s 
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definition, that energy is the capacity to do work, may be simple, its elegance lies in its capacity 
to connect seemingly unrelated energy flows on the Columbia River, be they the calories stored 
in salmon or the watts generated by a nuclear power plant. This allowed environmental historians 
to bridge the nature vs. culture debate that had defined environmental history for decades by 
recognizing that both natural and cultural forces were connected by energy. Similar energy 
connections characterize human attempts to shape the Transit Zone. While 19th century mule 
trains and 20th century nuclear explosions may seem alien to one another, they both provided a 
means of bringing human aspirations of pan-Isthmian transit to fruition through complex and 
expensive infrastructural improvement. White’s definition of energy provides me with the 
freedom to compare these and other energy regimes and their shared “capacity to do work.” 
My project will also recognize that the emergence of new energies played an essential 
part in the development of the Panamanian Transit Zone. The adoption of coal, oil, and nuclear 
energy provided new ways to cross the Isthmus and hence signal shifts in the energy history of 
the Panamanian Transit Zone. Numerous scholars have dealt with the social, political, 
diplomatic, and environmental consequences that have accompanied the adoption of new energy 
sources.13 Of particular interest is Christopher Jones’ Routes of Power.14 Jones suggests that new 
energy regimes only flourish when humans make a decision to utilize them in a particular way. 
                                                           
13 There are a slew of historians who have examined the consequences of energy transitions in the last few 
decades. Among the most comprehensive are: Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the 
Modern World, (New York: Penguin Books, 2012); David E. Nye, Consuming Power a Social History of American 
Energies (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); Martin V. Melosi, Coping with Abundance : Energy and Environment 
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Energy Security in Industrial America, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015) amongst others. 
14 This book examines the creation of energy transportation systems throughout the mid-Atlantic during the early 
and mid-19th century. These literal routes of power carried coal from Appalachia to urban centers like Philadelphia. 
Jones suggests that this process catalyzed an “energy transition” which saw a gradual shift from organic sources of 
energy such as human and animal muscle to inorganic sources of energy, in this case coal. Christopher F Jones, 




In doing so they create “Landscapes of intensification,” locations where the concentration of 
energy allows humans to alter the landscape to make it more conducive to energy consumption, 
creating a positive feedback loop of exponentially growing energy usage.15 Panama exemplifies 
this point. As Americans concentrated energy in Panama, they were able to create an 
infrastructural network of rail lines, power stations, coal and oil depots, and roads which 
facilitated the increased consumption of energy. This investment was crucial to dealing with 
entropy and maintaining their transportation networks, but also redoubled their reliance on 
energy by leading them to alter the landscape in increasingly dramatic and unstable ways. 
This is not to say that shifts from one energy regime to the next were neat and 
compartmentalized. Indeed, nothing could be further from the truth. While it is useful to 
acknowledge that the emergence of new sources of energy such as fossil fuels ushered in radical 
changes in the human capacity to reshape the environment, too many histories have failed to 
acknowledge that energy transitions are messy, overlapping, and far more gradual than we tend 
to acknowledge. This disconnect has led to the misnomer of energy “revolutions,” a label which 
implies immediate, radical, and unilateral shifts in human energy regimes. These processes are 
never so absolute. Energy transitions are entangled, and rarely result in the complete destruction 
of any singular energy source. Indeed, the creation of Panamanian infrastructural networks 
suggests that we should understand the emergence of energy regimes not as a process of 
revolution, but rather of proliferation. Ultimately the construction of the Panamanian transit 
networks challenges our assumptions about energy regimes and their development by suggesting 
that while coal, oil, and nuclear energy provided new possibilities for human movement across 
                                                           




the Isthmus, their utility was always mediated by the necessity of those energy sources that 
predated them.  
Energy transitions then were not so much revolutions as evolutions, gradual processes in 
which numerous energy sources existed in conjunction with one another. Panama in the spring of 
1914 exemplifies this point. As construction of the Canal approached conclusion, coal fueled 
dredges removed silt from the bottom of its meandering waterways while human muscle put the 
finishing touches on a hydro-electric station at Gatun dam which would provide the electricity 
necessary to operate the Canal’s gargantuan locks. This hydro-electric station was not to be 
confused with the oil-fueled generators located at sub-stations throughout the Canal Zone, which 
provided electricity for the towns that dotted the Panamanian jungle. While these developments 
seem to speak of the modernization of the Canal Zone’s energy sources, it is worth noting that 
1914 also saw the importation of more draft animals than any other year of canal construction. 
The completion of the Canal was not the result of a singular energy regime or revolution, but 
rather the confluence of numerous energies which each fulfilled a specific function. I want to 
challenge the traditional emphasis on energy revolutions by instead tracing this rich tapestry of 
entwining energy sources which together reshaped Isthmian landscapes. 
My hope is that by embracing the relationship between energy and entropy I can move 
beyond the concept of “hybridity” that has defined environmental history recently. While 
Panama certainly is the site of a hybrid environment, hybridity is a problematic idea. For the past 
two decades, a push to perceive nature and culture not as separate entities, but rather as 
interconnected forces, has dominated environmental history. Thus, human interactions with 




both their made and unmade qualities.16 Hybridity is a particularly relevant concept to the Transit 
Zone as incessant attempts to expedite travel across the Isthmus combined the cultural value of 
transportation efficiency with the natural realities of a dynamic landscape. While hybrid 
landscapes have been a useful concept for understanding environmental history, the term has 
grown relatively static over the past several years, with historian Paul Sutter going so far as to 
ask “If all landscapes are hybrid what are the useful distinctions to be made within this 
category?”17 I argue that energy can help us move beyond the concept of hybrid landscapes by 
emphasizing the connection between energy and entropic forces that lie at the core of landscape 
alteration. If humans must do work to overcome entropy and create and maintain hybrid 
landscapes, and energy provides them with the capacity to do work then it seems only reasonable 
that we should focus on the relationship between entropy and energy and the overlooked role that 
they have played in this process. In this way we focus on how landscapes are altered and 
maintained, emphasizing the physical forces that enabled this process and connecting them to 
humanity’s incessant need for increasingly more powerful sources of energy. 
The Panama Transit Zone is also perfectly situated for the adoption of a transnational 
approach. The Panama Transit Zone was a place where American energy and technology met 
with Caribbean labor, Panamanian politics, and Euro-American visions of a global future. The 
result of this strange alchemy was the creation of a truly transnational environment in which all 
parties involved sought to capitalize on the energy needed in Panama and the capital interests 
that accompanied the Transit Zone. Americans were acutely aware of the connection between 
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17 Paul Sutter, “The World with Us: The State of American Environmental History,” Journal of American History 100, 




their energy production and Transit Zone energy consumption. Indeed, during the years of canal 
construction, lobbyists clamored at the opportunity to provide American energy in the Canal 
Zone. William MacCorkle, a West Virginian politician and coal lobbyist, believed “If the nations 
of the world approach this empire of commerce through our canal, it means millions of tons of 
productions for West Virginia, and a gold stream pouring into our beautiful valleys and amidst 
our people, which will be as unending as time.” 18 While MacCorkle’s dream for West Virginia 
went unrealized, his comments were a harbinger of the Alaska North Slope (ANS) oil trade that 
dominated the Isthmus between 1970 and 1990. 
Underpinning these global structures was the continued role that human energy and labor 
played between 1848 and 1990. Richard White himself acknowledged the connection between 
energy, labor, and the environment by emphasizing the fact that the bulk of people know nature 
through work.19 Numerous historians have taken White’s observation to heart over recent 
years.20 Perhaps the most impressive of these recent works has been Thomas Andrew’s Killing 
for Coal. Andrew’s description of coal’s ability to dictate the living and working conditions of 
marginalized laborers provides a useful way of understanding the relationship between labor and 
energy in Panama. While coal, oil, and atoms catalyzed transportation revolutions on the 
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Isthmus, human muscle always lay at the core of landscape alterations. Despite their importance, 
manual laborers found themselves marginalized by their more skilled peers. Numerous historians 
have looked at the experiences of the marginalized men and women who made transit across the 
Isthmus possible. Led by Julie Greene and Michael Conniff, these scholars have argued that the 
adoption of a segregated labor force composed of white “gold” laborers and primarily Afro-
Antillean “silver” laborers created an easily exploitable labor pool capable of completing 
dangerous and dirty jobs.21 While I agree, I also contend that if historians tap this vein of 
scholarship with an increased focus on energy they may be able to identify other forces that acted 
in conjunction with racial prejudices to help codify a racialized labor hierarchy. 
It is worth mentioning that, despite my desire to write a bottom-up narrative, 
Panamanians are largely absent from this work, particularly the first four chapters. There are two 
reasons for this omission. First, sources authored by Panamanians themselves are challenging to 
obtain, particularly in the American archives which served as the basis for this project. In 
addition, this work seeks to focus specifically on the act of creating infrastructural networks. 
Panamanians often distanced themselves from this process. In the creation of the railroad there 
were a few Panamanians employed, but many of them decided to work in the transportation 
networks already in place. It was no accident that many laborers were recruited from South 
America and the Caribbean to construct the Panama Line. The same was true of the era of Canal 
construction. Indeed, Barbadians far outnumbered Panamanians in the Canal Zone. Due to the 
                                                           




constraints of sources and the dissertation’s focus on the Transit Zone, this work emphasizes the 
American perspective and should be read as such.22 
While manual laborers played an important part in Transit Zone networks, energy flows 
tended to be directed by governments, administrators, and foremen. Consequently, my project 
will also include top down interpretations of energy history. For guidance on this subject I look 
towards Scott Kirsch’s Proving Grounds which examines how political realities shaped “Project 
Plowshare,” the US government’s experimentation with nuclear engineering.23 In addition to 
providing context for my analysis of Plowshare’s proposed nuclear excavation of a new Isthmian 
canal, Proving Grounds expertly examines the relationships between energy and policy makers. 
Kirsch suggests that the unprecedented possibilities of nuclear explosions always existed in 
tension with the domestic and international concerns of American policy makers, 
environmentalists, and human rights advocates. Kirsch notes that more than anything else, the 
inability of scientists to control radioactive fallout doomed the project. I believe that Kirsch’s top 
down approach, in conjunction with a bottom-up focus on human labor, will allow me to 
demonstrate that energy pervaded all levels of Isthmian transit and meant different things to 
different people. 
By combining the insight of these historians with my focus on energy and entropy I can 
unify the history of American infrastructural networks in Panama by drawing attention to the 
continual role energy sources played in reshaping the Panamanian environment. The 
environmental realities of Panama forced Americans to import and deploy remarkable volumes 
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of energy to shape the Isthmus to their own ends. They managed to do so, and yet maintaining 
and preserving the landscapes they created was no small task. Panama then presents a wonderful 
microcosm to understand the struggle between energy and entropy that lies at the heart of 
landscape alteration, a relationship that has defined human landscapes with the natural world for 
millennia.  
Organization: 
 To keep my dissertation focused, I will organize it around a series of episodic chapters, 
each of which will deal with a particular time period and the dominant energy sources during that 
era. Christopher Pastore’s dissertation “’From Sweetwater to Seawater’ An Environmental 
History of the Narragansett Bay, 1636-1849” provides an excellent guide for the method. This 
approach provides the benefit of observing changes in energy regimes, processes which can take 
centuries, while still reflecting the continuity of energy’s centrality to Transit Zone transportation 
networks. Consequently, this dissertation is broken up into six chapters, each of which takes a 
snapshot of the Transit Zone under the sway of a particular source of energy. Flowing loosely 
chronologically, these chapters show the battles between energy and entropy that defined 
American attempts to cross the Isthmus. 
I: “It Will Require all the Energy of Which Man is Capable”: Human Energy and the 
Construction of the Panama Railroad, 1848-1854 
Chapter one explores Americans’ first attempt to use Panama’s geographic position to 
promote transportation: The Panama Railroad. This chapter follows the triumphs and trials that 
accompanied railroad construction by focusing on Chief Engineer G.M. Totten who, more than 
any other individual, brought the vision of an Isthmian railroad to fruition. While the railroad 
grossly exceeded both its initial timeline and budget, it was an immediate success thanks in large 




route emerged as the dominant means of transportation between New York and California.24 
Even before construction finished in 1855, prospective prospectors rode or walked along the 
tracks to the end of the line. The resulting transit system combined steam power and human labor 
to convey tens of thousands of Americans across the Transit Zone. Ultimately, interest in 
Isthmian transit unified American coal, Panamanian muscle, and a universal desire for profit to 
create the world’s first transcontinental railroad. And yet this project also was bound by a unique 
tension. While the promise of the railroad and the steam power that would propel it gripped the 
imaginations of Americans and Panamanians alike, the awesome potential it held could not be 
actualized without the muscles of thousands of workers. These workers had minds and desires of 
their own and frequently exercised their autonomy, much to the chagrin of railroad 
administrators. This tension between the dream of a railroad across Panama and the reality of the 
need for human labor defined the creation of the railroad and foreshadowed the challenges that 
later construction efforts would face.  
II: Black Gold: Coal, Infrastructure, and the Racialized Energy Hierarchy of the Panama 
Canal: 1904-1908 
Chapter two deals with the first few years of Panama Canal construction. Initially work 
was overseen by John Findlay Wallace, who had a fantastic mind for engineering but proved 
incompetent at the task of arranging his labor force. Wallace’s tenure as Chief Engineer was 
marked by disorganization, and progress was intolerably slow during this period. John Stevens, 
who took over construction of the line in 1905, turned the sputtering Isthmian Canal Commission 
into a model of efficiency. Stevens created a massive coal fueled infrastructure that could handle 
the task of excavating the extraordinary amounts of earth necessary to build the canal. In doing 
                                                           




so he also reorganized the human labor force working on the Isthmus. The increasing rigidity of 
the gold/silver labor rolls in Panama coincided with the coalification of the mechanical labor 
force and suggested a correlation between the growing importance of mechanical energy and the 
simultaneous devaluation of unskilled, primarily West Indian, manual laborers. By the time 
Stevens left his post in 1907 he had organized the Isthmian Canal Commission into a well-oiled 
(or in this case well coaled) machine, but in doing so had also created an energy hierarchy in 
which white, skilled machinists and engineers capable of harnessing and deploying coal-fueled 
machines were privileged while unskilled West Indians were increasingly marginalized, even 
though their energy was critical to the project. 
III: Locks, Shocks, and Barrels: The Proliferating Energy Regime that Constructed the 
Panama Canal: 1907-1914 
 Chapter three examines the energy proliferation that enabled the construction of the 
Panama Canal. After the silver and gold labor system became entrenched in Panama, Chief 
Engineer George Goethals faced the unenviable challenge of constructing the Panama Canal, an 
accomplishment that had eluded several other engineers. Goethals capitalized on the 
infrastructure and energy he had at his disposal, diversifying and expanding American energy 
reserves in Panama and using a brute force approach to overcome the entropy that plagued the 
region. By implementing electricity and oil on unprecedented levels, Goethals was able to 
reshape the Panamanian environment and make it conducive to transportation. Using concrete, 
he, and the men who worked under him, established a degree of permanence that would keep 
Isthmian entropy at bay for decades to come. Ironically in doing so they also placed distinct 
limitations on canal expansion by forcing future engineers to deal with a concrete landscape that 
was meant by its very nature to resist change and alteration. 




Chapter four discusses how perceptions of the value of the Canal ebbed and flowed 
during the interwar years and in the immediate aftermath of WWII. The utility of the Canal 
always existed in a state of flux. World War One slowed traffic through the Canal, keeping it 
from meeting initial projections of traffic. The 1920s reversed this trend with staggering 
efficiency and brought up uncomfortable questions about the long-term viability of the 
waterway. While the depression muted these questions somewhat, the Second World War 
brought them back with resounding force. The development of large aircraft carriers that 
couldn’t fit through the locks of the Canal, alongside the development of atomic bombs that 
could close a lock canal for years at a time, forced Americans to reckon with the distinct 
limitations of the waterway. This development forced the federal government to commission a 
comprehensive canal study in 1947 which sought to identify a means of increasing the Canal’s 
capacity and security. Ultimately these examinations proved fruitless thanks in large part to the 
lack of an economical means of creating a new sea-level canal. 
V: A Radioactive Flash in the Pan: The Atomic Canal: 1960-1970: 
Chapter five continues the quest for a sea-level canal by examining the rise of a new 
source of energy. While oil and coal power had become staples in Panama by the 1960s, the 
potential of splitting, or fusing, the atom left fossil fuels in its radioactive dust. The “Atoms for 
Peace” movement led nuclear enthusiasts to propose Project Plowshare, a government program 
to gauge the feasibility of geographical engineering: detonating nuclear weapons to reshape the 
geography of a region. Panama soon drew the attention of Plowshare administrators, and studies 
into the possibility of a nuclear canal in Panama or Colombia were underway. After ten years of 
study experts determined that the technology simply wasn’t practical in the fluid Panamanian 




monumental break in the arms race between energy and entropy in Panama. For the first time 
American engineers explored a new source of energy and decided not to use it. The dangers 
associated with nuclear explosives were simply too substantial to be overlooked and as a result 
they shied away from unleashing this volatile new form of energy. 
VI: A Crude Form of Survival: Alaskan Petroleum and Panamanian Pipelines: 1945-1990 
 Chapter six asserts that despite the decision to avoid the deployment of nuclear 
explosions, Americans ultimately doubled down on their commitment to energy in Panama. The 
appetite for oil that emerged during the postwar years wedded the Canal to petroleum products, a 
development that was reinforced by the discovery of a massive oil field at Prudhoe Bay on 
Alaska’s north shore. The transportation of Alaska North Slope (ANS) oil became a global 
imperative and Panama was seen as a route to facilitate the movement of this commodity. 
Ironically, in embracing the oil trade and, consequently, a bid for financial independence, 
Panama found itself at the whims of global forces beyond its control. Discussions regarding the 
creation of pipelines and other infrastructural networks between Panama and the United States 
were complicated by the simmering tensions between the two countries. While the negotiation of 
the Carter-Torrijos Treaties in 1977 alleviated these issues and allowed the ANS oil trade to 
explode, prosperity was fleeting. The rise of General Manuel Noriega in the late 1980s led to 
substantial sanctions and authoritarian economic policies which crippled the petroleum trade and 
heralded the end of American energy schemes in Panama, for the moment. 
 Over the 150 years that separate Totten’s arrival in Panama and Noriega’s ouster, 
Americans utilized a vast array of energy sources to reshape the Panamanian environment. The 
arms race between energy and entropy reshaped the landscape and deepened human reliance on 




expedite transportation across the Isthmus, creating new global markets and commodity flows 
that shaped the world in the 20th century. And yet they also released instability, both in the 
Panamanian landscape and in the economic, political, and social forces that shaped America and 







Chapter I: “It Will Require all the Energy of Which Man is Capable”: Human Energy and 
the Construction of the Panama Railroad, 1848-1990 
When Chief Engineer George Muirson Totten set foot in Panama in the spring of 1849, 
he was convinced that the Panama Railroad could be constructed, but that, “it will require all the 
energy of which man is capable.”1 Totten's words proved prophetic, and far more literal than he 
anticipated. Throughout the five years of its construction, an incessant energy crisis plagued the 
railroad, suggesting that the dream of connecting Atlantic and Pacific remained just out of reach. 
Yet it was not shortages of coal, nor wood (the dominant source of energy for locomotives at the 
time) that vexed construction of the world's first transcontinental railroad, but rather a lack of 
human energy.2 The awesome potential of the steam engine could not be actualized without the 
work of another prime mover, the human body, to contain the entropy of Panama and establish 
an infrastructure which harnessed and directed the combustion of cords and coals.3 Human 
muscle acted as the vanguard of mechanized labor, clearing jungles, filling swamps, leveling 
hills, raising valleys, dividing tributaries, and bridging rivers to make the Panamanian 
environment conducive to rail-borne transit. 4 And yet the work done by humanity's first prime 
mover is shrouded by the smoke that issued from the engines of those that came after. 
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The lack of attention paid to human energy, particularly during industrialization, is 
unsurprising. This is not to say that humans are absent from histories of industrialization. Labor 
historians have done a wonderful job of recognizing the ways in which the adoption of steam 
engines and fossil fuels impacted the lives of workers. However, these histories are tinged by an 
implicit assumption that the energy of human laborers was unimportant in relation to the 
awesome power of these new machines. This isn’t necessarily an unreasonable assertion. The 
metabolism of calories and the oxidation of coal are wildly different chemical processes, and the 
gulf in the amounts of energy yielded by these reactions is so vast as to make any comparison 
between the two challenging. Indeed, when referencing “all the energy of which man is capable,” 
Totten was not referencing the measurable energetic output of the human body, but rather a more 
abstract notion of vitality and vigor. Totten’s definition was far removed from the 
thermodynamic understanding of energy that was germinating in the minds of European 
physicists like William Thomson and Macquorn Rankine.5  
Ultimately, the need for human energy was predicated on the realities of the Panamanian 
environment. In effect, the creation of a rail line allowed for wheeled transit through the rugged 
interior. While the wheel had long been a staple of human society, its capacity to mitigate 
friction depended on the quality of the surface on which it traveled. On smooth, hard surfaces 
(such as a rail line) only 30 kg of force is needed to move a one-ton object, yet this figure could 
be four or even five times higher on loose soil and up to ten times higher in sand or mud, terrain 
common to Panama.6 Unfortunately, Panama would not yield an efficient road easily. If the 
central challenge regarding interoceanic transit was finding or creating a route with minimal 
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friction, Panama’s only advantage lay in the fact that it was narrower than any other point in the 
Americas. By all other metrics Panama was a brutal country, possessing a remarkable variety of 
rocky hills, low lying swamps, dense jungles, and rushing rivers which made the Isthmus 
virtually unnavigable for bulky coal-fueled machines. The hostility of the Panamanian interior 
was so staggering that in 1811 Alexander von Humboldt was forced to concede that, "after the 
lapse of 300 years there neither exists a survey of the ground, nor an exact determination of the 
positions of Panama and Portobello."7 The challenge of crossing the isthmus was such that, with 
the exception of poorly maintained mule roads and seasonally navigable rivers, it was next to 
impossible to carry large amounts of machinery and material into the interior. Bulky steam 
engines required a nimbler source of energy to clear them a path. 
Complicating matters further was the fact that the unique hydrological conditions of 
Panama made stable infrastructural networks difficult to create. Torrential downpours and the 
resulting landslides exacerbated the entropy of the region, forcing Totten to continually hurl 
energy at the Panamanian environment in hopes of establishing permanence. Tracks, piles, and 
bridges were constantly under siege by erosion and, despite Totten’s best efforts, it was 
impossible to entirely hold entropy at bay. Ultimately the tension between these forces shaped 
Totten’s reliance on energy by forcing him to find ways to concentrate increasing volumes of 
energy in the Transit Zone, an unenviable task to say the least.  
Panama’s rugged environment dictated the railway’s reliance on human energy’s distinct 
advantage over mechanized energy, its portability. The line itself crossed diverse environments. 
The Atlantic terminus was the newly constructed town of Aspinwall on the small island of 
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Manzanilla located in Limon (or Navy) Bay. A piled line across the bay connected it with the 
Panamanian mainland, a swampy terrain where terra firma was scarce, and mosquitoes were 
abundant. The line meandered south through these swamps and jungles until it reached the 
Chagres river, roughly seven miles from Aspinwall. The next twenty miles of the line ran along 
the eastern bank of the Chagres, occasionally bridging its tributaries, but not crossing the river 
itself until reaching a 625-foot bridge at Barbacoas, roughly thirty-one miles from the Atlantic 
terminal. Upon crossing the Chagres, the line left the swampy lowlands to ascend the continental 
divide, a roughhewn landscape of rocky hills and valleys. At mile thirty-seven the line crested 
the Obispo Valley and started its rapid descent towards the city of Panama, only ten miles away. 
The descent presented its own challenges as the line wound back and forth through four miles of 
foothills to ensure that its maximum grade was only sixty feet per mile. As it approached its 
destination, the railroad again had to cross a quagmire of lowland swamps. All said and done the 
line snaked its way through forty-seven miles of some of the most rugged terrain in the world.8 
The inaccessibility of much of the line meant that in many circumstances human energy was the 
only source of energy capable of weaving its way through the swamps, forests, and mountains 
that stood in its path. 
Despite being indispensable to the construction of the railroad, human labor was an 
unwieldy source of power. Workers engaged in leisure rather than labor, complained about the 
quality of food and drink, fell victim to the ravages of tropical diseases, or simply deserted in 
hopes of pursuing more lucrative endeavors. The central challenge in constructing the Panama 
Railroad was marshaling and deploying adequate stores of human energy. This is not to suggest 
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that human energy operated in a vacuum. Pile drivers helped the railroad overcome entropy and 
find stability as it made its way across swampy lowlands. An armada of steamships and sailboats 
carried the foodstuffs necessary to fuel human bodies and the shelter necessary to protect them 
from the dangers of the Panamanian environment. Ultimately the railroad itself would become 
essential to completing the line. The rapidity with which locomotive wheels could traverse the 
completed line made it the central artery upon which men and materials would reach and cross 
the Panamanian interior. Thus, the five years it took to construct the Panama railroad between 
1849-1855 were not defined by an energy revolution in which steam power overcame the natural 
environment of Panama, but rather an energy proliferation in which human muscle, supported by 
an increasingly complex network of steamships, sailboats, locomotives, pile drivers, and mules, 
enabled the creation of steam energy-based infrastructure in the Isthmian interior. The entangled 
network of energies that resulted contained the entropy of the Panamanian isthmus and provided 
the first reliable means of crossing the Isthmus, bringing American visions of rail-borne transit 
between the oceans one step closer to reality.  
Marshaling Manpower and Materials 
To say that George Muirson Totten, or as he was more commonly known “Colonel” 
Totten, was frustrated would be a colossal understatement. Writing from Cartagena, New 
Grenada in January of 1849, he watched as the discovery of gold in the Sierra Nevadas enticed a 
swarm of prospectors, panners, and prostitutes to descend on the Isthmus of Panama en route to 
California.9 The bulk of these prospective prospectors amounted to little more than paupers and 
panhandlers. By the time Totten wrote his letter, over three hundred passengers had arrived on 
                                                           





the Isthmus with hundreds more expected to follow. The US Mail Steamship Company and the 
Pacific Steamship Company were completely unprepared for this influx of travelers and Totten 
chastised the companies for double booking vessels, leaving passengers stranded on the Isthmus 
without adequate shelter. Compounding this logistical dilemma was the fact that few travelers 
brought the provisions necessary for the journey, and, furthermore, that comfortable shelter was 
hard to come by, leaving many to, “suffer the inclemency of the climate.” “What is to become of 
them?” lamented Totten, “Suffering there must be among them, perhaps death.”10 
The acquisition of California and Oregon and the discovery of mineral wealth in the 
region demanded action. Totten rightly discerned that the United States' new possessions would 
radically alter development and trade in the Pacific and believed that the railroad was crucial to 
that trade’s success. Having spent the bulk of his life working on railways and canals, Totten was 
uniquely qualified to understand the importance of expediting travel to and from the Pacific 
Coast. In 1831, at the age of twenty-two, Totten took a job as an engineer on the Delaware and 
Raritan Canal. For the next two decades, Totten established himself as a talented engineer on 
railroads and canals in Virginia, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina. Totten's major break came in 
1843 when he was appointed Engineer-in-Chief of the Canal of Digue, a waterway which would 
connect the Magdalena River with Cartagena.11 After seven years in Cartagena, the allure of 
constructing a railroad across Panama was enough to pull Totten away from the canal. “A year 
ago, I looked upon the result of this project as problematical,” Totten wrote of the railroad in 
January of 1849 before concluding, “I now consider it necessary.”12 Within a year Totten found 
himself in Panama, and shortly thereafter named Chief Engineer of railroad construction. 
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Totten’s good fortune was in many ways the result of the fact that he shared the vision of 
a group of New York magnates interested in expediting trade between the east and west coasts of 
the United States. Led by William Henry Aspinwall, a partner in the largest import-export firm 
in New York and the inspiration for naming the Caribbean terminus town the unlikely name of 
Aspinwall, these businessmen came together to create the Panama Railroad Company.13 The 
Company was founded in April of 1849, and in June of 1849 sold $1 million worth of stock to 
the public- although, due to low sales, the directors had to purchase half of the stock 
themselves.14 The financial concerns of the railroad now dealt with, Totten could begin his work 
in earnest. 
Totten’s earlier experiences led him to understand that his chief obstacle was the lack of 
adequate laborers. Prior to being named Chief Engineer of the Panama Railroad Totten expressed 
his concern that "From the magnitude of that work, foreign labor will be necessary. It will be 
impossible to find a sufficient number of natives (Totten’s term to refer to laborers from Panama 
and Colombia).”15 Labor recruitment proved a double-edged sword. Native laborers were sparse, 
but Totten felt compelled to “impress upon the company, the necessity of using all the native 
laborers that can be obtained, in preference to foreigners, who I do not think can stand the 
climate."16 While tinged by racially biased assumptions, Totten’s comments reflected one of the 
challenges of obtaining energy in Panama. Despite being relatively efficient, human labor still 
possesses limitations. Healthy adults are normally capable of maximizing their energy output at a 
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rate of roughly ten to twenty times their basal metabolic rate for short intervals.17 Individual 
performance varies from person to person, but most able-bodied men are capable of maximum 
exertions of roughly 1 to 1.5 kW.18 This level of activity is unsustainable, however, and over the 
course of a day most production falls in the realm of two times one’s BMR or roughly 130 to 180 
W. While Totten had no concept of basal metabolic rate, he was acutely aware of its 
consequence; more workers meant more work.  
The problem of obtaining adequate laborers was complex and affected by biases toward 
particular ethnicities. In 1853, as railroad construction entered its final phase, Totten outlined his 
personal preference for laborers. Among the best workers were the Irish and "natives," 
particularly those from Cartagena. Totten admitted that the Irish, "are not so efficient on the 
Isthmus as in cooler and healthier climates." However, he suggested that "for periods of four to 
six months, which is the term of their engagement, they perform a fair amount of work." These 
limitations didn't apply to native Cartagenians who Totten noted were, "as accustomed to the 
pick, shovel, and wheelbarrow, as are Irishmen,” and were also, “an elastic, hearty race, and in 
all respects the most efficient common laborers that can be employed on your work.” Both Irish 
and native laborers were far superior to the imported Chinese laborers who Totten noted “are at 
first feeble and inefficient.” And yet Totten was not above leveraging their comparatively 
ineffectual energy, suggesting that despite their shortcomings, “being steady workmen, 
temperate, and but little affected by the climate, as they become accustomed to the use of the 
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tools, and acquire strength from regular and wholesome food, they made useful workmen." 19 
Totten established a clear hierarchy of laborers in which “native” labor was superior, followed 
by Irish, and finally Chinese labor.  
Totten’s assumptions about the efficacy of his laborers suggested that his preferences, 
while certainly still reflective of contemporary racial biases, were also complicated by his 
experience in managing and deploying human energy. In essence, the factors Totten weighed 
reflected broader questions about the applicability of energy. Reliability, efficacy, ease of 
acquisition, and cost-effectiveness were qualities that were frequently applied to other sources of 
energy. Ultimately, Totten’s valuations were not only tied to racial assumptions, but also his 
personal assessment of each group’s capacity to do work.  
With these preferences in mind, Totten began the arduous process of filling labor rolls, a 
task complicated by the fact that employment on the railroad was not the only line of work 
available in Panama. The discovery of gold in California lured thousands of men and women 
across the Isthmus, creating a transportation bonanza. Many of the laborers who came to Panama 
had no intention of swinging machetes through dense jungles, instead, they directed their body's 
energy towards the booming network of bongo canoes and mule trains that were already reaping 
the benefits of the gold rush. These enterprising energy entrepreneurs used the Panama Railroad 
Company to secure passage to the Isthmus. Upon their arrival, they vanished into swamps and 
forests, making their way towards interior villages that facilitated transisthmian travel. What 
drove them to forsake the railroad? Put simply: money. The adventurers making their way to 
California were willing to pay exorbitant prices to speedily traverse the Isthmus. The desertion 
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problem grew so acute that Totten was forced to admit that, “We are not able to find labourers 
for our building and surveys at $1.12 per day, nor would $1.25 or $1.50 induce them to work for 
us with consistency."20 
Totten found himself faced with a predicament. How was he to control the laborers 
making their way into Panama? Initially, Totten attempted to use force to prevent desertions. 
When a group of laborers who had signed six-month contracts deserted in the fall of 1850, 
Totten sent one of his assistants to track them down and reached out to local authorities for 
assistance. Unfortunately for Totten his faith was poorly placed. The local alcalde sent a group of 
armed men to apprehend the deserters; however, when Totten’s agent arrived to gather the 
wayward workers, he found that they had been allowed to escape by the guards. The experience 
was so frustrating that Mr. Michel, the assistant sent to find the laborers, decided to leave the 
Isthmus shortly thereafter. An aggravated Totten was forced to concede that, "Under such 
circumstances, although I see some of our deserters around here, it appears to me useless to try to 
retake them."21  
Human energy proved far more challenging to control than coal or wood. For workers, 
the potential benefits of investing one’s energy in the transportation business far outweighed the 
rewards of laying track. Laborers were quick to recognize this and often directed their labor 
towards this more lucrative end. As a result, desertions plagued the railroad throughout its 
construction, sapping valuable stores of energy and hindering progress on the line. These 
individuals shrewdly used the transportation provided by the railroad company to fund their 
journey to Panama before abandoning their contracts and heading into the interior in search of 
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greener pastures. Totten had no illusions about the issue, writing in February of 1850, “We look 
to Cartagena and the neighboring provinces as our only resource for our laborers. There is no 
doubt that many of those we may bring here will desert us and enter the business of 
transportation upon the river and overland."22 Ultimately, the railroad company decided that the 
best course of action was to allow those lured west by the promise of gold to pay the railroad 
company to walk along the unfinished tracks. Additionally, they sought partnerships with 
existing transportation companies on the Isthmus, subsidizing potential competitors' expenses in 
hopes of driving the muscle-powered transportation network in Panama out of business.23 These 
aggressive policies indicated the lengths to which the railroad company was willing to go to 
ensure long-term, reliable access to human energy. Solving the energy crisis was paramount, 
even if it was done at great expense.  
Driving the muscle fueled transit network out of business alleviated some problems, but it 
wasn't just desertions that made human labor hard to manage and direct. Like all prime movers, 
human bodies needed a steady source of fuel. Unlike steam engines, human bodies also 
demanded a variety of vitamins and minerals. As a result, ensuring a steady and varied supply of 
food was essential. Foods including beef, pork, cod, cornmeal, and potatoes made their way into 
Panama, providing calories that could be metabolized by human bodies.24 The need for a steady 
supply of food emphasized connections between the Isthmus and the United States. Roughly 
every two weeks, ships made their way between Panama and New York, carrying rations of food 
and other essentials for construction work. Steamships tended to carry laborers and specie, while 
barks, schooners, and brigs- wind-powered vessels- were chartered to bring materials and 
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sustenance to the Isthmus.25 The impermeability of Panama and the lack of local energy in the 
region meant that it was easier to import energy into Panama rather than obtain it from local 
sources, a trend which defined energy regimes in the Transit Zone throughout its existence. The 
result was an intimately connected energy network which saw calories grown on American farms 
fed to laborers imported from around the Americas, Europe, and later Asia. The energy network 
in Panama then was a messy collection of overlapping energy sources from its very inception.  
The basic foodstuffs imported into Panama were supplemented by other items depending 
on the backgrounds of the workers in question. Because healthy and happy humans were so 
important, Totten had to provide not only an efficient source of fuel but also a palatable and 
culturally acceptable one. For his European and American workers, Totten made a point of 
obtaining pickles, a popular remedy for scurvy. Similarly, Totten requested 30 barrels of rice 
because "it is an article of prime consumption with the black laborers."26 This cultural 
predilection towards different sources of fuel separated human labor from mechanical labor. 
While different varieties of timber and qualities of coal yielded variable amounts of energy, the 
utilization of a particular fuel was a product of cost and accessibility rather than cultural 
proclivities. Steam engines seldom made their displeasure known at consuming Pennsylvanian 
rather than Welsh anthracite, but human laborers frequently directed their energy at protesting 
substandard grub.   
These challenges meant that work progressed slowly through the summer and fall of 
1850. This was not surprising. Totten had only arrived on the Isthmus earlier that year and had 
spent much of his time trying to obtain a reliable store of human energy. The Panamanian 
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climate also hindered progress. The variances in weather led Totten to admit that, “a day’s work 
is a very uncertain quantity.”27 Totten put these complications mildly. The wet season made 
work almost impossible, particularly in the swampy lands surrounding Limon Bay.28 At their 
most extreme, these conditions could actively work against the maintenance of human labor. In 
September of 1850 Totten wrote that five or six of his Irish laborers had deserted as they were, 
“not pleased at being placed to work in the water.”29 These concerns were well founded. The 
combination of heavy rains and inadequate shelter made tropical disease a constant companion to 
the laborers. At times these outbreaks grew so pronounced that work on the railroad ceased 
altogether.  
To deal with these challenges, the company grew increasingly aggressive in its attempts 
to provide Totten with the necessary manpower to create the railroad. A bevy of energy 
speculators saw the potential financial windfall that came from providing manpower to the 
Panamanian railroad. The financial incentives behind the trade of human energy have long been 
acknowledged by historians of slavery, and yet it is worth noting that energy tycoons often 
peddled their wares in other coerced labor markets as well. These manpower magnates signed 
contracts with the Railroad Company, promising to recruit laborers throughout the United States 
before transporting them to the isthmus. Successfully recruiting human energy could provide 
immense financial benefits. E.D. Baker signed a contract with the Company in July of 1850 
stipulating that he would take down to the Isthmus roughly one thousand men, the bulk of whom 
were engineers and mechanics, on one-hundred-day contracts. In return, the company would pay 
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Baker five-thousand dollars for the first fifty days of work and ten-thousand dollars of company 
stock at the conclusion of the hundred days.30  
A few months later, the Company signed a contract with a Mr. Armstrong to ship twenty 
to thirty Jamaican laborers to the Isthmus so that “an early trial may be made of the value of their 
labor.” Baker, Armstrong, and other middlemen like them capitalized on the energy needs of the 
railroad company by procuring, stockpiling, and distributing energy, reaping a tremendous profit 
as a result. Their business interests suggested that long before coal or oil bonanzas swept through 
the United States a vibrant energy market already existed, one driven not by fossil fuels but 
instead by human muscles. 
Despite these ambitious attempts to provide the energy necessary to construct the 
railroad, progress remained elusive throughout the wet season of 1850, and optimism that the 
coming dry season heralded greater productivity proved misplaced. Diseases and deluges grew 
more manageable during the dry season, but transportation into the interior grew increasingly 
problematic. Totten frequently advocated for the creation of a dirt road along the proposed 
railway to ease the transportation of materials.31 The initial period of construction saw such 
severe labor shortages that it was impossible to bring this plan to fruition. Additionally, as the 
company staged much of its work from the island of Manzanilla it still had to cross Limon Bay 
to reach the mainland. The answer to both challenges lay in the Chagres River. The Chagres was 
the largest river along the railroad line and had served as a major line of transportation across the 
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Isthmus for centuries. The company began employing steamers to take advantage of the minimal 
friction presented by the river and penetrate the Panamanian interior.32  
While in principle this would overcome many of the challenges presented by the 
landscape, it proved far from easy in practice. As the rivers fell in the dry season, the bulky 
steamships drew too much of a draft to make their way upriver.33 The combination of difficult 
access to the interior during the dry season and poor working conditions during the wet season 
led to the adoption of a cyclical labor schedule in Panama where the wet season would be used to 
marshal manpower and materials in Panama which could then be brought to bear on the work 
during the dry season. This was not a rigidly followed cycle, and often the railroad saw a more 
fluid application of human energy, however, the dry season was clearly understood as a period 
when work could be more easily accomplished if the necessary materials were available.  
Ultimately the first year of construction made little headway. Distracted by attempts to 
obtain human labor, Totten brought little of this energy to bear on the Panamanian environment. 
Despite this, as 1850 concluded, Totten and the company were optimistic that their actions had 
not been in vain. Gradually men and materials made their way into Panama and soon 
construction would commence in earnest. Or at least that was the hope. 
Reaching the Chagres 
 As the rainy season gave way to the dry season in late 1850 a sense of optimism settled 
over the line. In New York, company President John Stephens authorized the purchase of a 
second-hand locomotive to aid in the construction.34 Meanwhile, on the Isthmus, Totten took 
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steps to try to get roughly 600 men to the line by November, and, while desertions still plagued 
him, he finally seemed to be making headway in concentrating a store of human energy on the 
Isthmus. In addition, a steam pile driver arrived to help create a fixed line through the swamps 
surrounding Limon bay.35 Unfortunately for Totten, this process proved to be as smooth as the 
vexing landscape he was trying to cross. Once again it was not concerns over coal or steam 
energy that complicated construction, but rather the difficulties of controlling and deploying 
human energy.  
Caffeine addicts are quick to make their displeasure known if they fail to get their hands 
on a decent cup of coffee. The Irish laborers on the Panama railroad were no exception. Over the 
winter of 1850, a group of them decided not to work "on account of bad coffee and bad bread."36 
It is telling that these men were more outraged by the blasphemy of a bad brew than by the 
maladies of malaria and yellow fever. While quality coffee may not have been percolating on the 
Isthmus, discontent most certainly was. The strikers' frustration with the railroad's substandard 
joe was so pronounced that they threatened to use force to rectify the situation if necessary. Dr. 
Henry, the foreman overseeing the disgruntled and undercaffeinated rebels, warned railroad 
administrators to "look out for their own safety as he (Henry) would not prevent his men from 
coming over and redressing their own grievances."37 Clearly both sides struggled to find 
common grounds. Totten felt compelled to chastise the United States’ lack of preparation for 
such a crisis, writing, "I certainly think our government negligent by not having an armed vessel 
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on this coast,” before reassuring the Board of Directors that “I do not fear the revolvers or bowie 
knives of Dr. Henry's men."38  
While the brewing revolution on the Isthmus never boiled over, it exemplified the 
challenges faced by administrators in trying to control laborers. Underlying questions of caffeine 
were questions of control, particularly between Totten and Henry. Henry asserted that Totten 
lacked the authority to direct his men and their energy, while Totten countered that Henry was 
“not capable of managing his men, but consults with and is controlled by them.”39 While the 
general laborers’ disquiet may have been fueled by concerns over coffee, Totten and Henry 
grounded their conflict in questions over who had the authority to direct human energy, and the 
efficacy with which they deployed that energy. Ultimately, in the eyes of the railroad’s directors, 
primacy lay with the man capable of maximizing the efficiency of laborers and so Totten was 
given power over Henry and his men, a decision which clearly implied that fomenting an energy 
crisis on the Isthmus was an egregious sin that bore serious repercussions.40 
It's also likely that the climactic conditions of Panama exacerbated the labor conflict. Of 
the 150 men who followed Dr. Henry, Totten estimated that roughly 100 were laid low by 
diseases, and eight eventually died. Their suffering evoked little sympathy from Totten who 
suggested “if they had worked more and complained less” they may have been able to clear 
forests and swamps, erect shelters, and better protect themselves from the environment. This 
critique was somewhat misdirected however as, by January of 1851, complaints about the lack of 
quinine were springing up across the Isthmus.41 Indeed, Totten’s initial response to the strike was 
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not providing better quality food to the men, but instead obtaining mosquito nets for the men.42 
Regardless of where the fault lay on the matter the outcome was clear, and, by February, Dr. 
Henry and all of his laborers either voluntarily left the work or been asked to leave with the 
exception of a few men."43  
The situation with Dr. Henry at an end and the dry season now arriving, 1851 presented 
Totten with the opportunity to finally make headway on the line. Totten's initial goal for the dry 
season of 1851 was to complete the line between Navy Bay (Limon Bay) and Gorgona, a town 
on the Chagres River more than halfway across the Isthmus. Totten pursued this ambitious 
objective through the sequential construction of the line. Surveyors first located the line, then 
general laborers cleared and graded it. If necessary, pile drivers next provided cribbing for 
landfill and the creation of solid ground. Finally, the track itself was laid and the line progressed 
north to south through the interior.44 While perhaps overly ambitious, the plan seemed feasible to 
Totten. By February of 1851, he had 800 men on the road, expected an additional 400 to arrive 
presently, and 300 to trickle in over the coming months. With the help of this substantial influx 
of human energy, Totten was hopeful that the line to Gorgona could be completed by July, prior 
to the worst deluges of the wet season.45  
Totten's spirits were further bolstered by the promise of the line's newly arrived steam 
fueled labor. In November of 1850, the company contracted with George Sellers, a renowned 
locomotive engineer, to create three locomotives in Cincinnati and ship them from there to 
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Panama, the first to be transported to Aspinwall, by June of 1851 and the other two the following 
month.46 In order to unleash the potential of the locomotives, it was imperative that headway be 
made on the line. Anticipating this boom, the company purchased 10,500 yellow pine piles and 
424,000 board feet of yellow pine from J.T. Gilchrist’s lumberyard in Bangor, Maine and 1200 
tons of iron from Caron Brothers & Co. of London. These materials were carried to Panama by 
privately chartered schooners and allowed construction of the line to begin in earnest.47 Totten 
was optimistic that with the aid of another steam fueled component of his diversifying energy 
reserves, the piledriver, he could have the line ready for the locomotives. 
A series of challenges soon proved Totten’s faith misguided. Chief among these obstacles 
was a lack of foresight regarding the complications that accompanied Totten’s increasing 
reliance on the pile drivers. The fluidity of the Isthmian landscape meant that it was next to 
impossible to find terrain capable of supporting the combined weight of track and train without 
shifting. To overcome the instability of the Panamanian environment, piles were driven deep into 
the swampy soils that flanked the Chagres in hopes of striking solid ground. This was a more 
challenging process than it seemed. Initially, the railroad used twenty-four-foot piles, but these 
proved too short and thirty-foot piles soon became the norm.48 These piles formed an 
exoskeleton of sorts that was filled with soil and packed down until it was dense enough to lay 
track across. The lynchpin of this whole plan was the pile driver, a machine Totten had absolute 
faith in. In February of 1851, he bragged that he had five pile drivers on the road, each of which 
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could lay a mile of track a month.49 At this pace, construction could average roughly five miles 
of track a month, a clip that put them well on their way to reaching Gorgona by July. 
Unfortunately, Gorgona remained out of reach. While the pile drivers had the potential to 
work at such breakneck speeds, such a pace was seldom realized. Totten failed to anticipate that 
by increasing the complexity of his energy regime he had simultaneously unleashed the potential 
for new challenges. The heavy rains and shifting soils of the Isthmus proved as conducive to 
machine labor as they had to human labor and soon mechanical issues crippled the promise of 
reaching Gorgona. In one instance, a second-hand machine died after driving only 76 piles.50 
Three weeks later a replacement hammer for another piledriver couldn’t be lifted, weighing 2000 
pounds rather than the machine's maximum of 1500 pounds. To make matters worse, the lack of 
freshwater near Manzanilla meant that alterations had to be made to the steam engines' boilers to 
allow them to run on salt water.51   
The mechanical problems with the pile drivers pointed to another more serious issue that 
accompanied the diversification of the Isthmian energy regime. These finicky machines required 
a corps of engineers and mechanics to operate and maintain them, and workers of such quality 
were in short supply. As soon as the machines arrived on the Isthmus, Totten searched for 
suitable workers, admitting, “we have only one road pile engine at work at Navy Bay from the 
want of engineers to manage the other.”52 The issues accompanying the arrival of the steam 
engines pointed to broader shifts in the Panamanian energy regime and a reorientation of the 
importance of human labor. 
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The productivity of steam engines outpaced even the most capable laborers. The sheer 
force exerted by the pile drivers proved as much. And yet actualizing this power relied on a new 
type of human energy, one defined not by the amount of work that it could do, but rather by the 
specialized type of work that it could do. As steam began to augment human energy in the 
Isthmus it meant that less human energy was required to complete a singular task, however, the 
complexities of directing steam energy required increasingly specialized mechanics and 
engineers capable of harnessing steam power and ensuring its reliability. These specialized 
laborers became essential to railroad construction, and Totten went to great lengths to obtain 
their services. The addition of steam energy to the Isthmus ultimately created an "energy 
hierarchy," a stratification of power and privilege directly tied to one's capacity to direct 
powerful sources of energy. During railroad construction, these hierarchies were certainly 
present but remained amorphous. Track layers, masons, and quarrymen, positions that gradually 
lost their significance in the coming decades, were still of tremendous value to Totten as 
mechanical labor lacked enough precision for these tasks. As humans developed more 
sophisticated prime movers and harnessed more powerful energies, they inadvertently created 
increasingly rigid energy hierarchies to ensure energy’s effective deployment. The presence, or 
lack thereof, of engineers to direct the first manifestations of steam energy on the Isthmus was a 
testament to complexities that arose from a diversifying energy network. 
The lack of engineers and the mechanical issues impacting the pile drivers led to work 
progressing slowly during the first few months of the dry season of 1851. As February gave way 
to March, enough engineers made their way to the Isthmus to render the pile drivers effective. 
The engineers also maintained the steamships that carried supplies up the Chagres. These 




“We have got a good start, and with a fair supply of laborers, can now make more progress in 
one month than we have done in the last two.”53 The time had finally come to begin laying track. 
As with the adoption of pile drivers, the process of laying track required the acquisition 
of new laborers. Like the engineers, track layers were valuable not so much for the quantity of 
energy they could direct at the work, but rather their precise application of energy towards 
skilled ends. The ranks of the track layers were filled with a variety of carpenters including ship 
carpenters, bridge builders, and millwrights. Interestingly, Totten attempted to avoid house 
carpenters who he believed “are of little use.”54 In addition to manpower, Totten also tried to 
import more animal labor in the form of mules. Totten believed the mules were indispensable for 
the process of track laying, and that, for the purpose of moving materials through otherwise 
impassable terrain "one mule will count equal to three men."55  
As late as the wet season of 1850, energy on the railroad had been almost entirely human 
in nature excepting the ships that carried materials to the Isthmus, and almost entirely unskilled 
apart from Totten and his assistants. By early 1851, the small unskilled force on the railroad had 
grown exponentially and variety of other prime movers had joined them. Five pile drivers added 
steam energy to the increasingly diverse energy network, and skilled laborers such as engineers, 
surveyors, and track layers now directed their energy towards precise tasks, allowing other 
sources of energy to work unimpeded. Meanwhile, ocean-going steamships and sailboats 
continued to provide material support from American ports while newly deployed river 
steamships used the Charges (as best they could) to gain access to the Panamanian interior. In 
those regions inaccessible to boats, a corps of muleteers provided overland transit. The once 
                                                           
53 Totten to Stephens, 24 February 1851. 





homogenous energy network in Panama had grown, and so too had its capacity to reshape 
Isthmian landscapes. 
The increasing potential of energy on the Isthmus was not without its drawbacks. 
Increasingly complex issues accompanied the increasing complexity of the labor force. By June 
of 1851, Totten was content with the number of general laborers, mechanics, engineers, and 
surveyors on the work, but was having difficulty obtaining the necessary track layers. Many of 
the men who had agreed to go to Panama had lied about their credentials and lacked experience, 
leading Totten to deem them "good for nothing."56 For qualified track layers, disease remained 
problematic, limiting their efficacy as sources of human energy. Even when tropical diseases 
declined over the dry season, the specter of pestilence haunted the Isthmus. Its impacts were felt 
as far away as New York where it hindered labor recruitment. In one instance, twenty-five well-
regarded ship carpenters were on their way to the Panama Railroad Company offices to apply for 
employment when an anonymous interloper cut them off and proceeded to terrify them with tales 
of Isthmian hazards. All twenty-five men quickly rethought their decision and concluded that 
Panama simply wasn't worth the risk. The situation was so dire that when Totten sent an assistant 
to New York to recruit forty track layers he requested divine intervention. "God held him in his 
mission…" wrote Totten, "We are working at an awful disadvantage for the want of this craft."57 
Work progressed inconsistently. Stretches of great productivity were accompanied by 
periods when work halted altogether. Mechanical issues with the engines of pile drivers, 
locomotives, and steamships meant that talented engineers were constantly in demand. As the 
summer of 1851 progressed, the pile drivers became increasingly troublesome. The scow pile 
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driver at Mindee was "a snail," and another pile driver had become so problematic that Totten 
simply did away with it, characterizing “all machines of the kind on dry land perfect nuisances- 
inventions to retard the work."58 The one exception to these piling problems, the pile driver at 
Gatun, was also removed from service after a flood damaged the piles crossing the Gatun River. 
These mechanical woes were accompanied by rampant sickness as the wet season returned. One 
of Totten’s foremen had to return home because of a case of dysentery and another poor laborer, 
one Mr. Niles, was in even worse shape, his leg having been amputated after it was crushed in an 
accident. As if to add insult to injury, Niles was then struck by a nasty case of lock-jaw before 
returning home.59 Totten was particularly concerned by the high rate of sickness among his 
native force. By August of 1851, the situation was dire. Illness swept through the ranks, resulting 
in a few deaths and the departure of fifty of his native laborers, dropping their numbers to around 
500.60 
The result was a state of flux along the line as the wet season concluded. Surveying, 
clearing, and grading, work that could be done primarily with human and animal energy, nearly 
reached Totten’s intended target of Gorgona and yet the combination of disease and mechanical 
issues prevented piling and tracklaying from making any progress. Totten grew increasingly 
concerned as these issues progressed, feeling despair over the state of chaos on the line, and 
writing to President John Stephens: 
You must not think strange of my change of plans. This country does not admit of 
fixed plans. One is obliged to adapt himself to circumstances. Sickness is 
constantly breaking in upon one's intentions and thwarting all his best endeavors. 
I believe there are more causes for discouragement here than on any other work in 
the world. Sometimes I almost despair- and nothing but my most sanguine 
temperament keeps up my spirit. If I do not communicate these feelings to you it 
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is because I know that it would be of no use and therefore, I always try to pass on 
good appearances.61 
 
Disease, environment, and the unpredictability of mechanical energy had pushed Totten nearly to 
the breaking point. The increasing complexity of the energy network in Panama had allowed for 
some progress to be made, but the issues that arose from it seemed insurmountable. It was at this 
moment, when it appeared the work might be doomed to fail, that Totten realized there may be a 
solution to his woes. He was simply going to make them someone else’s. 
Contractors and River Crossings 
 Totten's despair in August did not lead him to abandon the work. Indeed, over the next 
few weeks his resolve seemed hardened. By the beginning of September 1851, Totten was 
confident that he could open the line to Gatun by the end of the year if not sooner.62 Despite 
continued challenges Totten reached his goal in December of 1851 and the railroad began service 
over the first seven miles of track between Manzanilla and Gatun.63 While this section 
represented only a fraction of what was to come, the opening of the line to passengers ushered in 
a new stage in railroad construction on the Isthmus, suggesting that, despite all the difficulties 
presented by the Panamanian environment, rail-borne transit was a viable means of expediting 
transit between the oceans.  
 The creation of the first section of track aided the work immeasurably. In the dry season 
of 1852, Totten began employing the locomotive Pottsville, a second-hand locomotive purchased 
from the Pennsylvania and Reading Railroad Company, to pull dirt cars between Gatun and 
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Manzanilla.64 Again, Totten found that utilizing more complex forms of energy came at a cost. 
The Pottsville fell out of commission when an engineman burned out the engine, rendering it 
useless. As had been the case with the adoption of pile drivers Totten now had to find laborers 
capable of managing the locomotive. He told the company, "We are exceedingly in want of one 
or two good locomotive engineers, who are at the same time good machinists and can repair their 
engines. For want of which men the Pottsville is now laid up, when her services are daily 
required."65  
 Even as these hardships complicated the work, Totten remained enthralled by the 
potential of this steam fueled labor force and attempted to expand it as rapidly as possible. The 
arrival of a skilled machinist, Mr. George Nichols, in January of 1852 further accelerated this 
process, and upon Nichols’ arrival Totten asked for “two Sellers locomotives and engineers to 
run them,” accompanied by anywhere from fifteen to thirty dirt cars of the highest quality.66 In 
response the company tested out the three Sellers locomotives it had previously purchased, 
preparing them for service in Panama, and contracted out the construction of thirty Boston 
Rocker dumping cars to carry dirt across the line.67 These steam engines sped up the progress of 
construction during the dry season of 1852, allowing laborers to carry materials more easily 
between Manzanilla and their forward stations along the line. While human labor remained 
paramount in Panama, mechanical labor played an increasingly important role. 
Despite these successes, the problems of the fall of 1851 remained in Totten’s mind and 
he began insisting with increasing regularity that the Board explore the potential of contracting 
                                                           
64 Speis, Minutes of the Executive Committee, 9 August 1851, Executive Minutes, USNA, RG 185, Vol. 1. 
65 Totten to Speis, 21 November 1851, Totten Letters, USNA, RG 185, Vol. 1. 
66 Totten to Speis, 18 January 1852, Totten Letters, USNA, RG 185, Vol. 1. 
67 Speis, “Minutes of the Executive Committee, 31 December 1851”, Executive Minutes, USNA, RG 185, Vol. 1; 




out some, if not all, of the remaining work.68 After a period of reluctance, the Board began 
seeking contracts in December of 1851. Initially, contracts covered specific tasks, such as the 
erection of a bridge over the Chagres River, but as time went on the Board warmed to the idea of 
contracting out the entirety of the remaining work. 69 Totten was making headway by the spring 
of 1852, but construction was far slower and more expensive than initial estimates suggested. In 
response, in April, the Board of Directors granted the executive committee the authority to 
contract out the Pacific half of the road from the Chagres River crossing to the Pacific terminus 
at Panama City.70  
While the Board examined contracts in New York, Totten drew closer to the Chagres. By 
July of 1852, his goal was in sight as the line finally reached Barbacoas, the point at which the 
line crossed the river.71 This was not to say that the work was completed. The entropy unleashed 
by heavily falling rains undid much of the energy laborers invested in reshaping the landscape. A 
series of deluges in May of 1852 proved particularly disastrous. For weeks laborers worked 
feverishly to prevent the newly laid track from shifting as rains bombarded the line. Despite their 
best efforts, several train cars were thrown off the tracks on May 24th, leaving nearly 400 
passengers trapped at Frijoles station overnight.72 The situation didn’t result in any major injuries 
or damages but served as a sobering reminder of the Panamanian environment’s entropic 
proclivities. The extension of the line placed additional burdens on Totten’s already taxed labor 
force, requiring a corps of track gangs to maintain set rail lines. At times these small track gangs 
could not provide enough energy to overcome Panamanian entropy. After one particularly 
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devastating storm Totten was forced to reassign some of the laborers from the excavation corps 
to provide the energy necessary to right the tracks. This added another layer of complexity to the 
task of managing Isthmian energy stores and Totten requested “5 good repair gang foremen and 
60 good track layers” to ensure that he had the energy on hand to keep the existing line stable.73  
As Totten approached his objective so too did the Board approach theirs. At a meeting on 
May 7th, the Executive Committee met with Miner Story to go over the details of his proposal. 
After a month of negotiations and haggling, both sides agreed to terms and Story made his way 
down to Panama to commence the work.74 Similar to Totten, Story’s previous experience made 
him well qualified for the task of completing the railroad. A career contractor and entrepreneur, 
Story made a name for himself working for the Portland and Montreal Railroad.75 The Board 
placed faith in Story's previous experience; however, ominous signs accompanied the execution 
of the contract. Negotiations were almost derailed when the contract prepared by Story was 
compared to that prepared by the Board. The two contracts were "found to be different in form 
and arrangement so much as to be impracticable."76 The two parties eventually found common 
ground, but the disagreement foreshadowed a series of contractual conflicts that undermined 
work on the Isthmus for over a year.  
To fulfill the terms of his contract and complete the entirety of the line between 
Barbacoas and Panama, Story needed to overcome the chief obstacle lying in his path, the 
Chagres. Totten had long contemplated the best way to bridge the river, and while he had yet to 
settle on a final design, he knew a tremendous labor force was required to erect the bridge. 
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Totten was happy to wash his hands of the challenge of crossing the Chagres in the summer of 
1852, but he too seemed uneasy about the way Story approached the task, noting that the 
contractor had little idea of where he was going to look for laborers.77 Totten’s concerns were 
soon forgotten amongst his other responsibilities. While he would not be directly overseeing 
construction of the track, Totten retained his post as Chief Engineer and focused on improving 
the existing line and preparing the Pacific terminus at Panama City. 
Totten first directed his efforts towards the improvement of the Cruces Road, a mule road 
which connected the Chagres with Panama City. The Cruces had played an essential role in 
Panamanian transit networks for centuries, having been used to transport silver across the 
Isthmus since the 16th century. By 1852 the road was in a state of disrepair, a fact brought to light 
by a disastrous attempt to carry American soldiers across Panama. In July of 1852, the troops 
unloaded at the Atlantic Terminus and passed over the rail line without difficulty. They were 
supposed to be met by a muleteer at Barbacoas who would carry them the rest of the way to 
Panama City, however, the man fell ill and when the troops arrived there was no one to guide 
them to their destination. The results were disastrous. By the time replacement mules arrived 
many of the soldiers had been struck by cholera, several of them dying as a result.78 The 
suffering of the soldiers pointed to the necessity of establishing a safe, reliable mule service over 
the line until the railroad was complete. 
It was not only humanitarian concerns that dictated improvements to the Cruces Road. 
The Railroad Company also sought to transport mail over the Isthmus and recognized that it was 
reliant on the mule road to do so until railroad construction was complete. Frequent 
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conversations with steamship companies in the United States and England suggested that the 
Board was convinced of the railroad’s potential not only as a conveyor of people, but also of 
parcels, packages, and posts.79 Both Totten and the Board were acutely aware of the importance 
of reliable mule transit and so Totten spent much of the summer of 1852 improving the mule 
road.  
Renovation of the Cruces became increasingly necessary by the fall of 1852. Freight 
increased dramatically on the rail line after it was opened to Barbacoas in the summer of 1852. A 
single trip in August saw over six-hundred express packages cross the Isthmus along with other 
freight. The repairs to the Cruces road progressed slowly and it was incapable of adequately 
handling such a volume of packages. A month earlier, a group of packages sat in Cruces for eight 
days waiting to be carried over the mule line. In another instance, parcels accompanied by a 
representative of the railroad arrived in Cruces to find no mules waiting for them. The unlucky 
representative had to carry the packages over the road piece by piece on a limited supply of 
mules, a process taking four days.80 It was ironic that the completion of the railroad to Barbacoas 
exacerbated rather than diminished the need for animal labor.  
The difficulties with the mule road paled in comparison with the growing tensions 
between Story and the company. Story initially seemed to be a good fit, but work had ground to a 
halt by December of 1852. Story’s continued inability to obtain and maintain adequate stores of 
human energy particularly concerned Totten. “A large number of Mr. Story’s men have deserted- 
both white men and Natives,” Totten reported in October of 1852.81 He felt compelled to point 
out that "the season has now arrived when that line should be covered with laborers. Not less 
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than 6000 men should be upon it in the month of January, where there will not be 1000."82 In his 
next letter to William Young, the sitting President of the Company, Totten was even more blunt, 
writing, " It does not appear to me that Mr. Story has an adequate idea of the amount of work 
before him. He should have a force of 4000 daily laborers which will require a force of 6000 
men on the work and recruits by every steamer to keep up the supply. The season for work is at 
hand and should be taken advantage of."83 It was not Story’s mechanical or engineering abilities 
that Totten questioned, but rather his ability to obtain and marshal the stores of human energy 
necessary for the work. Totten, having by this point spent years adapting to the unique energy 
needs of Panama, understood what Story failed to; in Panama the chief determinant of success 
was enough human labor to overcome the constraints of the Isthmian environment. 
 By February of 1853, the Board was openly criticizing Story’s slow progress.84 Concerns 
began to emerge that he was no longer actually fulfilling his contractual obligations. The 
Executive Committee remarked, "It is of course evident that the part of our contract with Mr. 
Story providing for the road being ready for the engine to run to Gorgona by the 1st February 
will not be complied with.”85 Totten echoed the Board's frustrations with Story's slow progress, 
writing, "I am greatly disappointed in the progress that has been made as well as in the prospects 
for the future."86  
The flood of April 7th, 1853 made manifest the Board’s and Totten’s frustrations with 
Story. Seasonal flooding was common to Panama during the wet season and regularly derailed 
progress on the line. These floods, or “freshets” as they were called, served as a testament to 
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entropy’s radical capacity to sow disorder in human organized landscapes. Small freshets 
plagued the work from its inception, shifting embankments, destroying piles, and hindering 
construction as the line made its way from Manzanilla to Barbacoas. Fortunately, these freshets 
had been on smaller rivers such as the Mindee and Gatun.87 While still dangerous, the smaller 
size of these rivers and the fact that less energy and material had been invested in crossing them 
tempered their capacity for destruction. The same could not be said of the freshet of April 7th. 
The widest and strongest river along the line, the Chagres could make or break railway 
construction. Even before arriving in Panama, Totten was acutely aware of this fact.88 The bridge 
crossing it needed to be several hundred feet in length and exceptionally sturdy to deal with the 
floods that occurred during the wet season. To withstand the energy of the freshets, engineers 
proposed a foundation of stone masonry and wooden piles. As an additional precaution against 
nature's energy, the bridge was to be erected during the dry season. Story’s initial contract 
stipulated that the bridge was to be finished by February 1st, 1853, yet by that date it was only a 
quarter complete.89 The work continued to move slowly over the next several months. Story’s 
inability to obtain adequate stores of human energy was acutely felt in the masonry corps, and 
between January and March, Totten’s requests for quarrymen, masons, and carpenters grew 
almost incessant.90 These shortages were not entirely Story’s fault- a severe bout of sickness 
among the masons prevented them from bringing their skills to bear on the work. Yet ultimately, 
as the wet season approached, the bridge remained incomplete. 
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In the weeks leading up to the disaster, Totten grew increasingly optimistic about the 
completion of the bridge. By late March construction seemed to be going well despite the 
numerous setbacks and labor shortages that had hampered its completion. In a letter to William 
Young on March 30th Totten noted that the first span was almost completed as the track laying 
and advanced masonry neared completion. Totten suggested “These are all matters worthy of 
particular notice the remainder of the work being simply grading.”91 Totten's optimism proved 
short-lived. The freshet heralded the arrival of the rainy season in spectacular fashion. Rushing 
waters carried away the nearly completed first span of the bridge as well as temporary 
scaffolding and structures meant to support the second and third spans. The flood was so 
powerful that it washed away the gravel bed of part of the river. Construction on the bridge 
needed to start from scratch, the force of the rushing waters having entirely destroyed the 
structures bridging the river.92   
The loss of the bridge brought the tensions between Story, Totten, and the Board to the 
breaking point. Culpability for the natural disaster, however, was far from obvious. Story felt that 
the Company should be liable for paying for the damages as they were outside of his control. 
Totten and the Company saw the matter differently and suggested that Story had broken the 
terms of his contract months earlier when he failed to complete the bridge and sections of track 
by the dates outlined therein.93 While valid criticism, Totten had also missed several deadlines 
during his tenure leading construction without any punitive action. It was more likely that the 
                                                           
91 Totten to Young, 30 March 1853, Totten Letters, USNA, RG 185, Vol. 1. 
92 Totten to Young, 11 April 1853, Totten Letters, USNA, RG, 185, Vol. 1; Totten to Young, 17 April 1853, from 
Totten Letters, USNA, RG 185, Vol. 1. 




destruction of the bridge provided a justification for the Company to act on their previous 
concerns about Story’s slow progress and lack of labor recruitment.  
The termination of Story’s contract lingered on well into the summer, but the freshet of 
April doomed Story the moment it happened.94 However, Story's most intolerable folly in the 
eyes of his employers was not the loss of the Chagres Bridge, but rather his inability to maintain 
enough energy to alter the Panamanian environment. Disease, landscape, entropy, and desertion: 
the four horsemen of the energy apocalypse in Panama, certainly deserved much of the 
responsibility for Story’s ineffectiveness. However, whereas Totten tried to overcome these 
obstacles by increasing his available energy sources, be they human, animal, or mechanical, 
Story, at least in the eyes of the Railroad Company, looked on passively as his workers trickled 
away from the line. By the time of the April flood Story had only 811 men left on the work.95  
The Board acknowledged this issue, and, in an ultimatum delivered to Story in June of 1853, 
they suggested “that unless (Mr. Story and his legal representative, Mr. Law) proceed 
immediately with more energy and by a greatly increased force on the line of the road, that the 
company will find it necessary to take the work out of their hands and assume the completion of 
it on their own account.”96 Perhaps the most cutting criticism of Story came from Totten who 
suggested that Story himself was the root of the problem, writing, “the objection of the labourers 
appears to be to the treatment of the contractor, more than to the company or the climate.”97 
Story’s failure was not the result of the natural realities of Panama, but rather his inability to 
recruit and maintain an effective store of human energy. The result was a complete inability to 
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contain Panamanian entropy and the erasure of considerable investments of energy. Totten, once 
again in control of the work, quickly learned from Story’s failures and took aggressive steps to 
avoid them. 
The End of the Line 
 Story’s failure initiated the final period of railroad construction. Story may have been the 
victim of poor circumstance, but his incompetence served as a lesson to Totten to redouble his 
own recruitment and retention efforts as he prepared to cross the Chagres and complete the line 
to Panama City. This period still possessed difficulties, particularly in relation to the adoption of 
Chinese laborers, but it was the smoothest period of railroad construction. The significant 
portions of the line already completed made it far easier to get materials into the Panamanian 
interior, and Totten and the Board’s aggressive labor recruitment paid dividends as thousands of 
laborers made their way to Panama. A new era of Isthmian transit was on the horizon. 
Construction of the line progressed slowly over the summer of 1853. Story’s contract was 
not terminated until August, leading to substantial confusion over whether Totten or Story was in 
control. Despite this, Totten focused on preparing the Atlantic terminus of the line: Aspinwall. 
Located on Manzanilla Island, Aspinwall became the headquarters for many of the railroad's 
operations as well as the point of departure for Atlantic steamers. As a result, the quality of the 
city directly correlated with the efficacy of pan-isthmian transit. Totten improved the city over 
the summer of 1853, constructing wharves, a machine shop, and buildings for several other 
auxiliary services.98 Simultaneously, he maintained track between Aspinwall and Barbacoas, 
filling cribbing and reinforcing embankments to prepare the line for the rains of the wet season.  
                                                           




In addition to these physical improvements, Totten again filled out the labor rolls in 
anticipation of the coming dry season. While Story was still nominally in charge of railroad 
construction at the end of May, Totten began encouraging the Railroad Company to send agents 
to recruit laborers. Totten was particularly concerned by the fact that the bulk of Story’s white 
labor force finished their labor contracts by July of 1853. “What are the prospects for a force 
hereafter?” he worried, “This is a question to which I must turn the attention of the board.”99 
Recognizing Story’s failures, the Board heeded Totten’s warnings. They explored the potential 
of recruiting laborers from Ireland, Jamaica, and China, hoping that proactive action would 
generate a substantial labor pool in time for the dry season.100 In July of 1853, they sent Francis 
Speis to England to obtain laborers and directed Henry Coit and George Lamar, fellow board 
members, to contract for Chinese workers.101 These laborers were essential to the completion of 
the road and Totten was keenly aware of this, noting, “The time requisition for constructing this 
division must, of course, depend upon the amount of labor which can be thrown upon it."102 By 
1853, Totten fully recognized and accepted that the best way to reshape the Panamanian 
environment and contain entropy was by maximizing his available stores of human energy and 
hurling as much of it as possible at Panamanian landscapes. 
In August 1853, Story left the Isthmus, leaving Totten once again the sole source of 
authority along the railroad. Totten predicted that with enough laborers he could complete the 
line by August of 1854. Calculating that Story had completed roughly eight miles of road with 
no more than 900 men, Totten believed that he required a force of roughly 5000. By November 
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of 1853, his force was already considerably larger than Story's had been, consisting of roughly 
1200 Chinese and Jamaican laborers and 390 white men. He expected to receive roughly 2000 
men from Cartagena in January 1854, with 500 more to follow in addition to roughly 1700 
Chinese laborers and 1000 Irish laborers expected to arrive in early 1854. If all went well, this 
would yield a labor pool of roughly 6790 men.103  
While he waited for more laborers to arrive, Totten directed the laborers he did have at 
his disposal to a series of tasks along the road. Among the most pressing issues was the 
continued improvement of the Cruces Road. By this point the Cruces was in such bad shape that 
it was harming the mules themselves. An exasperated Totten wrote, “Not a train of mules- 
treasure, mails, or any other- goes over it without a large number of them breaking down. The 
wonder is that they make the trips as well as they do.”104 While animal energy was more 
geographically liberated than steam energy, it could not contend with the poor state of the road. 
The problem became so pronounced that traversing the length of the road took 39 hours in the 
dry season and up to 57 hours during the wet season.105 In August, the Railroad Company struck 
a deal with the Pacific Mail and US Mail Companies in which each party paid one-third of the 
expenses to repair the road. The companies were natural allies in this venture, and so the 
Railroad Company authorized Totten to spend up to $50,000 dollars on the improvement of the 
road. 106 This investment paid immediate dividends. Totten directed considerable resources 
towards the completion of the road. As his available stores of manpower increased, Totten placed 
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150 men at work on the Cruces road, and by December they had successfully completed the 
repairs.107 
Completion of the Cruces Road rehabilitation was a significant development for the 
Panama Railroad Company, but it paled in comparison to the task of finally completing the 
bridge over the Chagres. Reconstruction of the bridge commenced by the end of May 1853; 
however, the work moved slowly. Totten estimated that one hundred carpenters were required to 
complete the bridge- he had five. And not just any sort of laborer would do. Totten expressed his 
preference for American carpenters, once again suggesting that complex and specialized tasks 
demanded equally specialized and precise prime movers and energies.108 This small labor force 
made gradual progress on the bridge and by the beginning of August they completed the 
scaffolding for the first and third spans of the bridge as well as the trestling for the track.109 
Gradually the labor situation improved and, with the arrival of a steamer in August, Totten 
believed that he had an adequate number of carpenters to complete the work, although he was 
still in want of quarrymen and masons to create the stone foundation for the bridgework.110  
As more laborers arrived and the energy directed towards the bridge increased, the work 
progressed rapidly. By mid-September 1853 the first two-hundred-foot section of the bridge was 
complete and merely needed to have the track laid across it.111 By the end of the month, Totten 
was confident that construction of the bridge could be finished by the beginning of December.112 
Excited by the potential of the bridge being completed, Totten also directed his expanding labor 
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force to clear and grade the line on the other side of the river. Prior to the bridge's completion 
they had laid three miles of track on the far side of the river and graded several more miles.113 
The bridge itself was completed by the beginning of December, and, more importantly, 
withstood several freshets without issue. Immediately upon completion of the bridge, the railroad 
carried riders to Gorgona and only the final stretch of track needed to be completed.114 
Totten and the Company’s recruitment techniques proved quite effective. While the labor 
force failed to reach the 6000 men Totten desired, by the end of December it sat at 2110 with the 
promise of an additional 700 Irish laborers set to arrive in January.115 This energy influx was not 
without complications. The increase in personnel demanded an equally massive increase in 
calories. Totten requested 800 barrels of beef, 900 barrels of pork, 157,000 pounds of bread and 
154,000 pounds of rice to feed his expanding labor pool.116 These resources required the 
company to begin chartering more vessels to keep its workforce on the Isthmus supplied. By 
November of 1853 schooners and steamers were relying on currents and coal on a nearly weekly 
basis.117 This solidified the expanding energy network in Panama by increasing both its 
regularity and efficacy, further enabling the rapid construction of the road.  
The influx of human energy expanded the Company’s ability to restructure the 
environment, and within a year the line was complete. This process went smoothly excepting the 
importation of Chinese laborers. Small numbers of Chinese laborers had been employed since 
early 1853 without incident. This changed as their numbers increased in 1854. The central 
concern Totten held regarding Chinese laborers had always been their adaptability to the climate, 
                                                           
113 Totten to Young, 29 October 1853, Totten Letters, USNA, RG 185, Vol. 1. 
114 Totten to Hoadley, 22 December 1853, Totten Letters, USNA, RG 185, Vol. 1. 
115 Totten to Speis, 22 December 1853, Totten Letters, USNA, RG 185, Vol. 1. 
116 Totten to Speis, 14 November 1853, Totten Letters, USNA, RG 185, Vol. 1. 




an issue compounded by the poor conditions in which they were transported to Panama. 
Regardless of the cause of their illness, the problem grew so pronounced that by the spring of 
1854 the Board of Directors examined the potential of setting up special treatment facilities for 
Chinese workers on the islands of the Bay of Panama.118  
The Chinese laborers, disdained from the moment they arrived in Panama, continued to 
be the target of hostility. The marginal steps taken by the Board did little to improve the physical 
and emotional hardship Chinese laborers faced. Disease, death, and an exceptionally high 
number of suicides soon took their toll. Concerned only with their capacity as a source of energy, 
the Board saw the destitute Chinese as nothing more than an inefficient tool to be replaced by a 
more fit and effective one. In response, the Board adopted a policy of trying to remove as many 
of the Chinese laborers as possible from the Isthmus. They implemented a variety of practices to 
this end, including lowering fares to transport Chinese workers away from the Isthmus, buying 
out their contracts, or selling them outright.119 Eventually, in November of 1854, the Board 
worked with the government of Jamaica to send the remaining one-hundred ninety-seven 
Chinese laborers to Jamaica in exchange for a corps of Jamaican laborers at a cost of $17.77 
each.120  
The exploitation and brutalization of Chinese workers indicated the complicated issues 
that developed from the increasing devaluation of unskilled human labor. The growing 
importance of specialized human energy in Panama reinforced the biases that dogged Chinese 
laborers. The difficulties Chinese laborers faced in dealing with the climate of Panama and the 
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terrible conditions they were kept in served as justification for the assumption that they were an 
inferior source of energy, valuable only for their cost-effectiveness.  
Such perceptions cannot be explained by racial biases alone. Totten's distaste for 
Jamaicans was quite clear. In a letter to John Stephens, he wrote of how they required "driving or 
tasking" and that if placed with other laborers they would become dissatisfied with their lower 
wages.121 When a new cohort of Jamaicans arrived in Panama in December of 1850, Totten 
admitted they were “a little better lot than the former” but that they were still “not the kind of 
labourers one requires.”122 It is remarkable then that Totten willingly accepted Jamaican laborers 
in exchange for Chinese laborers. Prejudices impacted his perceptions of both groups, but his 
valuation of the energy each could contribute led him to conclude that Jamaican laborers were 
more valuable. No explanation exists for this decision other than the fact that Jamaicans were 
healthier and hence were more reliable. While he neglected to keep figures of deaths amongst the 
non-white labor force, Totten did acknowledge that, “the proportion was greater among Coolies 
and less among Jamaica men and natives.”123 
Despite the hardships faced by the Chinese, work progressed rapidly during 1854. The 
combination of increased human energy on the Isthmus and the completion of the bridge over the 
Chagres meant that, while still arduous, the work faced less unpredictability than it had in earlier 
years. In addition, Totten’s experience allowed him to direct his stores of human and mechanical 
energy with greater competency than ever before. In the fall of 1854, laborers cut through the 
Obispo valley, summiting the continental divide nearly 300 feet above sea level. From there they 
made their way down the Pacific slope, careful to maintain a maximum grade of 60 feet per mile, 
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lest the combination of gravity and the limited friction of the rail line brew a recipe for runaway 
locomotives. As they continued towards the Pacific terminus, they crossed more swamps, but 
with the added manpower the labor force overcame the ravages of disease.124 And so, in January 
of 1855, the task was completed. The track ran 47 miles and 3,020 feet from Aspinwall to 
Panama City. The world’s first transcontinental railroad was complete. 
Opening a Line and Ending an Era 
 Getting George Law and his eighteen companions to the Isthmus in February of 1855 
proved far easier than it had been to get laborers there. The men, officials and guests of the 
Panama railroad, were furnished with free passes by the U.S. Mail Steamship company to travel 
from New York to Aspinwall. Upon their arrival they boarded the train and rode it the length of 
the line, officially recognizing the railway’s opening.125 By the time of their arrival the line had 
been running for over a month, so the trip was more pomp than substance, and yet it reflected the 
entangled energy network of Panama perfectly. The men likely took horse-drawn carriages or 
walked to the steamships, nestled in their berths in New York's harbor. Their luggage was carried 
on board by human muscle, and they were carried to Panama by the combustion of coal, a 
process overseen by a specialized group of mechanics, engineers, and sailors possessing the 
skills and knowledge necessary to direct and control steam energy. Upon their arrival in 
Aspinwall they made their way to the train station while a group of laborers transported their 
luggage. From there the steam engine of the train drove pistons, allowing the train's wheels to 
travel along tracks which minimized the friction of the Panamanian environment. Behind the 
scenes, a supplementary force of men and mules worked to ensure that the heavy rains of 
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Panama didn’t erode any embankments or shift the tracks. After a few hours the men arrived in 
Panama City where, if they so desired, they could board a Pacific Mail Steamship Company 
Steamer and make their way to California, going from sea to shining sea via the Panama Route.   
 Eventually, the Panama route was overshadowed, a victim of entropy. The irony behind 
the creation of such a massive energy infrastructure was that it was a relatively static landscape. 
The sheer cost of obtaining the energy and material necessary to create the Panama route meant 
that it was impractical to alter the railroad after its completion, and, aside from work done to 
maintain the line against landslides, little energy was invested in its development. The lack of 
investment in energy meant that the line suffered distinct limitations in the types of locomotives 
it could accommodate, and it became increasingly obsolete. The creation of a new transportation 
network, the American transcontinental railroad, in 1869 undermined the primacy of Panama as 
the central conduit between East and West. Goods and materials from Central and South 
America still made their way through Panama, but American ridership dwindled. As convenient 
as Panama was, the Isthmus failed to rival the Transcontinental railroad as an overland route of 
personal transportation across the United States. Yet this did not mean all hope was lost. Indeed, 
as the 19th century closed and the 20th opened, many Americans would look not forward, but 
backward, towards visions of an interoceanic canal, a scheme that had been associated with 
Panama since the days of Spanish colonization. 
The energy sources that held entropy at bay and created the railroad reflected important 
trends that would continue to define transit across Panama. The challenges faced by Totten in 
controlling human energy indicated the importance human muscle would play in shaping 
Isthmian transit. Coal alone did not fuel this passage. Even after the completion of the line in 




all played crucial roles. The proliferation of these various energy sources rendered the Panama 
railroad a success and brought visions of pan-isthmian transit to fruition. 
This, however, was not a “revolution.” There was no moment of disruption that radically 
altered the status quo. Instead, a massive proliferation of energy sources saw older sources of 
energy such as animal, muscle, and wind power joined by the emergence of the world’s first 
fossil fuel, coal. The energy regime that powered the Panama Railroad suggested that while 
monumental, the shift to coal energy was neither immediate nor absolute. The creation of a coal-
fueled transit network was facilitated by the bodies of laborers who altered landscapes and 
countered entropy in ways that enabled coal to flourish. Even when coal seemed ascendant, 
muscular and mechanical energy sources worked in symbiosis, reinforcing the effective 
deployment of one another. This trend was not isolated to the construction of the railroad. As 
visions of an empire danced in the heads of American leaders, and Panama again became the site 
of a massive infrastructural project, the fusion of human and mechanical energy lead to an even 
more massive energy proliferation and an even more complex energy network, one which once 





Chapter II: Black Gold: Coal, Infrastructure, and the Racialized Energy Hierarchy of the 
Panama Canal: 1904-1908 
When Canal Zone Policeman Harry Franck first caught sight of the Culebra Cut, the 
point at which the Panama Canal crossed the Continental Divide, in January of 1913, the 
mechanization of the Canal Zone labor force enthralled him. Franck wrote with awe of 
“pounding rock drills” and “belching locomotives.” He described, “the rattle and bump of long 
trains of flat cars on many tracks, the crash of falling boulders, the snort of the straining steam 
shovels, heaping the cars high with earth and rock.” Franck ended his depiction of the Cut by 
noting that “over all the scene hung a veritable Pittsburgh of smoke.”1  Franck’s wonder of the 
steam-fueled behemoths is not surprising. Indeed, most historians of the Panama Canal cannot 
help but emphasize the significance of the steam shovels, dredges, and locomotives that gouged 
out and moved nearly 200,000,000 cubic yards of earth and rock.2 And yet, Franck noticed 
something which historians have largely overlooked.  The mechanized labor force that parted the 
Isthmus and connected the seas was useless without energy and the haze of smoke it left in its 
wake.  
Coal’s importance came as no surprise to the builders of the Canal. Decades of 
familiarity with the hazards and unpredictability of the Panamanian environment had germinated 
a degree of cynicism when it came to landscape alteration. The Panama railroad proved that 
Panama was a rugged country with an entropic landscape that often shifted in unanticipated 
ways. The failed French attempt to build a sea-level canal across the Isthmus in the 1880s 
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reinforced these difficulties and suggested the limits of humanity’s ability to enforce its will on 
Panama. If Americans were to succeed where Suez Canal engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps had 
failed, they needed to harness and direct remarkable amounts of energy. 
 Steam shovels, dredges, and locomotives formed a coaly trinity that gouged out and 
carved up hundreds of thousands of tons of rock. While a variety of steam shovels were used on 
the Isthmus, the machine most synonymous with canal excavation was the 95-ton Bucyrus. The 
Bucyrus was a marvel of modern technology, hauling up to five cubic yards (roughly eight tons) 
of material in a single scoop. When operating at its peak efficiency, a ninety-five-ton Bucyrus 
filled an entire dirt car on its own in about eight minutes.3 Locomotives enabled the remarkable 
efficiency of the Bucyrus by conveying dirt cars from the canal bed to dumping sites scattered 
throughout the Canal Zone. The lack of progress made by steam shovels in the years before the 
railroad was improved served as a testament to the importance of the line. Prior to the railroad 
renovation in 1907, steam shovels operated at barely a quarter of their capacity.4 While steam 
shovels and locomotives carved up the Isthmus on dry land, a variety of dredges removed 
material from the aquatic landscapes of Panama. These ladder, dipper, and suction dredges failed 
to garner the celebrity that accompanied the Bucyrus, but they were indispensable in countering 
the entropy of the Panamanian landscape. These three coal-fueled harbingers of modernism and 
other machines including pile drivers and track layers revolutionized construction, turning the 
dream of a canal into a reality. 
Before they could make the dirt fly, American engineers and machinists had to create an 
infrastructure capable of enabling the remarkable amounts of energy imported into Panama. 
                                                           
3 David G. McCullough, The Path between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914 (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1977), pg. 491-492. 




Prime movers needed to be regimented, organized, and placed in a system that allowed them to 
work efficiently and effectively. The inability to accomplish this task ultimately vexed 
construction during its first several years as a feckless John Wallace struggled to deal with the 
entropy presented by the Isthmian environment. John Stevens, who took over for Wallace in July 
of 1905, proved far more effective in organizing and deploying the energy he had at his disposal. 
Beginning in 1905, he set about restructuring the obsolete Panama railroad, turning it into an 
efficient, modern line capable of hauling thousands of dirt cars.  
And yet it wasn’t enough to restructure his mechanized labor pool. Stevens also 
understood the essential role that a substantial pool of human energy was to play in canal 
construction. Between 1904 and 1914, tens of thousands of laborers were recruited to the Canal 
Zone by labor agents in the West Indies, America, and Europe.5 The result was an energy regime 
that combined human muscle and coal energy to counter the entropic landscapes of Panama. And 
yet the relationship between human labor and coal energy became increasingly complicated as 
canal construction progressed. Gradually, human energy too was restructured and reorganized, 
often by its perceived value to the construction of the Canal. 
As construction progressed, humans found themselves increasingly toiling away in the 
shadow of coal-fueled machines. The landslides, shifting landscapes, diseases, and derailments 
that characterized canal construction amplified the importance of coal in Panama. By 1907 over 
20,000 tons of coal were consumed monthly.6 The unprecedented ability of steam shovels and 
train cars to remove soil ultimately made machines more important than the men who scurried 
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alongside them. Harrigan Austin, a silver laborer who came to the Isthmus in 1905, spoke of 
working “Day and night, sun or rain; for they were times when it was compulsory to go through 
the rain in order not to hold up the shovels or the trains things had to be on time.” 7 The 
implication was clear, coal energy, not human energy, was the key to dividing the Isthmus and 
uniting the world. As a result, human labor and life played second fiddle in an orchestra of 
mechanized labor. 
Ultimately, the importance of coal-fueled machines in the construction of the Canal 
privileged those workers who had the skills and training necessary to operate such machines 
while simultaneously devaluing unskilled labor. Generally, the ranks of the skilled laborers were 
filled by white American men who had training working with machinery.  The Isthmian Canal 
Commission (ICC) preferred drawing its unskilled labor corps from the West Indies or South 
America. The result was that skin color became an easy way of distinguishing between skilled 
and unskilled laborers.  
 Many historians have addressed this tension and pointed to the classification of laborers 
into either “gold” or “silver” labor pools.8 This process began in 1904 when the U.S. government 
took over the administration of the Canal Zone. The ICC adopted a policy practiced by the 
Panama Railroad Company of separating employees into gold and silver payrolls. Nominally this 
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system merely identified the type of metal in which laborers were paid. In practice the 
distinctions between groups was vast. Gold laborers were better paid, occupied separate housing 
and transportation facilities, tended to work on machines, and were almost exclusively white 
Americans. Silver laborers, on the other hand, were darker skinned, generally West Indian, lived 
in subpar facilities, performed dangerous, dirty labor, received less pay and were often 
transported in segregated rail cars.9 Harry Franck succinctly described the gold and silver system 
as an "awful gulf that separates the sacred white American from the rest of the Canal Zone 
world." 10  
 The evolution of the gold and silver system from a country of origin system to a racial 
system accompanied the increasing reliance placed on coal. Coal, and the machines that it 
powered, privileged those laborers who had the training and experience necessary to harness and 
direct coal energy. This development reinforced assumptions about Jamaican and Barbadian 
inferiority, providing an ideological justification for the entrenchment of the gold and silver 
system without the necessity of adopting an explicitly Jim Crow system of racial segregation. By 
the time the Canal Zone's mechanized labor force was restructured and deployed in 1908, the 
silver and gold system had become almost entirely racially defined. 
By restructuring the energy infrastructure in Panama between 1905 and 1908, John 
Stevens created an environment conducive to the efficient use of energy to combat entropy. Coal 
provided the tremendous amounts of energy necessary to impose a degree of order over the 
entropic Isthmian landscape. And yet the importance of coal and the simultaneous devaluation of 
unskilled human labor combined American's insatiable appetite for energy and modernism with 
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their longstanding racial biases, a recipe which created an energy hierarchy in which white 
Americans who had the training and ability to harness coal-fueled machines, stood on top. 
Fueling the Imagination 
For weeks Americans had waited with bated breath. On May 19th of 1898, they could 
relax, slightly. "OREGON IS SAFE," read the headline of the Duluth News Tribune. The U.S.S. 
Oregon, a state-of-the-art battleship completed just a few years earlier, had successfully reached 
the Caribbean after a treacherous 13,000-mile journey that took it from San Francisco, around 
the tip of South America and through Spanish controlled waters on the eve of the Spanish 
American War.11 Newspapers around the country watched the Oregon's progress with rapt 
attention. From Minnesota to Georgia, Pennsylvania to Idaho, and everywhere in between 
newspapers chronicled the trip of America's most expensive vessel. 12 The Oregon completed the 
trip in an amazing sixty-seven days, a testament to what the newest generation of coal-fueled 
warships could accomplish. In the nationalistic fervor sweeping through the nation, the Oregon, 
and the sailors aboard it, were never far from conversation. They were a physical manifestation 
of the emergence of America as a global power. While readers were primarily concerned with the 
role the Oregon was to play in the war with Spain, the Oregon's journey also emphasized the 
need for a quicker passage between the Pacific and Atlantic. In the period leading up to 
American acquisition of the Canal Zone, coal dictated the naval, imperial, and economic 
concerns that ideologically legitimized the creation of an interoceanic canal. 
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 Coal’s capacity to eradicate space and time proved essential to concerns over naval, 
colonial, and economic efficiency. In Nature's Metropolis, William Cronon argues that railroads 
“fundamentally altered people's expectations of how long it took to travel between two distant 
points on the continent,” and consequently, “time accelerated and became more valuable the 
greater the distance one could travel.” 13 Cronon's comments can apply to any coal-fueled 
transportation technology. Coal's substantial yields provided the power to move people, ideas, 
and goods through space more rapidly than ever before. Coal was also geographically liberated; 
useable anywhere humans could carry it, making it a perfect source of energy for transportation. 
These two characteristics allowed coal to radically shrink the world by expediting transit and 
opening new possibilities for globalization. This smaller world emphasized the importance of a 
canal to further expedite transportation times. 
 The journey of the Oregon exemplified the increasing importance placed on naval power 
and the rapid deployment of America’s military might. While naval prowess had long been tied 
to military success, a strong naval fleet became the chief characteristic of an international power 
in the late 19th century. Coal provided new possibilities for the movement and range of naval 
vessels and advocates such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and future President Theodore Roosevelt 
clamored at the opportunity to increase naval spending and bolster the United States’ fleet.14 This 
naval fervor gave rise to new ships like the Oregon, which heralded the rise of the United States 
as a global power. However, the U.S. was not alone in its desires. Russia, Japan, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and even China sought to emulate America's naval expansion by creating state-
of-the-art ships of their own. Russia went as far as to invite Irving Scott, the designer of the 
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Oregon, to Russia to contract for battleships of their own. 15 This nascent naval arms race caused 
military strategists and politicians alike to clamor for the tactical advantages provided by an 
interoceanic canal. 
 The expansion of naval power also promoted canal construction by emphasizing the 
geographic shortcomings of coal. While coal was a spatially liberated source of energy and could 
be carried to any location, it did possess its own set of challenges. Increasingly large naval 
vessels required increasingly large stores of coal to fuel their voyages, more than could be 
carried on board. To cope with these natural limitations, governments provided coaling stations 
at which ships could refuel. The Oregon stopped at coaling stations in Peru, Chile, Brazil, and 
Barbados before reaching the Florida Keys.16 The construction of a canal limited the need for 
coaling by shortening travel distances and minimizing the amount of energy consumed over the 
course of a voyage. The successful completion of the Canal negated these concerns by shortening 
trips and utilizing the United States’ coaling stations exclusively.17 
 Questions of naval efficiency and coaling stations were directly tied to the expanding role 
of the United States as an imperial power.18 Imperialism carried both militaristic and ethical 
demands that the Canal and coal could help America meet. Joseph Bishop, a journalist who later 
became Secretary of the ICC, described America's imperial obligations, writing, “We have 
shown we are exceptionally fit for the work of colonization... and we have honored ourselves in 
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the eyes of the world for the way in which we have performed it.” The success of America's 
imperial mission in Cuba and the Philippines wasn't solely the result of alleged moral 
righteousness; military force was intimately tied to these ventures. It was no accident that in his 
book, Issues of a New Epoch, Bishop combined coal shortages, the Panama Canal, and American 
imperialism. Militaristically, the Philippines presented a unique challenge. Sitting thousands of 
miles west of America's west coast, it was difficult for naval forces concentrated in the Atlantic 
to reach. In June of 1901, over 70,000 troops occupied the Philippines, and traversing from the 
Philippines to America's other colonial outpost in Cuba was impractical. Without the completion 
of a canal, these two holdings were isolated from one another, complicating imperial cohesion.19 
 The militaristic concerns of empire were combined with a focus on uplifting native 
populations. Indeed, one of the greatest objectives of the American colonial mission was 
allegedly to prepare Cuba and the Philippines for self-governance.20 Coal was essential to this 
mission. William MacCorkle, ex-governor of the state of West Virginia, expressed the value of 
coal as a social equalizer in the aftermath of the Canal’s construction, arguing that countries, 
“yellow, brown, and white- filled with the desires of new commerce, fired with new hope by the 
touch of the West, thrilled with new ideas of government and religion are all mingled in one 
tremendous combat for the mightiest markets vouchsafed to man since the stars sung together.”21 
MacCorkle suggested that through the utilization of coal transportation, these nations could reach 
these markets as civilized, democratic, and friendly entities. The Canal could expedite this 
process by more rapidly conveying these goods and ideas around the world, benefiting both 
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America and the peoples it was destined to uplift.  
The most alluring argument for the construction of the Canal was the potential economic 
benefit Americans could reap. An American canal teeming with coal-fueled ships could provide 
tremendous financial benefit to the United States. Americans had already toyed with the idea of 
creating coaling stations in Panama in the 1880s.22 While the idea didn’t come to fruition at the 
time, a canal made a coaling station a far more intriguing opportunity. If international commerce 
was funneled through a single point, whoever controlled energy distribution in that location 
would have access to a remarkable number of potential customers. A canal with suitable coaling 
stations could give Americans a virtual monopoly on the oceanic energy trade, guaranteeing 
money would flow north into America as ships flowed through the Canal.  
Coal provided opportunities for the expansion of American naval, imperial, and economic 
interests that were too enticing to be overlooked. As the United States expanded its empire and 
global influence, the Canal moved from a pipe dream into a reality. The only lingering question 
by the dawn of the 20th century was where and when this structure would be built. Canal 
proponents had ample fodder to graze on. Pitches for interoceanic canals sprung up every few 
years during the second half of the 1800s. Boosters suggested Nicaragua, Mexico, Panama, and 
Colombia amongst other Central and South American nations as potential sites. In the 1880s, the 
French went so far as to begin construction of a sea-level canal in Panama under the guidance of 
Ferdinand de Lesseps, the national hero who had been the brains behind the Suez Canal. All 
these ventures ended in failure. And yet the enthusiasm they garnered proved invaluable to canal 
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By the end of the 19th century, the chorus of voices calling for a new canal had reached a 
crescendo. The American government, under the leadership of President McKinley, responded 
with the creation of the Isthmian Canal Commission (ICC) in 1899. The Commission, often 
known as the "Second Walker Commission" thanks to its chair, Admiral John G. Walker, 
intended to once and for all determine the most feasible route for the creation of a canal. The ICC 
studied the canal question for two years and initially suggested Nicaragua was the best location 
for a canal thanks in large part to the $109 million price tag La Compagnie Nouvelle du Canal de 
Panama (New Panama Canal Company), the French firm that had failed to build a canal in 
Panama, had placed on its assets. After a protracted negotiation, the New Panama Canal 
Company agreed to slash its price to $40 million. At the behest of President Roosevelt, the I.C.C 
reconvened, this time recommending that Panama be the site of the Canal. After some political 
wrangling, Roosevelt was able to get Congress to support the idea as well. The U.S. next pursued 
negotiations with Colombia to obtain the concession necessary to construct the Canal. Despite 
the best efforts of diplomats, the Colombian government rejected the Treaty. Not one to be 
deterred by such a trifling matter as sovereignty, Roosevelt decided to support the fledgling 
Panamanian independence movement, determining that fomenting a rebellion was a far easier 
course of action than diplomatic negotiation. After a quick coup and some strong-arming of the 
newly formed Panamanian government, the US obtained its concession and was set to begin 
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work on the Canal.24 
Encountering the Limits of Power 
On May 4, 1904, the whistles blew at Bas Matachin for the first time, and "the old French 
workers and other nationalities such as Jamaican and a few native, danced and jumped about 2 
feet high when they understood that the American government were in charge of the new 
undertaking."25 The euphoria in the Canal Zone was matched by that back in America. Thanks to 
the seemingly unlimited potential of coal, America was picking up where the French left off. Yet 
the question remained: could Americans overcome the entropy of the Panamanian environment 
and succeed where the French had failed? 
Initially, the question of American success was very much in doubt. As Americans arrived 
in Panama in the spring and summer of 1904, they had no idea what type of canal they wanted to 
construct, let alone how they would go about constructing it. Consequently, the first year of canal 
construction was beset by nearly continual delays, both bureaucratic and energetic. John Wallace, 
the first Chief Engineer of the Panama Canal Company, knew that he had to bring human and 
mechanical energy to bear on the Panamanian environment if it were going to yield a feasible 
waterway, and yet the chasm between intent and reality was wider than the Canal itself. 
Wallace’s tenure was marred by marked difficulties in deploying energy thanks to the lack of a 
tangible infrastructure to support coal’s utilization. 
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The ICC was tasked not only with determining the site for the Canal but also bringing the 
vision of Isthmian transit to fruition. Members of the ICC made their first visit to Panama on 
April 8th, 1904.26 The scene that greeted the Commission when they landed in Cristobal was not 
encouraging. Colon and Panama, the two major terminal cities on the Isthmus lacked water and 
sewage systems. The harbor facilities at Cristobal, the major port on the Atlantic side of the 
Isthmus, were incapable of receiving the tremendous amount of equipment necessary for the 
excavation. The force still at work under the French Company consisted of a mere 700 laborers 
and a few obsolete steam shovels. The ICC conceded that "Neither the equipment nor the 
organization of the force could be considered adequate, or in any way fitted for the prompt 
removal of the great mass of material in the Cut."27 Housing facilities were dilapidated.28 
Machine shops and machinery “had practically remained idle for over sixteen years, and was 
almost entirely concealed by the jungle.”29 Tropical diseases remained troublesome both to the 
effective utilization of human energy and as a deterrent for labor recruitment.30 If Americans 
were going to carve a canal out of the rugged Panamanian landscape, they had a lot of work to 
do.  
These initial obstacles to the creation of a canal reflected a broader lack of knowledge 
about the conditions of work in Panama and realities of the Panamanian environment. The first 
Americans deployed to the Isthmus were mostly surveyors and engineers meant to provide a 
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better understanding of how and where the Canal would be constructed. In May of 1904, the first 
engineering party left New York for Panama. Their primary objective was to determine whether 
the best course of action was the creation of a sea-level or lock canal. A sea-level canal required 
more substantial amounts of energy to excavate, but upon its completion would be far easier to 
operate. A lock canal required less intensive excavation but presented several engineering 
challenges including finding a suitable water supply, constructing large enough locks, and 
providing the energy necessary to operate the locks. The design of the Canal was not the only 
charge given the engineers. The ICC mandated that "At the same time the great question of water 
supply of the canal, the control of the Chagres river, especially when in flood, and certain larger 
details of alignment, section of the prism and plans of harbor at the two termini of the canal and 
other questions of less magnitude, are to be conclusively settled."31  
In some ways, these men had learned from their forebears working on the Panama 
Railroad and the French Canal. The emphasis placed on containing the Chagres River was a 
testament to this fact. The Chagres and its seasonal freshets had the potential to destroy any 
major infrastructural network, and Wallace was acutely aware of this fact. Indeed, the Chagres 
became such a priority that a special party of engineers was created by the ICC to determine the 
best site to dam it.32 Preliminary studies suggested either Tiger Hill, Gatun or Bohio, on the 
Atlantic side of the Transit Zone, or Gamboa closer to the Pacific terminus. Damming the 
Chagres also had the potential to turn a liability into an asset. Wallace hoped that a hydroelectric 
station at the dam could harness the kinetic energy of the rushing Chagres and convert it into 
electricity. Wallace went so far as to suggest that damming the river was a panacea of sorts, as a 
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dam might “solve the problem of the control of the Chagres River, the provision of water for any 
low-level lock canal designed, and the supply of efficient electric energy for lighting purposes, 
railroad operation, or the operation of machinery use in the construction of the canal; and 
incidentally a water supply for the towns and villages situated along the line of the canal, and for 
supply of the work."33 Wallace was ahead of his time. It took ten years, but the creation of a 
hydroelectric station at the Gatun dam eventually provided the energy necessary to operate the 
locks on both ends of the Canal. In these early years, however, a hydroelectric solution to the 
ICC’s energy woes was far from realistic. 
The objective of taming the Chagres was admirable and pointed to a growing realization 
of the challenges presented by Panama’s hydrological conditions, but it also emphasized a failure 
of imagination that plagued much of Wallace's tenure as Chief Engineer and continued to vex 
those who came after him. While coal energy allowed humans to alter the environment in 
exponentially greater ways than ever before, it also had the potential to destabilize Panama's 
entropic environment in exponentially greater ways than ever before. Damming the Chagres 
provided an answer to the issue of flooding and freshets, but removing and redistributing tens of 
millions of cubic yards of material exacerbated Panama's frequent landslides, the first of which 
occurred on September 23rd, 1904 in the Culebra Cut.34 Throughout the years of excavation, it 
was not flooding but landslides and unstable soils that became the chief obstacles to the 
successful completion of the Canal.  
While engineers toiled and trudged through the mountains and valleys of Panama, 
Wallace took Roosevelt’s mandate to “make the dirt fly” to heart. Wallace immediately sought to 
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set his motley collection of men and machinery to work in the Culebra Cut. This task was 
challenging. The bulk of the French machines remaining on the Canal had fallen into disrepair. 
The 465 machinists in the Canal Zone worked tirelessly to bring them back into working order, 
but even when these machines were fixed, their productivity was marginal at best.35 Wallace was 
adamant that work be continued in the Cut. From the inception of the work, he believed that 
"The time and cost of excavating that section of the canal embraced in the Culebra Division, 
through the Continental Divide, will be the controlling feature in determining the time and cost 
of completing the canal."36 Gumption could only take one so far on the Isthmus, however, and 
the rocky terrain proved difficult for the French engines to penetrate. Between the start of 
excavation on May 4th and December of 1904, only 243,472 cubic yards of material was 
removed from the Cut.  
Recognizing that the French machines could not provide enough power to make headway 
in the Cut, Wallace contracted for fourteen American steam shovels in the fall of 1904, and by 
December 31st three were already on the work.37 Despite this, energy consumption remained 
relatively low during the first year of construction. The Culebra Division consumed only 5584 
tons of coal over the course of the year, a figure considerably less than the 8818 tons of coal used 
by the defunct French Company in 1900.38  
While these new machines proved far more adept at cracking Culebra, the energy of 
steam shovels did not exist in isolation. The increased capacity to remove earth was useless 
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without an equally massive increase in the capacity to transport earth and a place to deposit it. To 
bring the full power of the new American steam shovels to bear on the Panamanian environment, 
it was necessary to exponentially increase the available stores of energy in the infrastructure that 
supported the shovels. Wallace was aware of this fact. Towards the end of his tenure, he wrote, 
"One thing I have clearly demonstrated, and that is that we have so far not even approximated 
the average potential capacity of our steam shovels. The largest output and most economical 
results can only be obtained with these shovels are at work to their full capacity continuously. Of 
course, this simply depends upon the shovel being continuously and constantly supplied with 
cars to load."39  
This was no small task. A regular supply of cars required: enough cars to load, the power 
to transport these cars, enough trackage to handle the cars, facilities to keep the cars in working 
order and properly arranged dumping sites, amongst other concerns.40 Complicating matters 
further was the fact that even if all these conditions were met the rail lines were continually 
vexed by the fluid landscape of Panama. The Belgian locomotives that Americans inherited from 
their French forebearers were extremely rigid and could be derailed by the slightest shifts of the 
track. Panama’s spongy soils often settled and moved due to rains and excavation, leading to 
inconsistencies in the track. Division Engineer H.F. Dose complained that “The result has been 
that numerous derailments have taken place daily, causing serious interruptions to the work.”41 
The Canal effectively faced an energy bottleneck throughout 1904. The lack of a modernized 
transit network meant that constant derailments slowed the work, and slow progress assembling 
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newly arrived machines caused the mechanical labor force on the Isthmus to grow slowly. The 
answer to the ICC’s burgeoning energy problem lay in the same place it had for G.M. Totten half 
a century before, in the demand for human labor to create an infrastructure necessary for coal 
labor to thrive. 
The human labor necessary to create the Canal was in short supply during the initial 
phase of canal construction. When work began in July of 1904, the ICC had roughly 2,392 men 
on its rolls. By the middle of February of 1905, that number had reached only 3,620.42 The slow 
growth in human energy was problematic, hindering the deployment of mechanical energy 
thanks to the lack of personnel to erect machines and lay track. The Engineering Committee of 
the ICC suggested that successful completion of the Canal required roughly ten years work by 
100 steam shovels and that it was imperative that this mechanical labor force be installed within 
two years.43 A dejected Wallace complained that this required his men to receive, assemble, and 
deploy a shovel every week. “They could be installed and put to work at the rate of one a week,” 
lamented Wallace, “but owing to the difficulty in securing necessary labor of all classes, together 
with the shortages of track tools and track material, one every two weeks will be about the best 
we can do."44 Unless the labor shortage was dealt with, it was impossible for the Canal to be 
constructed. 
The challenge in obtaining human energy foreshadowed the entwining of energy and 
racial biases in the hierarchization of the labor force. In general, Americans were reluctant to 
make their way down to Panama, and, as a result, the ICC relied on West Indian labor to fill the 
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bulk of its labor rolls. These West Indians faced marginalization from the moment the work 
began. The first annual report of the Bureau of Materials and Supplies complained, "The greatest 
difficulty has been experienced in securing a laboring force sufficient to meet the needs and 
requirements of this Bureau, and it can be said that at no time has it been adequately supplied. 
The Jamaican is shiftless and lazy and returns but a small measure of work for his wage."45 The 
ICC was caught between a rock and a hard place. They could not recruit enough skilled 
American laborers, and while they could obtain scores of West Indians, they believed these men 
lazy, unskilled, and, most egregiously, a completely inefficient source of energy for the price. 
This marked a longstanding tradition of valuing human labor based primarily on its relationship 
to energy. Those workers who directly enabled coal energy were in high demand; those who only 
tangentially aided in the unleashing of coal were not. Thanks to discrepancies in training 
opportunities in and between the US and the Caribbean, these qualifications were perceived to 
fall along racial lines, a distinction that was quite palatable to white American administrators. 
The chief deterrent to the acquisition of skilled, American labor in Panama during the 
first year of construction was the constant specter of tropical disease. These microscopic 
murderers had defined the efficacy of human energy on the Isthmus for centuries and in the 
process created a "reputation of the Isthmus of Panama for unhealthfulness."46 These diseases 
significantly limited the effectiveness of human energy. The problem grew so pronounced that 
the Commission was forced to adopt a policy that all employees of the Commission received free 
healthcare and medicine.47 Additionally, they frustrated recruiters' attempts to bring Americans to 
the Isthmus. W.E. Dauchy, a senior engineer with the ICC, suggested that "Yellow fever scares 
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have done a great deal towards keeping such men away."48 The ICC looked to the eradication 
campaigns launched in Cuba and Puerto Rico as models that may be applicable to Panama.49 The 
rub was that enacting such an insecticidal campaign required a substantial sanitation force 
stocked with considerable stores of human energy, a resource that was hesitant to come to the 
Isthmus due to the presence of mosquitos to begin with. As the dry season of 1905 progressed 
and the labor shortage continued to fester, Wallace's inability to overcome Panama's energy 
bottleneck came under increasing scrutiny. 
The ongoing energy crunch, culicidaec crisis, and mechanical issues pushed Wallace to 
the brink, but the curse that damned the tenure of Chief Engineer Wallace was the bureaucratic 
logjam that rendered progress on the Canal a logistical impossibility. Throughout the dry season 
of 1905, Wallace’s letters to the ICC grew increasingly combative. The main point of contention 
was the anemic pace at which material was imported to the Isthmus. In February, Wallace 
warned the Commission that, "Delay in the filling of requisitions, or delay in providing the 
necessary number and kind of men when needed, will result in the holding back of some 
particular part of the work, which in turn will impede and delay the organization and progress of 
the work in some other direction."50 The Commission did little to heed these concerns and 
shortages in machine parts, timber, tools, oils, paints, coal, tracking, and personnel continued to 
plague progress.51 By June of 1905, Wallace’s patience had run its course. Burdened by the 
magnitude of the work and disenchanted by the bureaucratic hurdles he faced; Wallace resigned 
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his post on June 26. The first phase of canal construction had come to an end. With little progress 
to show after a year of work, the fate of the Canal hung in the balance. 
Getting on the Right Track 
 As Wallace’s tenure in Panama came to an end, Americans had been at work in Panama 
for over a year and had shockingly little to show for it. There were a few areas of optimism. Coal 
consumption had exploded throughout the zone from 3,496 tons between May and December 
1904 to 8,123 tons between January and June of 1905.52 Many French machines had also been 
rehabilitated by the mechanical division, and surveys were providing considerable amounts of 
information to the ICC. Yet these minor victories were completely overshadowed by the laundry 
list of issues that remained unresolved. Labor recruitment sputtered along, and while the number 
of laborers on the isthmus had grown to 8,706 men, nearly every department was still clamoring 
for more.53 Tropical diseases wreaked havoc on human bodies, a problem worsened by the fact 
that many of those who made their way to Panama with the promise of suitable quarters found 
deteriorating shacks waiting for them.54  
 The hardships faced by human energy reflected and compounded the hurdles Panama’s 
environment placed in front of the ICC’s mechanical labor force. A year of hard work saw the 
rehabilitation of 58 French engines and 980 French dumping cars, and the assembly of ten new 
American steam shovels, the bulk of which were at work in the Culebra Cut. And yet this 
Frankenstein French force succeeded in removing only 741,644 cubic yards during a year of 
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work.55 At this pace it would take nearly 300 years to excavate the Canal. And yet the work could 
not expand without substantial preliminary work to modernize and restructure the infrastructural 
network supporting these machines. Dauchy cut to the core of this issue, writing, 
At Culebra, the work has reached a stage where no great expansion is possible 
without a large amount of preliminary work being done. This preliminary work 
consists of the construction of a large amount of railroad track, for which a 
corresponding amount of grading has to be done. Also, the diversion of certain 
streams preparatory to carrying on excavations on a large scale; the building of 
roundhouses for the care of locomotives, the construction of storage yards, and 
numerous connections between the existing tracks and tracks to be construction, 
with the Panama Railroad; also the double-tracking of the latter and the 
preparation of numerous dumping grounds and of tracks leading to them; also the 
installation of modern drilling machinery. All of this work requires a large number 
of preliminary laborers. Five thousand additional laborers could be used to 
advantage at once and have been asked for for some weeks.56 
While he didn’t explicitly state it, the implication of his comment was clear; the Panama 
Railroad was the weak link. The lack of track and the inferior quality of the track that existed 
rendered progress untenable. What the Panama Canal needed was someone who understood 
railroads and had extensive experience in their construction and administration. Fittingly enough 
that was exactly who they received.  
 John Stevens had made a name for himself working for the Great Northern Railroad 
where he rose through the ranks from a locating engineer to the Chief Engineer of the railroad in 
just over five years.57 His insight and engineering aptitude led him to be named the Chief 
Engineer of the ICC on July 1st, 1905, a few days after Wallace’s resignation, and by the end of 
the month he had departed for the Isthmus.58  
John Stevens’ greatest contribution to the excavation of the Panama Canal was likely his 
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decision to halt the excavation of the Panama Canal. Upon arriving in Panama, Stevens quickly 
obtained the lay of the land, and within a few months he expressed his plan for how the work 
should proceed. Stevens discontinued the practice of rehabilitating and utilizing French 
machines, a task which he saw as pointless. Stevens criticized the work done in the Culebra Cut, 
dubbing it, “largely in the nature of experiments” which were useless, “owing to several causes, 
among these causes being poor equipment, poor tracks, unsuitable dumping grounds, and 
piecemeal work generally."59 Stevens recognized what Wallace had struggled to come to terms 
with. It was not enough to throw continually increasing amounts of energy at the Canal and 
expect it to be built. Organization of energy was just as important as its volume. To this end, 
Stevens began contracting for a tremendous amount of new American plant including 300 steel 
flat cars, 120 locomotives, 800 wooden flat cars, 6 earth spreaders, 6 heavy unloaders, and 31 
steam shovels. The acquisition of these new machines reflected the general restructuring of the 
line. What had previously been a quagmire of energy incompetence was evolving into a model of 
efficiency.  
The desire for modern and efficient material transcended the machines that removed and 
distributed earth and rock. Stevens’ chief contribution to the work was the overhauling of the 
Panama Railroad. The importance of the railroad to canal construction wasn't a novel realization. 
Wallace clearly expressed the importance of the railroad in conveying spoil. The ICC had gone to 
extreme lengths to ensure that they obtained the railroad when they purchased the resources of 
the French company, writing, " It was admitted on all sides that the railroad was an essential 
instrument to be used in the construction of the Canal. If there had been no railroad in existence, 
one would have had to be built over which to distribute material for the construction of the 
                                                           




Canal."60 Despite this knowledge, the railroad's condition was abysmal by 1905. When Stevens 
shared his professional diagnoses of the railroad, he disdained it as "lines which, by the utmost 
stretch of the imagination, could not be termed railroad tracks."61 He felt the inadequacies of the 
railroad were so pronounced that on August 15th, within two weeks of arriving on the Isthmus, he 
halted all excavation work in the Canal Zone and focused all of the energy at his disposal on the 
task of rebuilding the railroad, thus creating an infrastructure for the deployment and 
augmentation of mechanical energy.62 This involved laying new stronger track that resisted 
shifting Isthmian soils, strengthening bridges, adding more signals and building more support 
facilities including a coaling plant at Cristobal.63 While the work took time, the shift in priorities 
inaugurated a considerably more optimistic and productive era of canal construction. 
To construct the new Panama railroad, Stevens had to continue to develop the human 
labor stores on the Isthmus. The number of laborers on the Isthmus ballooned from 8,706 on July 
1, 1905, when Stevens was named Chief Engineer, to 12,977 three months later on September 
30th.64 As the year progressed, this number continued to grow and by June of 1906, there were 
16,145 men employed by the ICC65 The substantial growth in energy reflected the priority placed 
on obtaining human labor. More importantly, the expansion of the human energy stores in 
Panama allowed Stevens to more aggressively implement coal energy as well. 
The little black rock accompanied the human bodies flowing into Panama, creating a 
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broad network of interconnected energy sources capable of bridging the oceans. Between July of 
1905 and June of 1906, the Culebra Division, the chief coal consumer along the line, used 25,033 
tons of coal by itself. Of this, more than 13,532 tons of coal were used in transportation.66 As the 
rail lines in the Culebra Cut expanded, more locomotives were put to work, which in turn could 
haul more cars, thus allowing more shovels to work more efficiently. This positive feedback loop 
of energy consumption was responsible for the progress made during the fiscal year. The work 
accomplished during the first year of Stevens’ tenure was preparatory in nature, but it yielded an 
infrastructure capable of supporting the demands of construction. The Mechanical Division had 
been hard at work erecting machinery and by June 30th 1906 the ICC’s mechanical labor force 
included: one 45-ton shovel, fifteen 70-ton shovels, 23 95-ton shovels, 100 French locomotives, 
39 American locomotives, 541 French dumping cars, 324 American dumping cars, 1061 
American flat cars, twelve Lidgerwood unloaders, thirteen bank spreaders, and 22 unloading 
plows.67 Thanks to the expansion and modernization of the Panama Railroad these machines 
could now commence canal construction. 
Distinguishing Between Silver and Gold 
And yet machine labor also needed men to operate it, particularly white American men on 
the gold rolls who had both the experience and training to direct coal-fueled machines. As 
employment increased, the ICC increasingly focused on trying to obtain and appease these 
workers. The ICC was concerned that “Most of the men who come down here from the States are 
isolated from their homes and families. There is practically nothing in the way of amusements or 
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anything to occupy the time of the men when they are not at work.”68 These gold laborers 
presented the ICC with a unique challenge. Their skill and technical training qualified them for 
the most important positions on the Isthmus, ranging from clerks and stenographers to steam 
shovel engineers and machine shop foremen, but they were also among the toughest laborers to 
maintain as they came from good paying jobs and stable conditions in the United States. The 
ICC and Stevens were aware of this fact and attempted to incentivize living and working on the 
Isthmus. Stevens authorized a raise for his mechanics in December of 1905 and created a variety 
of venues for their entertainment, including restaurants and commissaries peddling high-end 
meals and luxury goods, as well as club houses and community centers that provided 
amusements for off duty laborers.69 In those areas the ICC could most easily control, the lived 
environments of canal employees, they created a segregated landscape which privileged the gold 
laborers who controlled and directed coal energy. 
The privileging of gold laborers was tied to the crucial role they played in enabling 
machines. In 1907, as excavation began in earnest, D.W. Bolich, a senior Division Engineer, 
estimated the amount of manual labor required to equal the Canal's mechanized labor force. 
Bolich believed that it would take 124 laborers to match the pace set by a single steam shovel. 
Since there were roughly 44 shovels regularly at work in the Canal Zone that year, Bolich 
suggested that 5,456 laborers were needed to match this output, not mentioning foremen to 
oversee their work. This figure contrasted starkly with the 298 men who actually operated the 
steam shovels. A similar trend emerged when looking at the disposal of dirt. Bolich found that 
seven mechanized unloaders and plows could handle the duties of unloading train cars for a day. 
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This mechanized labor force required just under 70 men to operate. Bolich suggested that this 
work would require 2,660 laborers as well as foremen to be done manually.70 Mechanized labor 
so far transcended human capabilities that individual laborers, particularly those who didn't 
operate machinery, became increasingly irrelevant.  
Due to this shift, West Indian laborers, who formed the bulk of the Canal Zone labor 
force, were not privy to the same benefits and perks as their American counterparts. Indeed, the 
men who made up the common labor pool of the ICC were often viewed with scorn and distaste 
by those that hired them. Dauchy, who administering the Culebra Division, described his 
common laborers as “an un-ambitious, inefficient and worthless class,” and wrote that they may 
have worked more effectively if Dauchy had foremen who “had a knowledge of this negro labor" 
at his disposal.71 Dauchy’s opinion was shared by nearly all American ICC administrators. 
Stevens himself said of West Indians in comparison to common laborers in the United States, “I 
doubt their efficiency can be rated at more than 33 percent."72 The stigma attached to West 
Indian laborers in conjunction with the burgeoning importance of mechanical labor rendered 
them increasingly interchangeable.  
The developing energy hierarchy in Panama was most pronounced in the lived 
environments both sets of workers faced. By 1906 and 1907, work on the Isthmus had 
progressed to the point that most men were no longer living in the ramshackle quarters that had 
greeted the first labor crews. The scale of improvement was more pronounced in the gold 
laborers’ quarters, where both the variety and quality of housing afforded these important energy 
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enablers far outstripped anything offered to the expendable human energy of silver laborers. 
While gold laborers seldom accounted for more than ten percent of the Canal Zone’s total labor 
force, the Division of Building Maintenance consistently poured more resources into the 
construction of gold quarters. In 1907, the Division spent only $482,502.88 on silver quarters in 
comparison to $1,432,415.51 for gold quarters.73 This level of investment directly reflected the 
priority placed on gold laborers and indicated the solidification of their superiority in the energy 
hierarchy of the Canal. 
Silver laborers frequented labor camps which were often only refurbished boxcars filled 
with bunks. Joseph Gard, who journeyed from Barbados to the Canal Zone in 1906, was 
promised a bunk by his recruiter, but when he arrived, "it was not so. There was some large 
wooden bunks, three (workers) leaves I took one the night we had no light and for a whole week 
I had all restless night."74 Even if one found a bunk he could find himself crammed into a single 
car with 83 other men. Unsurprisingly, the converted cars lacked latrines and cleansing stations, 
so workers had to walk to other buildings, often through the rain, to reach what laborer Aaron 
Clarke jokingly dubbed, “our office for sanitary convenience.”75  
The ICC also found it easier to keep accurate counts of employee numbers when they 
resided in these camps. To enforce their oversight, the ICC provided meal tickets for unmarried 
silver employees living in the labor camps. At the end of each day, a foreman provided tickets to 
those men working below him.76 Laborers brought these tickets to dinner where they received 
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breakfast and lodging tickets for the following day. Dinners generally consisting of rice, red 
beans, and meat. Vegetables, in short supply throughout the Canal Zone during the early years of 
construction, were a rarity.77 The ICC adopted policies which essentially forced laborers to eat in 
sanctioned mess halls. If laborers wanted to live in the labor camps, they needed to receive a 
lodging check, given to them at the mess hall. The ICC justified this practice by claiming that 
they wanted to prevent unemployed workers from taking advantage of their facilities. However, 
sick workers who were unable to work and obtain meal tickets were often removed from camps 
as a result.78 In many cases, the punishment for being found in a labor camp without a lodging 
check was a thirty-day stay in a jail cell.  
The meal ticket system forced segregation by mandating West Indian workers who lacked 
the time to prepare meals live in labor camps. In addition, it sought to provide administrators 
with complete control over West Indian bodies and the energy they possessed. The smallest 
infractions or misuse of one's own energy by missing work, even for legitimate reasons, was 
grounds for removal. Perhaps the greatest indictment of the living conditions accorded silver 
employees was the fact that very few silver employees decided to utilize them, preferring instead 
the freedom that came with living in Panama City or other communities outside the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. A frustrated John Stevens was forced to concede that, despite the best attempts of 
the ICC to control human bodies, West Indian laborers would often work long enough to bank up 
some money and then disappear into the bush for weeks at a time until they needed to restock 
their coffers. The result was that while there were well over 20,000 West Indians on the Canal by 
June of 1906 only about 10,000 actually worked each day.79 
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The ICC consistently provided better quarters for their gold employees, valuing their 
labor and contentment above all else. The comforts accorded individual gold laborers depended 
on their position. Low-level gold employees often found themselves sharing rooms in houses of 
over twenty employees. Despite the cramped conditions, they had access to beds with mattresses, 
personal storage and basic comforts including furniture.80 Men who held more prestigious 
positions generally resided in better quarters. An anonymous steam shovel operator spoke 
enthusiastically about his living arrangements, claiming, “We have nicely furnished rooms with 
baths, electric light, and toilet rooms, and the board is exceptionally good. In fact, everything is 
done to make it as pleasant as possible for the man, and I have not seen a man that was not 
satisfied; as for myself. I like it very much.”81  
The greatest privilege accorded to gold workers was their access to family quarters. By 
1910, out of 4,646 gold employees, 1,737 resided in family quarters. Comparably, of the 25,044 
silver employees on the ICC's rolls, only 1,341 lived in family quarters.82 The quarters were the 
most spacious that the ICC offered. A description of family quarters under construction in 
Balboa in February of 1914 claimed that they included a living room, kitchen, two bedrooms, 
and a bathroom along with decks and verandas for socializing. These spaces provided a greater 
amount of comfort to gold employees and the advantage of having family nearby allowed for the 
completion of domestic tasks and familial structures that silver laborers could not easily access.83 
The differences between silver and gold laborers were perhaps most stark when it came to 
mitigating the impacts of mosquito-borne diseases, particularly malaria. Yellow Fever was also 
                                                           
80 Leon Hallett to Ida May Richards, February 27, 1913 “Leon Forest “Slim” Hallett, Sr. Papers” University of Florida 
Digital Collections http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00025618/0000. 
81 Isthmian Canal Commission, Panama Canal Record, vol. 1 No. 3, September 18, 1907, pg. 23 
82 Isthmian Canal Commission, Panama Canal Record, vol. 4 No. 18, December 28, 1910, pg. 139. 




problematic in the Canal Zone, particularly during 1904 and 1905, but by 1906, an aggressive 
sanitary campaign effectively eradicated the disease by wiping out Aedes aegypti- the mosquito 
species serving as a vector for the transmission of yellow fever- preventing it from being the 
scourge it had been during the construction of the railroad and the French attempt to build the 
Canal.84 Malaria was far more problematic. Unlike Aedes aegypti, which tended to thrive in 
stagnant water left by humans, Anopheles mosquitos- several of which could serve as vectors for 
malaria- proved far more difficult to control. Due to the high heat and heavy rainfall in Panama 
they could breed year-round.85 As a result, malaria ran rampant throughout the Canal Zone and it 
was silver men who most frequently fell victim to the disease.86  
 Malaria permeated every component of life in the Canal Zone. And as Stevens attempted 
to bring more men into the Isthmus, the disease spread. In 1906 alone, 21,736 workers were 
admitted to hospitals for treatment of malaria out of a workforce of 26,000.87 William Gorgas 
effectively combated the disease through the removal of stagnant water, fumigation, and the 
erection of mosquito netting and by 1912 only 5,580 were treated for the disease.88 Still, malaria 
remained the most common affliction in the Canal Zone. It was not uncommon for a single 
individual to be treated for malaria multiple times in the span of a few weeks. Allen Belgrave, a 
Barbadian general laborer, described his experiences with malaria while working in the Canal 
Zone in 1906, writing, "Malaria fever began to worry me, I went to the rest camp, got quinine 
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treatment for two days, I return to work the fourth day, could only work two hours, six to eight, 
fever and my bowels took me in such a way that I had to be taken back to the rest camp.” 
Belgrave was laid low by malaria two more times over the next few months before being offered 
a job in the relative safety of a hospital. 89 His experience was far from unique. 
 While malaria impacted all laborers in the Canal Zone, the burden of death lay heaviest 
upon the silver community, particularly before Gorgas' sanitation department made headway 
against the disease. Much of the inequity stemmed from the geography of the Canal Zone. 
Elevation varied wildly along the path of the Canal as rolling hills were interspersed with 
lowland swamps that became breeding grounds for mosquitoes.90 Frequently, silver labor camps 
lay close to these sources of stagnant water, providing a buffet of blood for disease carrying 
mosquitoes. The result was that in 1906 black laborers died from malaria at a rate of almost eight 
per thousand while white laborers died at a rate of only two per thousand. These figures declined 
over time, largely equalizing by 1908, yet by that point in time hundreds of black laborers had 
died of malaria and tens of thousands more experienced the hardships of the disease.91  
The focus on providing lodging and eradicating tropical diseases in gold labor camps 
reflected the ICC's acknowledgment of the importance of the energy provided by gold laborers. 
These men, thanks to their training and experience in tasks ranging from bookkeeping to 
operating the controls of steam shovels, provided a specialized energy that was in short supply in 
the Transit Zone. This reality, combined with preexisting beliefs about the inferiority of West 
Indian labor, led the ICC to create an environment which consistently provided better diet, living 
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conditions, and medical care to gold employees. As Stevens restructured the infrastructure and 
mechanized labor force of the Canal Zone, he also reinforced this fledgling energy hierarchy by 
creating environments and conditions which reinforced the superiority of white American 
laborers on the gold roll. However, these benefits extended primarily to the environment that the 
ICC could most easily control, the living quarters of employees. As workers made their way into 
the ditch itself, the distinctions between silver and gold remained ideologically present, but the 
unpredictable energy at work in the Cut subjected men to many of the same dangers, and 
challenges. 
Unpredictable Equality 
Gold and silver laborers were on their most equal footing when they stood on the sloped 
banks of the Canal itself. While the ICC could exercise considerable control over the lived 
environments of gold and silver men, the injection of tremendous amounts of energy into the 
Cut’s already entropic environment was a recipe for chaos. Men and machines toiled side-by-
side, attempting to excavate and move tons upon tons of rock. Aiding them in this venture was 
the energy of chemical explosives. While dynamite could be directed and unleashed, the sheer 
violence and speed with which its reaction took place meant that it could never be completely 
controlled. Compounding these issues were the unstable tendencies of the Panamanian 
environment itself. As excavation commenced and banks became steeper, slides became 
increasingly problematic. Gold and silver men both encountered these realities in the Canal as 
they physically occupied the same space. The unpredictable energy at work in the canal bed 
presented perhaps the greatest challenge to the developing silver and gold system, impacting the 




By January of 1907, Stevens was ready to put his newly renovated railroad to the test by 
reinitiating excavation of the Canal. Between July 1906 to June 1907 excavation removed 
5,570,432 cubic yards of material, 4,047,071 cubic yards of which was removed between 
January and June 1907.92 This increased productivity was primarily due to a substantial increase 
in the amount of mechanical labor and energy directed towards the work. In June of 1906, the 
Department of Excavation and Dredging averaged just under ten shovels at work per day. By 
June of 1907, that figure was up to 29.03 shovels at work per day.93 Dredging also increased 
during the year. The Atlantic terminal only had one French ladder dredge in June of 1906. In 
September, a 16-inch suction dredge joined the work and in March these two machines were 
joined by a 5-yard dipper dredge. Recognizing the importance of dredges to the work, the ICC 
made a point of contracting for two oceanic seagoing dredges, the Ancon, and the Culebra, with 
the Maryland Steel Company at the end of the year.94 While dredges were never as numerous as 
steam shovels, they were far more efficient. The three dredges at work on the Atlantic had 
removed 1,112,321 cubic yards of material by the end of the year.95 
Enabling this increased productivity was a substantial investment in coal energy. During 
this period the ICC consumed 116,586 tons of coal. This figure was in addition to the 86,865 
tons of coal consumed by the Panama Railroad and various steamship companies supplying 
materials to the isthmus. The 203,451 tons of coal imported to the Isthmus between July of 1906 
and June of 1907 more than doubled the previous maximum of 99,438 tons brought to the 
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Isthmus the previous year.96 This energy did not come cheap. The Culebra Division paid an 
average of $6.48 per ton for the 79,500 tons of coal its consumed over the course of the year. 
Costs more than doubled the average of $3.00 to $3.25 per ton for domestic coal consumption in 
the United States.97 Despite this, the Culebra division was lucky in comparison to some of its 
counterparts. The La Boca Dredging Division, working at the Pacific terminus of the Canal, was 
forced to pay an average of $7.50 per ton.98 The fact that the ICC was willing to pay such 
exorbitant prices for coal indicated the importance of the little black rock.  
Despite its primacy, there were some tasks that coal simply was not cut out for. 
Shattering the rocks that littered the Canal Zone was one such task. To break apart rock and soil, 
particularly in the Culebra Cut, it was necessary to rely on a far more violent combustive 
reaction. Dynamite was the primary explosive of choice. More powerful than black powder, 
dynamite’s chief benefit to the builders of the Canal was the inherent instability of 
nitroglycerine. An incredibly reactive compound, nitroglycerine released enough energy to 
shatter rock formations. This power was essential to excavation in the rockier areas of the Cut. 
Between July 1906 and June 1907, a total of 1,998,655 pounds of dynamite and 408,385 total 
pounds of black powder were used to loosen 3,291,856 cubic yards of rock.99  
The tremendous amount of variance in Panama’s landscapes demanded this broad array 
of different energies. Steam shovels and human muscle removed loose materials from the canal 
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prism and loaded it on to locomotives that carried it to dumping sites where it was deposited. For 
rocky areas like the Culebra Cut, where steam shovels were unable to work effectively, chemical 
explosives provided a rapid, violent reaction capable of breaking up rock so steam shovels could 
remove it. In swampy and oceanic environments, dredges used coal energy to remove soft sand 
and muck from the approaches of the Canal and deepen harbors for incoming vessels. None of 
these actions were possible prior to Stevens’ tenure on the Canal. The restructuring of the Canal 
Zone’s infrastructure provided enough support to mechanical energy to allow it to thrive. And 
yet infusing the Panama environment with an unprecedented amount of energy injected chaos 
into the workscape. Laborers now needed to contend with both natural and unnatural dangers. 
One of the most dangerous components of the literal powder keg at the bottom of the 
Canal was the unpredictability of explosives. In the early years of canal construction, blasting 
crews relied on blasting batteries and fuses to detonate their charges. The high humidity and 
moisture content of the Canal Zone wreaked havoc with firing mechanisms, often preventing the 
ordinance from exploding.100 Unexploded sticks of dynamite needed to be removed before 
excavation could continue, but due to the shifting of the ground during explosions it was difficult 
to account for every device. Laborers and shovelmen needed to navigate a literal minefield, lest 
they inadvertently set off a catastrophic explosion. 
James Lewis of Antigua was working in Pedro Miguel, one of the lock sites on the 
Pacific end of the Canal, in 1906, helping steam shovels load soil onto dump cars. Powder gangs 
set off dynamite, loosening the soil so that the steam shovels and Lewis’ crew could load the 
cars. On one occasion, after loading a car, Lewis and his crew moved down the line to continue 
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their work. Fifteen minutes later a deafening explosion rent the air; the entire powder gang they 
had been working with was gone. Lewis remarked, "On the track lines you could see parts of a 
man's body. It's an awful sight to see." Lewis was spared physical injury over the course of his 
canal career, but many others weren't so lucky. A single explosion on December 12, 1908, at Bos 
Obispo took the lives of over twenty men. Canal Zone employees could only mourn from behind 
the controls of a steam shovel, or while tying a fuse themselves. Death simply became another 
part of the Canal Zone environment.101 Dynamite was crucial to the excavation of the Canal, but 
it also suggested the limits of human control over energy.  
In addition to the immediate dangers presented by explosions, the injection of energy into 
the Isthmus also destabilized the shifting landscape of Panama. One of the ironies of canal 
construction was that to impose a static order on the Canal Zone, humans first had to loosen, 
shift, and redistribute the land. In doing so they unleashed the entropy bound in Panama’s 
landscape by catalyzing slides and slope failures that toppled machines, derailed equipment, and 
injured the unwary. As time went on slides became increasingly common along the Isthmus. The 
Cucaracha Slide, which began in 1904, remained problematic in 1907, and continued to vex 
excavation until the Canal was finished in 1914 when the Culebra Cut was flooded and dredges 
were brought in to deal with it once and for all.102 Major landslides didn’t appear until late 1908 
and 1909, but slides occurred with increasing regularity as the work progressed and more energy 
was brought to bear on the Panamanian landscape.103 These slides may have lacked the violence 
of unexpected explosions, but they still threatened both silver and gold men alike. 
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Landscape alteration made unnatural threats such as train derailments, flying rocks, 
premature or delayed explosions, overturned machines, and drowning normal occurrences in the 
canal bed environment. The spontaneity of workplace accidents prevented administrators from 
controlling these events and, consequently, they impacted gold and silver laborers with equal 
ferocity. In 1907, for example, 55 white laborers and 87 black laborers were killed by "accidental 
traumatisms" (workplace accidents).104 In 1908, 79 white laborers and 111 black laborers lost 
their lives to “violence.”105 These tragedies emphasized that, in the chaotic environment created 
by the energy pouring into the Isthmus, gold and silver men were at their most equal. Indeed, 
gold men may have been at even greater risk due to their proximity to machines. Explosions 
didn’t differentiate between skin color or rank. Ironically it was here, in the very area that Canal 
Zone administrators sought to most dramatically alter the environment, that they also 
encountered the most substantial limits to their control.  
 Administrators’ answers to these issues was simply to inject more energy into the 
Isthmus. The aforementioned escalation in energy and progress between July 1906 and June 
1907 indicated that Stevens' infrastructure and organization could be scaled to deal with any 
challenges Panama could throw at the Commission. Entropic forces such as landslides and 
explosions accompanied this increase in energy but were seen as necessary evils of restructuring 
the Panamanian landscape, and the more energy that the ICC had at its disposal, the more 
effectively it could deal with these inconveniences. Thanks in large part to the efficacy of 
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Stevens techniques, the Panama Canal seemed feasible, and yet as it drew closer to reality, the 
distinctions between gold and silver laborers grew increasingly stark. 
Good as Gold 
Few images reflected the growing chasm between silver and gold laborers as dramatically 
as one taken during Theodore Roosevelt’s visit to the Canal in the fall of 1906. In November, 
Roosevelt visited the Canal Zone to observe excavation first hand. In typical Rooseveltian 
fashion, the trip oozed charisma. The President traveled by rail across the Canal Zone, stopping 
to interact with countless workers, silver and gold alike, during his journey.106 Excitement 
accompanied Roosevelt wherever he went, but few moments were as iconic as when Roosevelt 
took the controls of a Bucyrus Steam Shovel in the Culebra Cut. A photograph of that moment 
shows Roosevelt sitting easily atop the massive piece of machinery. A slew of other men watch 
as he reclines behind the controls of the all-important machine, a king atop an anthracitic throne. 
The image conveys Roosevelt's persona, and perfectly embodies the labor hierarchy of the Canal 
Zone. Roosevelt, clad entirely in white, looks down from the Bucyrus. To his right, a group of 
men, including several black laborers, wait, ready to assist the operator of the machine. 
Roosevelt's coat, hat, and positioning convey a simple fact: control of a Bucyrus, and control 
over coal energy more broadly, was reserved for men as white as the outfit worn by the President 
on that November day. 107  
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Roosevelt's visit marked the end of the preparatory phase of canal construction. Under 
John Stevens, the energy infrastructure of the Canal Zone had been entirely restructured. The 
revitalized Panama Railroad carried tons upon tons of material, allowing steam shovels to work 
at peak efficiency. Human labor was also reorganized to meet the demands of the coal-fueled 
labor force. Initially, the distinctions between American laborers and West Indian laborers were 
reflected through their different experiences in the lived environments. As the labor force grew 
throughout 1907, however, these distinctions become increasingly encoded in the formal hiring 
and employment policies adopted by the ICC Over the course of 1907 and 1908, the ICC 
enshrined their racially defined labor classes through explicit policies that clearly asserted that 
recruitment and promotion within the gold roll was a benefit reserved for white Americans. In 
hiring, wages, advancement, and position the "awful gulf" was excavated thanks in large part to 
coal energy. 
Ironically, the catalyst for the adoption of such formal pro-American policies was not 
West Indians, but instead, the influx of Europeans who came to the Isthmus between June 1906 
and June 1907. In June of 1906, there were only about 500 Europeans on the work; by the 
following year that number had reached 4,317, most of whom were Spaniards or Italians.108 
Europeans were seen as better laborers than West Indians, but still not as essential to 
construction as mechanically savvy Americans. To deal with this tension, the ICC placed 
Europeans on the silver roll but provided them with nearly double the wages, better living 
conditions, and more benefits than West Indian laborers.109 The only complication was that the 
ICC could no longer rely on complexion alone to distinguish between the tiers of its energy 
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hierarchy. Formalizing the gold and silver system became essential to reinforce the distinctions 
between Americans and the rest of the Canal Zone world. Policies adopted by the ICC during 
1907 and 1908 ensured that while they made up a minority of the labor force, Americans and 
their ability to fulfill essential functions in the coal energy regime of the Canal Zone were placed 
well above their non-American counterparts.  
While the ICC had implicitly relied on the employment of skilled laborers from the 
United States since construction began in 1904, it formalized this process in 1907, decreeing, 
"employments of unskilled laborers are not made in the United States. Neither are persons 
employed who have followed no regular trade or profession or who have not specialized in one 
particular kind of work."110 The policy reflected the fact that it was simply cheaper and easier to 
obtain unskilled labor from the West Indies and Europe, and simultaneously ensured that 
Americans would seldom be placed in the unskilled labor pool. Furthermore, the important role 
that these individuals were to play in canal excavation demanded far more vetting than that 
required for an expendable and replaceable common laborer. In the employment process "Agents 
of the Commission receive applications for all outside positions, personally examining the 
individual, and looking into his previous service record. This includes trainmen, steam shovel 
operators, foremen, and mechanics."111 The ICC hoped that this intensive review ensured that 
only the most talented and qualified men operated the controls of a steam engine. The 
Commission went so far as to adopt a policy that should a position open in the Canal Zone which 
could not be filled by internal promotion, Americans would be given priority over foreigners. 
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The implication was clear. Americans possessed better qualifications and abilities to operate 
machinery than their counterparts.112  
 It was not only in hiring that these distinctions were drawn. Promotion also favored 
American laborers. The ICC's employment practices allowed “authorities on the Isthmus to fill 
the position of foreman by the promotion of journeymen who have rendered faithful and 
satisfactory service on the Isthmus and are otherwise qualified.”113 Because the ICC went out of 
its way to hire white American journeymen, the individuals who moved up the ranks into 
positions of greater importance were also invariably American. Indeed, when making promotions 
the ICC stated its considerations as, “A. Efficiency. B. Conduct. C. Length of Service. D. 
American Citizenship.” This is not to say that silver laborers, primarily of European descent, 
were completely absent from supervisory roles, however as one ventured up the labor hierarchy 
their presence became increasingly rare.114  
 Nothing so aptly captured the distinction between American and foreign laborers as the 
practice of replacing foreign employees with American employees. In August of 1908, in 
accordance with an order from the Secretary of War, the ICC began a process of retaining 
American employees through the termination of foreign clerks. In a circular in the Panama 
Record, William Goethals, Chairman of the ICC, wrote that foreign employees must be replaced 
with Americans, and further, “The retention of aliens now employed in clerical positions paying 
$1,500.00 per annum or more will be authorized only in exceptional cases where it is shown to 
my satisfaction that the duties of the alien employee demand peculiar qualifications, which he 
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alone possesses, and could not be satisfactorily discharged to any available American.” 115 The 
wording adopted by Goethals made it all but impossible for foreign workers to remain in the 
valued position of clerk, further reinforcing the boundaries in place in the Canal Zone.  
 Despite the rigidity of the ICC's policies, there remained rare situations in which a white 
American and a black West Indian may have been employed in the same line of work. This was 
particularly true in mid-level positions. In these situations, American laborers made more than 
double the wage commanded by their West Indian counterparts. Thomas Gittens came to the 
Canal Zone from Barbados in 1905. By 1907 he was employed as a rodman for the Panama 
Railroad. While not technically employed by the ICC, Panama Railroad employees were subject 
to similar treatment as their ICC counterparts. Gittens recollected, “I started to work with the 
railroad and with the sivel (civil) engineers work as rodman for $30.00 a month, in those days a 
rodman from the states was paid $83.33.”116 Gittens was still better off than many of his 
counterparts. Amos Clarke noted that many Americans were salaried employees, making sixty-
five to seventy-five dollars monthly, whereas "West Indians were paid 10 cents per hour, 
Italians, Greeks, and Spaniards 20 cents per hour."117 Ultimately Americans held positions of 
dominance even when employed in the same positions as their West Indian or European 
counterparts.   
The true scope of this racialized labor force was seen in the descriptions of how the coal-
fueled machines operated. White men were expected to operate most machines in the Canal 
Zone. 298 laborers served as pitmen and firemen for steam shovels in the Culebra Cut in 1907, 
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clearing track and shoveling coal into the machines while a crew of "two white men" served in 
the positions of engineer and cranesmen, the most skilled jobs on the shovel. This type of labor 
arrangement was not unique to steam shovels. A track throwing machine, which helped settle the 
railroads and move unnecessary soil, was "handled by three white men and six laborers." 
Operating the plows and unloaders that removed soil from train cars took "28 white men" to 
operate the machinery as well as "43 laborers and firemen."118 This experience was echoed by 
West Indians working in the Canal Zone. John Prescod came to the Canal in 1906 from Barbados 
and worked alongside a steam shovel. Prescod never sat behind the controls, instead, he served in 
a support role, trudging through mud and water daily, noting, "one pair of boot last me one 
day."119 George Morgan had a similar experience working for the Panama railroad where he 
served as a fireman, stocking the train's coal reserves for hours on end. In each case silver men 
didn't interact directly with technology, instead, they supported the trains and steam shovels 
while white men operated the machines themselves.120 
Wages also reflected the value of American laborers. The all-important cranesmen and 
engineers mentioned by Bolich were acutely aware of their importance to the Canal Zone. While 
Morgan, Prescod or any of the nameless silver laborers who toiled next to their machines could 
be easily replaced, engineers possessed the ability to direct and maneuver mechanical energy and 
thus could negotiate from a position of strength. Interestingly these laborers were among the 
most difficult for administrators to keep happy. In December of 1906, the steam shovel operators 
and cranesmen working in the Culebra Cut asked for raises. When the ICC suggested a five 
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percent raise after the first year and a three percent raise every following year, the incensed 
operators resigned en masse even though they were making $210 and $185 a month respectively, 
figures between 40 and 70 percent higher than those same positions would pay in the United 
States. Most of these malcontent mechanical manipulators returned to work after a brief hiatus 
after receiving more modest raises. Their ability to petition for, and receive, higher wages 
indicated the unique power they held on the Isthmus.121  
Thanks to the policies adopted by the ICC during 1907 and 1908, the reorganization of 
the Panama Canal's human energy regimes came to fruition. As Theodore Roosevelt sat atop the 
Bucyrus, his white coat and hat starkly contrasting with the mud and dirt adorning the laborers 
around him, he came to embody the superiority of Americans in the Canal Zone. A year after 
Roosevelt left the Canal Zone, the gold and silver system was almost completely racially 
defined. A coal-fueled mechanical labor force presented a reliable means of codifying these 
implicitly racial distinctions while explicitly tying them to the experience and training of 
American laborers. Gold laborers were valuable thanks to their ability to operate the heavy 
machinery essential to the construction of the Canal. The coal-fueled machinery that was 
constructing the Panama Canal thus created a racialized, exploitable, and expendable labor force 
defined by de facto segregation between white American and Black West Indian laborers; it was 
an energy hierarchy in which white Americans, like Roosevelt, sat on top.   
Making the Dirt Fly 
 Despite the tremendous progress that characterized his tenure as Chief Engineer, Stevens 
abruptly resigned from his post in February of 1907. While no concrete reason has ever been 
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provided for his decision to leave the work, the most likely scenario was that he was simply 
overburdened by the scope of the undertaking.122 Stevens’ decision was a blow to the progress of 
the Canal, particularly on the Isthmus itself where many laborers saw the railroad man as a force 
of nature. And yet Stevens' departure contrasted starkly with Wallace's departure two years 
earlier. Wallace had left a floundering mass of energy lacking any sort of cohesion or 
organization, an unnecessarily complex monstrosity, completely unfit for the task of creating the 
Canal. Stevens, on the other hand, bequeathed his successor a well-oiled machine capable of 
rapidly and effectively moving and deploying energy to just about any point on the Isthmus. 
While the scale and scope of excavation grew exponentially between 1908 and 1914, the 
foundation laid by Stevens allowed escalation to take place smoothly and efficiently.   
 The key to this transition lay in Stevens’ decision to discontinue digging and focus work 
primarily on the modernization of the Panama railroad. While not digging seemed blasphemous 
to many, Wallace included, it provided the resources and focus necessary to turn the antiquated 
railroad into the circulatory system of the Canal Zone. By 1908 the Culebra Cut alone contained 
over 151 miles of track.123 The exponential growth of the transportation network in the Canal 
Zone allowed steam shovels to work at their full capacity, removing tons upon tons of material 
from the Cut. Plows, unloaders, and spreaders used their coal energy to remove and deposit this 
soil at dumping sites far away from the canal bed. Meanwhile dredges removed silt, sand, and 
soil from the waterways of the Canal Zone. This interwoven network of coal-fueled prime 
movers provided the labor necessary to excavate the Isthmus and bring the dream of interoceanic 
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transit to fruition.  
And yet the very success of coal energy also catalyzed changes within the human energy 
at work on the Isthmus. ICC administrators conflated the need for technically savvy laborers 
with their racial prejudices and biases to create a hierarchy of labor. American laborers, who had 
training and experience utilizing coal-fueled machines, occupied positions of prestige in the 
Canal Zone. Initially, this manifested itself in better living conditions, food, and wages. As time 
went on this system became increasingly entrenched. In 1907 and 1908, as Stevens’ tenure came 
to an end, the ICC began codifying the energy hierarchy in Panama, creating policies that 
permitted the hiring of skilled laborers only in America, and purging non-Americans and African 
Americans from the gold roll. These actions reflected the new reality in Panama. While Jim 
Crow may never have explicitly made his way down to the Canal Zone, he cast a shadow over 
the work.  
The restructuring of both the mechanized and human labor pools in Panama was due in 
large part to the indispensability of coal. The creation of a stable transit network in Panama 
required remarkable amounts of energy to overcome the entropy of the Isthmus. Coal was the 
only fuel capable of providing such quantities of energy. As a result, it was necessary to create a 
landscape conducive to the deployment of coal-fueled prime movers and obtain human energy 
capable of facilitating its implementation. The wedding of the demand for coal energy and the 
creation of the tiered labor system in Panama reflected the complex and unanticipated 
consequences that accompanied energy proliferation.   
 And yet the energy proliferation in Panama was not done. As William Goethals took over 
the work, he escalated all facets of canal construction, pouring even more energy into the 




tendencies of the region precipitating a complex series of challenges that required an 
increasingly diverse array of energy sources to create. Oil, electricity, and animal labor gradually 
joined coal, and human muscle in the Isthmus, broadening the spectrum of energy Americans had 







Chapter III: Locks, Shocks, and Barrels: The Proliferating Energy Regime that 
Constructed the Panama Canal 
It started simply enough. On October 10th, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson pressed a 
button in the White House. From there it got complicated. The push of the button sent an electric 
charge along telegraph lines running overland from Washington, D.C. to Galveston Texas. The 
electrical current was then channeled south, through the Central and South American Telegraph 
Company's submarine cable, before being diverted to the company's Transisthmian cable. 
Finally, the current traveled down a local circuit near Gamboa Dam, a dyke which prevented the 
waters of the artificially constructed Lake Gatun from entering the Culebra Cut. In August, over 
a month before the current arrived, engineers drilled holes into the Gamboa Dam and, in 
preparation of the current, carefully packed these holes with explosives. When the current 
reached the Gamboa dam it closed a local circuit and tripped a weight connected to a switch. The 
second the switch was thrown a massive explosion gouged a 125-foot opening in the dam. Water 
rushed into the Culebra Cut, flowing across the last stretch of land blocking the aquatic highway. 
The Panama Canal was finally complete… kind of.1 
The official inaugural voyage through the Canal didn’t take place until August 15th, 1914, 
nearly a year after Wilson triggered the demolition of the Gamboa Dam.2 And yet the fact that it 
was the President himself who sent the signal that destroyed the last major obstacle in the path of 
the Canal was telling. The complexity surrounding the detonation of the Gamboa Dam reflected 
the intricacy that defined the energy regimes at work in Panama. Coal remained paramount to 
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canal construction in 1913. Part of the incentive for flooding the Cut was that coal fueled dredges 
could easily remove the material remaining in the Cut.3 Despite coal’s continued centrality, the 
energy sources at work in Panama in 1913 were far different from those that were in place when 
John Stevens had left the work six years earlier. It was fitting that it was an electrical current that 
triggered the blast at Gamboa. Electricity now powered locomotives and cranes at Miraflores and 
Gatun and provided power throughout the Canal Zone. Meanwhile, oil powered fixed engines at 
the major machine repair shop in Gorgona and 40,000-gallon storage tanks were being 
constructed at terminal sites to provide oil for passing vessels. The Canal of coal had become the 
site of a massive energy proliferation that saw oil and electricity join the coal and human muscle 
powering Panama.  
As the energetic infrastructure that was installed by John Stevens expanded under the 
guidance of George Goethals it diversified, adding new sources of energy to deal with the variety 
of tasks that accompanied the expansion of excavation and the commencement of construction. 
This transition defined the second half of canal creation and heralded the increasing diversity that 
came to define energy regimes in general over the 20th century. Yet it is worth remembering that 
this was by no means a revolution in which the combined forces of electricity and oil usurped the 
throne of coal. Instead, all three energy sources saw rapid growth in their use, plateauing only 
when construction was ending.4 
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The increasing consumption of energy in the Canal Zone embodied what Christopher 
Jones has dubbed a "landscape of intensification," a location where the influx of tremendous 
amounts of energy allowed for the creation of an environment more capable of harnessing and 
deploying energy through positive feedback loops. The creation of the Panama Canal was reliant 
on this process and suggests further that even as fossil fuels were ascending to dominance in 
Panama, a complex web of supplementary energies and prime movers remained essential to 
canal construction. As coal, oil, electricity, and muscle shifted the earth, creating a passageway 
for water to flow between the seas, they also provided the energy to construct a fixed landscape 
of concrete capable of, at least temporarily, countering entropy in Panama.  
It was the fusion of these various sources of energy that allowed the completion of the 
Canal. As the tasks necessary for the Canal’s completion grew increasingly complicated and 
specialized so too did the energy sources used to complete these tasks. Ironically, this process 
liberated canal construction from the challenges of Panama’s entropic environment, while 
simultaneously enslaving it to expanding energy regimes and a static structure and size. The 
massive energy proliferation that took place between 1907 and 1914 pointed to both the promise 
and challenges of energy expansion. Navigating this task was crucial to the successful 
completion of the Canal and reflected a broader reliance of constantly expanding energy regimes 
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Oil % of 
total 
energy 
1907 203,451** N/A Not tracked 
separated 
203,451 N/A N/A 
1908 380,792** N/A Not tracked 
separately 
380,792 +177,341 N/A 
1909 292,608 290,958 88,796 381,404 +612 23.3% 
1910 398,719 463,186 141,292 540,011 +158,607 26.2% 
1911 415,199 784,642 196,160 611,359 +71,348 32.1% 
1912 401,385 876,325 219,009 620,394 +9,035 35.3% 
1913 371,764 904,917 226,229 597,993 -22,401 37.8% 
*Information listed in Fiscal Years (running July 1-June 31st) 
**Note that oil was not tracked separately from coal until 1909 
 
Table 2: Electrical Generation in Panama: 1908-1912 
Year* Electricity Produced (in 
Kilowatt Hours) 
Difference from Previous 
Year 
1908 984,744 N/A 
1909 3,703,407 +2,718,663 
1910 9,500,000 (number not 
exact)** 
+5,800,000 
1911 24,671,095 +15,171,095 
1912 30,857,213 +6,186,118 
*Information listed in Fiscal Years (running July 1-June 31st) 
**The energy produced at the newly opened Gatun and Miraflores plants could not be tracked 
conclusively during the year 
 
Inherited Energy 
When George Goethals was named Chief Engineer of the Isthmian Canal Company 
following the resignation of John Stevens, he inherited a force remarkably effective at the task of 
excavation. Steam shovels, railroads, dredges, and bodies all worked in concert with one another 
to dig the big ditch. Goethals also acquired a tangible plan for the construction of the Canal. In 




construction of a lock style canal, believing such a structure was the only way of completing the 
herculean task.  While Stevens wasn’t the architect of the plan, his convictions eventually rubbed 
off on Canal Zone administrators and the American government and on June 19, 1907 the 
decision was made to commit to a lock style canal once and for all.5 
While the lock style canal required less excavation than a sea-level canal, it also 
mandated more construction work. The Isthmian Canal Commission (ICC) had to find a way to 
raise boats nearly 100 feet above sea level while also creating a structure capable of withstanding 
the Isthmus' entropic tendencies. Goethals’ central challenge then was taking an energy 
infrastructure adept at excavation and converting it to one capable of the equally demanding task 
of construction. The key process in this transformation was the broadening of the energy regimes 
at work in the Canal Zone. Human muscle, coal, and explosives were tremendously effective at 
destroying landscapes, but they faced limitations when it came to constructing them. To 
overcome these challenges Goethals began a gradual process of energy proliferation, which 
relied upon the emergence of oil and electricity. 
This process was already beginning during the end of Stevens’ tenure. By mid-1907 the 
excessive price of coal caused some to consider whether it might be more prudent to begin 
converting some engines to run on fuel oil instead. Coal was effective for mobile engines thanks 
to its portability. A fireman could easily keep a coal-fueled boiler stoked with little more than a 
shovel. As a liquid, oil needed to be loaded and transported in cumbersome barrels that were 
difficult to handle, particularly on mobile engines. When it came to fixed engines however, oil's 
cheap price and great efficiency made it a compelling choice, particularly considering the 
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massive quantities of energy being consumed on the Isthmus. This Culebra Division alone 
consumed 79,500 tons of coal in the fiscal year 1907, a total that cost $515,453.6 Due to the 
difficulty of transporting coal to the interior and Pacific coast in particular, it was among the 
chief expenditures of the Division. Oil proved far more economical thanks to an 8-inch pipeline 
Union Oil constructed across the Isthmus to carry its oil from California to the east coast, 
precluding the exorbitant shipping costs that accompanied the importation of coal.7 Starting in 
1907, oil consumption on the Canal grew rapidly. Energy proliferation was percolating in 
Panama. 
The growth of oil occurred because of coal, however, not in spite of it. As excavation 
expanded in 1907 Stevens, and later Goethals, constantly augmented their mechanical labor 
force. The Excavation and Dredging Division had 39 shovels on the work in July of 1906. A year 
later that number jumped to 63.8 The additional shovels paid immediate dividends. In August of 
1907, shovel No. 211 appeared on the front page of the Panama Canal Record, celebrated for 
moving a record 29,604 cubic yards of soil.9 The addition of more mechanical energy, however, 
also added additional challenges, namely, the need to maintain and service more machines. In the 
fall of 1907 Shovel No. 222, which was damaged in an explosion. Interestingly, Shovel No. 222 
was not described as “damaged” but instead “injured,” anthropogenic terminology which 
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suggested a degree of empathy with the machine itself.10 Doctoring these new industrial patients 
forced the ICC to broaden its support facilities and the energy they consumed.  
The Division of Municipal Engineering, Motive Power, and Machinery expanded its 
facilities to deal with this task. The principal facility on the Isthmus remained in Gorgona (or as 
it was known prior to December 24, 1906, Bas Matachin); however, the Division began 
renovating its facility at Empire to deal with the influx of new shovels. The installation of an 
expanded power station formed a key component of this overhaul. The power facility contained 
two 100-kilowatt generators direct connected to a 160-horsepower tandem compound ball 
engine, as well as a 200-kilowatt generator connected to a Harrisburg engine, all of which were 
fueled by oil.11 In fixed locations like the Empire shop, it was far easier to use oil-fueled 
generators to create electricity and rely on wiring to deploy the electricity to machines as it was 
needed. The same principle held true for providing the power to light the townsites constructed 
throughout the Canal Zone. 
Powerplants were springing up throughout the Isthmus in 1907, providing a more stable 
and accessible form of energy for those individuals working in fixed facilities. Of particular 
importance during 1907 was providing lighting for the townsites constructed in the Panamanian 
interior. In addition to powering the Empire shop, the power plant at Empire also provided 
enough electricity to power roughly 4000 lights. Ten miles of transmission lines ran from the 
Empire station, powering nearly all the lights in Empire and in the surrounding communities of 
Culebra, Rio Grande, Enterprise, Cerro, and Lirio. Meanwhile, the ICC constructed a 
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supplementary lighting plant at Gorgona which was placed in operation in May of 1907. This 
plant sustained 2000 lights and was connected to a three-mile transmission line which provided 
lighting throughout Matachin and Gorgona.12 While these two shops were modest, they pointed 
to a broader trend of energy diversification in Panama.  
This is not to suggest, however, that the energy proliferation in Panama was relegated to 
fossil fuels and electricity. The adoption of novel sources of energy in Panama was predicated on 
expanding organic energy sourced as well. In addition, the previously discussed human labor that 
came to the Isthmus in 1907, pack animals grew increasingly commonplace. In June of 1907, a 
force of 600 mules and horses provided a reliable means of transportation across the Isthmus. 
Pulling wagons, carts, and even ambulances, these animals engaged in tasks ranging from the 
transportation of goods and materials to the construction of roads and other public utilities.13 
While their labor was highly specialized and far less voluminous than the power provided by 
mechanical prime movers, horses and mules remained integral to the broadening energy regime 
at work in the region. The fact that they remained relevant while oil and coal consumption 
increased suggests that they were not subsumed by the energy proliferation taking place in 
Panama, but rather were part of it. 
The growth of oil, electricity, and animal labor between 1906 and 1907 was modest. Coal 
and human labor dwarfed these initial forays into energy diversity, and yet they served as a 
harbinger for what was to come. The economic benefits of oil made themselves readily apparent 
by early 1907 and the ease of deploying and utilizing electricity suggested that it too had a key 
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role to play in the coming years. While a bit of a statistical outlier, animal muscle also fulfilled 
specific tasks along the Canal Zone. As the work expanded over the summer of 1907 so too did 
the consumption of oil and electricity. Indeed, these two forces played crucial roles in the 
completion of the Canal, particularly as construction became more prevalent. 
Tipping the Scales: 1908-1909 
 When George Washington Goethals took charge of the work on March 31, 1907, he was 
focused on only one thing: growth. Starting in June of 1907, the Isthmus saw a marked uptick in 
energy consumption across all fronts as coal, oil, electricity, and human labor were brought to 
the Isthmus in remarkable quantities. Stevens had crafted an infrastructure that could excavate 
the Canal. Goethals initiated an energy explosion that expanded excavation and constructed the 
facilities that would make up the Canal. The early years of this process were still dominated by 
coal energy, but electricity and oil left their mark in increasingly tangible ways as electrical 
lights, fixed motors, and the expansion of electrically powered facilities brought modernization 
and convenience to workers on the Isthmus.  
Goethals’ appointment to the position of Chief Engineer was emblematic of Roosevelt’s 
frustration with his inability to maintain consistent leadership. While Stevens’ tenure as Chief 
Engineer had been quite successful, Roosevelt took his decision to leave the work as a personal 
affront. Goethals, a Colonel in the Corps of Engineers, already had a distinguished career by 
1907, having overseen coastal construction projects for nearly two decades before being named a 
member of the inaugural General Staff in 1903. Goethals’ keen unyielding resolve and 
consummate professionalism drew the attention of William Taft who recommended the young 
officer to Roosevelt. Roosevelt, impressed by Goethals directness and sheer force of will, and 




man who could complete the Canal. Goethals possessed a singular vision and an incessant 
demand for perfection, and while he was an engineer first and a soldier second his organizational 
skills were remarkable. Perhaps most importantly, Goethals wasn’t a civilian. Unlike Stevens, he 
could not leave Panama even if he wished to. The work was now his for better or worse.14 
Goethals quickly put his logistical prowess to work, radically increasing the energy stores 
available on the Isthmus. Over the course of his first year as Chief Engineer, he nearly doubled 
the volume of coal consumed on the Isthmus and began gradually relying more on oil as a source 
of fuel.15 While Goethals never explicitly stated a desire to specifically increase Panamanian 
energy reserves, he actively increased both the size and scale of the work. That energy would 
increase simultaneously was a foregone conclusion. This drastic escalation marked the initiation 
of several years of energy expansion in Panama. From the time Goethals took charge of the 
work, the total amount of energy imported to the would continue to rise before declining as work 
approached its conclusion in late 1913. 
The escalation in energy use was unsurprising. Coal, which remained the most common 
source of energy on the Isthmus throughout the Canal’s construction, was crucial to the 
successful removal of material and by the end of 1907 there were over 100 shovels at work on 
the Isthmus.16 Over the course of the year shovels removed nearly 14,000,000 cubic yards from 
the canal bed while dredges at work on the Atlantic and Pacific terminals were able to remove 
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nearly 11,000,000 cubic yards for a collective total of 24,792,703 cubic yards.17  While these 
figures were impressive, the increased scale of earthmoving also made instability far more 
problematic and pervasive than it had been in previous years. Issues started in early October 
1907, when the Cucaracha slide slid nearly fourteen feet in a single day. While the slide 
eventually slowed to a rate of roughly four feet per day, the increased entropy unleashed by more 
invasive excavation presented a continual challenge.  
The sheer scale of the slide made it difficult to deal with, spanning over 34,000 square 
feet and containing over 600,000 cubic yards of material. D.D. Gaillard, the head of the 
Department of Excavation and Dredging, went so far as to install electric lights at the slide so 
that steam shovels could work 24 hours a day to remove the material that slid into the cut.18 Nor 
was the Cucaracha slide an isolated incident. A more concentrated slide of 140,000 cubic yards 
of material took place at Paraiso in April of 1908 and smaller slides at New Culebra and Las 
Cascadas complicated cleanup efforts further. The most troubling issue with these slides was that 
they took place in the dry season, a period when slides had previously been a rarity.19 If the ICC 
wished to contain the increasing entropy it unleashed it needed to import and direct increasing 
amounts of energy at the landscape in hopes of establishing stability.  
Excavation was also expanding at the terminal facilities by late 1907. The decision to 
commit to a lock canal the previous year had given construction a degree of direction that it had 
lacked, but it also created new issues. First and foremost, among these challenges was finding 
terrain suitably stable for the creation of the locks. To this end, coal-fueled drills made dozens of 
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exploratory drillings at both the Pacific and Atlantic ends of the Canal.20 At Gatun, the site of the 
Atlantic terminus, the work progressed well, and despite and despite some minor tinkering to 
determine the best possible site for the locks, steam shovels and dredges removed 1,769,115 
cubic yards of material from the lock site.21 In addition to the material removed from the lock 
site, Two French ladder dredges, two dipper dredges, a sixteen-inch suction dredge, and the sea-
going suction dredge Ancon all worked in concert to remove 5,087,623 cubic yards of material 
from the waterways near the Atlantic locks.22 
The ICC was not as lucky at La Boca, the planned site for one of the two sets of locks on 
the Pacific terminus. The underlying material at La Boca was too soft and shifted considerably 
whenever weight was applied to it. The engineers at the site described it as, " an unctuous blue 
clay without grit, possessing very little supporting power, instead of a stiff clay as indicated on 
the profile."23 Structures in the region would simply sink into the muck, so the site of the locks 
was shifted to Miraflores.24 By January 1908, two steam shovels arrived at Miraflores and began 
excavation in earnest.25 As was the case in the Atlantic, it was the dredges however that were the 
main source of landscape alteration at the Pacific locks as well. Here four French ladder dredges 
and the sea-going suction dredge “Culebra” worked together, removing 5,273,369 cubic yards of 
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material.26 While completion of the Canal was still far away, coal provided the energy to bring it 
closer to reality.   
 Despite its primacy, coal alone did not account for the exponential increase in energy that 
swept through the Isthmus in late 1907 and early 1908. Newly initiated construction projects 
required far less mobility than excavation and didn’t require a highly portable source of energy 
like coal. Oil and electricity proved efficient and economical sources of energy for construction 
as Goethals endeavored to provide amenities for the laborers working in Panama. In particular, 
the expansion of electricity illuminated the working towns of Panama and ensured that workers 
could acquire luxury food items from the Commissary.  
 Illumination brightened the night sky of Panama on an unprecedented scale as 1908 
dawned. While this development was not crucial to the completion of the Canal per se, it was 
part of a broader campaign of providing modern conveniences to laborers. Prior to 1908, lighting 
had been a combination of traditional oil-fueled lamps and electrical lighting. While this worked, 
oil lights required more maintenance than electrical lights and during 1908 the electrical 
subdivision mandated that all new lights would run on electricity with the exception of those 
located in areas that would be flooded by the Gatun Lake.27 This mandate ushered in a rapid 
expansion in the lighting of the Panamanian countryside. Concentrating on worker towns in the 
interior and at terminal sites in Panama City and Balboa, the ICC installed 13,355 new lights 
during the year. This effort quadrupled the 3,381 electrical lights that had been installed on the 
Isthmus in prior years, bringing the new total to 17,186.28 The lights comforted workers and their 
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families and challenged assumptions about a wild and uncivilized Panama. The potential of this 
new technology to breed comfort was infectious and soon spread to other amenities. 
 Food distribution was also modernized by electrification. Panama had limited resources 
and while tropical fruits and plants could be found in abundance, American staples like meat 
were hard to obtain. The ICC and Panama Railroad quickly recognized that discontent could be 
mitigated with luxury food items that gave laborers a taste of the homes they had left behind. The 
ICC looked to the “Commissary” that had been operated by the Panama Railroad Company since 
the 1800s to provide American goods to its employees.29 Working with the railroad, the 
Commission expanded the Commissary, using electricity to increase its offerings and storage 
facilities. The chief thrust of the Commission’s efforts was to provide meat and dairy products 
that were difficult to obtain in local markets. Because these items spoiled rapidly it was 
necessary to use electrical energy to find ways to create cold storage spaces capable of 
processing and storing these valuable commodities. Starting in 1908, the Commissary added a 
cold storage facility, an ice making plant, and an ice cream plant. Upon opening, the cold storage 
plant handled nearly 1.5 million pounds of meats, vegetables, and fruits monthly, the ice plant 
manufactured roughly 1,950 tons of ice monthly and the ice cream plant manufactured roughly 
100 gallons of ice cream per day.30  
 These additions were so popular, and demand so substantial that within a year the 
Commissary sought to expand the output and operating capacity of all three plants.31 
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Unfortunately for some, the acquisition of a frosty treat created more problems than it solved. 
Mitchell Berisford, a Barbadian working on the Canal in 1909, fell victim to dessert disaster 
when his wife spent ten dollars on cake and ice cream to host a party for her friends. A dejected 
Berisford remembered, “when I went home the evening I saw the ice cream dishes what they use 
and the crumbs of cake all over the table, not a crumb leave for me, pots cold, stove cold, and no 
dinner, and she was away, hungry killing me and nothing to eat, great experience.” Berisford 
deemed the sugary slight so egregious that “I had to make a divorce on her."32  
 While the number of marriages ruined by desserts on the Isthmus is difficult to track, the 
increase in electricity that enabled the Commissary’s expanded culinary offerings is not. The 
illumination of the interior and the expansion of Commissary facilities both reflected the greater 
emphasis placed on electrical generation in 1908. Facilities at La Boca, Cristobal, and Colon 
generated 984,744-kilowatt hours over the course of the year. Increasingly oil fueled the turbines 
that generated this power. The La Boca facility was converted to operate on oil during the year, a 
decision which yielded, "decided economical operation." Meanwhile the growth of the 
Commissary branch at Cristobal forced the electrical plant supporting the facility to more than 
double its output through the installation of new motors and generators. The expansion of the 
Commissary was so rapid that even the new machines “will be so badly overloaded that it will be 
impracticable to supply any current for Gatun, as was previously considered." The only way to 
meet the needs of the Commissary was to convert the Colon beach station to run on oil and 
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integrate it with the Cristobal facility.33 Luxury food items may have made the Canal Zone a far 
more alluring place to laborers, but they also stretched electrical generation to its limit. 
 By June of 1908, the Canal Zone was a drastically different place than it had been a year 
before. During his first full year on the work, Goethals made headway in excavation, particularly 
at the lock sites, and made drastic changes to the Canal Zone environment that made it far more 
alluring to prospective laborers. Illuminated night skies and luxury food items were now 
hallmarks of the Isthmus, a development which led to 18,000 more individuals coming to the 
Isthmus than leaving it over the course of the year.34 While the ICC still made a point of 
recruiting laborers externally, the massive jump in immigration in 1908 suggested that the 
organization's labor issues could be mitigated through the modernization of the Isthmus, a 
process catalyzed by electricity and the amenities it provided. 
Petroleum in Panama 
Goethals continued to reorganize operations on the Isthmus in July of 1908, dividing the 
engineering force into three divisions, the Atlantic, Pacific, and Central Divisions, each of which 
was responsible for construction and excavation in its geographic area.35 This change indicated 
the shifting work on the Isthmus. In the Central Division, excavation remained the chief concern, 
but in the Atlantic and Pacific Divisions work was focused on construction. This shift in the 
work was accompanied by the continued ascendance of oil as an efficient source of energy for 
construction work. Oil had played an important role in the diversification of Isthmian energy 
                                                           
33 Panama Railroad Company Board of Directors, “Annual Report of the Panama Railroad Company to the Board of 
Directors for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1908,” pg. 25. 
34 Wood, “Annual Report of the Department of Labor, Quarters and Subsistence for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 
1908,” July 1, 1908, USNA, RG 185, Collection PL 153 31, Box 507, pg. 1. 
35 George Goethals, “Annual Report of the Isthmian Canal Commission for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1909,” 
August 20, 1909, USNA, RG 185, Collection PL 153 31, Box 503: Folder: Annual Report of the Chairman and Chief 




sources for years; the summer of 1908 saw a far more concerted effort to utilize oil and its 
economy. Storage facilities made it more accessible, and engines across the line were converted 
to run on it. The energy expansion that had taken place during 1907 expanded in 1908 and 1909 
as the ICC set new records in the use of coal, electricity, oil, and human labor in Panama. The 
single biggest testament to the expansion of oil on the Isthmus was the fact that while there was a 
net increase in energy over the course of the year, the bulk of that difference was made up of 
oil.36 While the amount of coal consumed still dwarfed oil consumption overall, oil was growing 
increasingly prevalent. As the ICC established more fixed locations and was better able to 
transport materials around the Isthmus, oil became increasingly viable as a fuel source for static 
processes such as construction and power generation. 
Starting in the summer of 1908, Goethals and his division leaders began constructing 
facilities to better handle and deploy oil. The Mechanical Division redoubled its commitment to 
petroleum during the year, constructing a massive 2500-barrel holding tank and a 500-barrel 
auxiliary tank to provide the fuel necessary for the day to day operations at Gorgona. By August 
1908 the tanks and pipelines connecting them to the main facility were completed and by 
October Gorgona was consuming oil at a rate of 3100 barrels per month.37 The transition 
immediately paid dividends, resulting in a savings of $200 per month.38 The adoption of oil then 
was both an act of convenience as pipelines to fixed motors required far less labor than stoking a 
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coal-fueled engine with firemen, and an act of economy as the savings received from the practice 
made it more cost-effective than coal as well. 
The expansion of oil consumption on the Isthmus also made itself felt in electrical power 
generation where the ICC was conducting a piecemeal installation of new motors and engines. 
As was the case in the Gorgona shops, oil was rapidly becoming the dominant source of fuel in 
electrical generation. The Commissary continued the expansion of operations it had begun the 
previous year, increasing the productivity of its ice cream plant to 500 gallons per day and 
adding 2856 square feet of cold storage to its facility at Cristobal. These developments were 
enabled by the addition of three new generators.39 Long at the vanguard of oil usage on the 
Isthmus, the Panama railroad also began experimenting with the use of oil for fuel in its 
locomotives.40  
Electricity also expanded during the year. The Electrical Subdivision of the Mechanical 
Division took over administration of the Balboa plant in July of 1908, giving them control of all 
power plants on the Isthmus with the exception of the remaining railroad plants at Cristobal and 
Colon.41 This plant consisted of direct current generators of 125 and 325 kilowatts as well as 
alternate current generators of 60 and 200 kilowatts.42 The Division installed another 400-kW 
generator at Empire and extended their pole line all the way to Miraflores and outlying labor 
camps in the area. At Gorgona the additional 100 kW of capacity allowed for the expansion of 
lighting and a new electric crane, and even the powerplant at Gatun received an extra 50 kW of 
power to expand lighting in the area surrounding the lock site. All together, these new facilities 
                                                           
39 Panama Railroad Company Board of Directors, “Annual Report of the Board of Directors of the Panama Railroad 
to the Stockholders for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1909,” pg. 25-26. 
40 Ibid, pg. 22. 
41 Brooke, “Annual Report of the Mechanical Division for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1909”, pg. 30. 




generated 3,703,407 kilowatt hours on the Isthmus, an unprecedented figure that indicated just 
how quickly electricity was adopted.43  
The highest concentration of electrical expansion was at the lock sites on both the 
Atlantic and Pacific terminals of the Canal. By early 1909, Goethals had plans for both sets of 
locks and settled on 1000-foot by 110-foot lock chambers contained by miter gates at the ends of 
each lock.44 The adoption of this detailed plan allowed both the Atlantic and Pacific Divisions to 
begin erecting the construction plants they would use to pour the concrete foundations for the 
locks, as well as the powerhouses at Gatun and Miraflores that provided the electricity necessary 
to both construct and operate the locks.  
Thanks to the early identification of Gatun as a dam and lock site, the Atlantic Division, 
under the guidance of William Sibert, found itself ahead of its counterparts in the Pacific 
Division. Steam shovels and dredges removed 1,400,000 cubic yards of material from the area 
surrounding the locks and five dredges removed nearly 6,000,000 cubic yards of material from 
Colon and Mindi harbor and the approaches to the Canal.45 Much of this material was used in the 
construction of the Gatun dam. The structure holding back the Chagres River, the dam was 
imperative to the success of the Canal by managing the water supply for Gatun Lake. As material 
was removed from the cut it was placed in the expanding dam structure which contained a 
hydraulic fill core surrounded by trestling and solid fill. By June of 1909, over 2,500,000 cubic 
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yards of material were deposited in the dam and, apart from a few minor alterations, the structure 
seemed to be well on its way to completion.46  
Electricity served little purpose in the excavation at Gatun, but as Sibert redirected his 
attention on the construction of locks themselves electricity became increasingly important. The 
plant at the lock site was a complex infrastructure of trains, cranes, cableways, and mixing plants 
that took rock and sand from quarries at Porto Bello and turned it into concrete.47 The machines 
were powered by a massive power plant at Gatun consisting of Three 1500 kW turbo-generators 
which provided 3-phase alternate current at 2,200 volts. This energy powered the cranes, 
cableways, and trains. Direct current, supplied by two 500 kW and one 300 kW rotary 
converters, provided the energy necessary for the mixing plant itself.48 All of this equipment was 
housed in a temporary power station that would be moved to the Gatun spillway upon the dam’s 
completion.49 While the plant had yet to be fully completed by June of 1909, the structure itself 
was completed and the equipment eight-five percent installed.50  
Work on the Pacific Locks progressed more slowly. Division chief, S.B. Williamson’s 
decision to shift the locks from La Boca to Miraflores had slowed the work, but the Division 
moved rapidly to catch up to their counterparts on the Atlantic. The Pacific Division outpaced 
the Atlantic Division in excavation during the year, removing over 10,000,000 cubic yards of 
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material between steam shovels and dredges.51 Intriguingly, of the seven dredges that worked on 
the Pacific terminus and approach during the year, five were converted to run on oil.52 This 
diversification of energy paid off and by August of 1909 the Division had nearly completed 
excavation at Pedro Miguel and had excavated over 80% of the upper locks at Miraflores.53 Here 
too electricity was crucial. During the year, the Division began building a powerhouse at 
Miraflores that mirrored the one under construction at Gatun. The intent was for this station to 
provide the energy necessary for the construction of the Pacific Locks and to act as a redundant 
support for the Gatun powerplant once the Canal opened.54 At both the Atlantic and Pacific 
terminals, oil and electricity were usurping the primacy that coal had enjoyed during the early 
years of canal construction.  
Despite its utility as a source of light and power, the most valuable contribution made by 
electricity during the year may have been the adoption of electrical current as the firing 
mechanism for explosives in the Central Division. The task of carving a path through the rocky 
continental divide invariably required the tremendous energy contained in explosives. Of the 
14,325,876 cubic yards removed by the Central Division between July 1908 and June 1909, 
12,622,880 cubic yards of material were first broken apart by 3,365 gross tons of explosives.55 
The concentration of such a substantial amount of volatile energy created issues, particularly 
when combined with the damp conditions of Panama. Heavy rainfalls and damp conditions 
wreaked havoc with blasting batteries, resulting in delayed or failed explosions which could 
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maim or kill unsuspecting powdermen. To counter these explosive conditions, the Mechanical 
Division and Central Division worked together to create a sophisticated but intuitive blasting 
system. The Empire plant was connected by transmission wired to the Central Division. When 
the current reached the Division’s territory, it was directed into 45 blasting spurs, each of which 
was roughly 1000 feet apart and connected to a 5 kW 110-volt transformer. The fuses were 
connected to this spur and when a switch on the transformer was thrown the current ignited all 
the fuses simultaneously, ensuring that each device detonated.56 The value of this new system 
was self-evident as 14,325,876 of the cubic yards of material were removed from the Central 
Division alone during the course of the year.57  
The increase in energy also had the unanticipated consequence of unleashing Isthmian 
entropy. A frustrated George Goethals was forced to admit that, "The slides continue to be a 
source of annoyance.”58 Assurances from the previous year that the Cucaracha slide had been 
contained proved premature as it grew to cover an area of twenty-seven acres.59 Ultimately, no 
fewer than ten additional slides popped up between July 1908 and June 1909, forcing Central 
Division chief D.D. Gaillard to oversee the removal an additional 884,530 cubic yards of 
material. And yet, in the face of the pervasiveness of these slides, the Gaillard remained naively 
optimistic, suggesting that slides would only necessitate the removal of an additional 1,000,000 
cubic yards from the cut.60 Fate soon proved this optimism misplaced, but given the amount of 
energy at his disposal, Gaillard felt slides could easily be dealt with. 
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Landslides continued to complicate the creation of the Panama Canal, but the growth of 
energy made them see trivial obstacles. Oil and electricity had grown increasingly important 
since July of 1908, and the overall increase in energy on the Isthmus suggested that more energy 
could impose order on the entropic environment. It's worth mentioning that it wasn't only fossil 
fuels and electricity that made up this increase. By the end of April 1909, the Commission set a 
record with over 33,699 laborers on the work.61 By July of 1909, a tremendous amount of 
progress had been made in construction, thanks in large part to the adoption of a diverse array of 
energy sources, each of which was suited for particular tasks. The flexibility and fluidity that this 
system afforded was crucial to construction and helped impose a degree of order on the 
Panamanian environment.  
Abundant Energies 
 Under Goethals leadership the work reached a fever pitch by the summer of 1909. The 
completion of the Gatun and Miraflores power plants revolutionized lock construction while coal 
and oil consumption exploded in the Panamanian interior as D.D. Gaillard’s Central Division 
continued to wage war on the entropic tendencies of the Culebra Cut. All these factors coalesced 
to usher in the most diverse and prolific energy regime of canal construction. While energy 
consumption had been increasing for the last several years, the tremendous jump that took place 
between July 1st, 1909 and June 30th, 1910 was the largest of Goethals’ tenure. Consumption 
increased across all departments on the Isthmus, and across all energy sources.62 The number of 
laborers on the Isthmus ballooned to nearly 39,000 during the dry season of 1910 and was so 
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substantial that the ICC stopped recruiting laborers for the Isthmus altogether later that year.63 
The abundance of energy even extended to pack animals. C.A. Devol, the head of the 
Quartermaster’s Department, noted, "More animals have been available for and more have been 
used in construction work than at any other period on the canal work. Teams were used in the 
spillways at Miraflores and Gatun, on the reservoirs at Gatun and Toro Point, in the canal bottom 
at San Pablo, and on paving and sewer work in the city of Panama."64 This concentration of 
energy was unprecedented, dwarfing the volume of energy used in years past, and continuing the 
trend of utilizing as broad an array of energies as possible.  
 One of the chief sources of excitement in the fall of 1909 was the opening of the Gatun 
powerplant. In August of 1909, it came online and began providing power for the construction 
plant building the Gatun Locks. This process was far from efficient. When the plant opened only 
one of its three generators was working, generators number two and three requiring replacement 
parts and increased insulation respectively.65 These issues lingered through the end of the year. 
In March of 1910 two of the generators again burnt out, but by this point in time they were 
quickly replaced and put back to work. Despite these hiccups, the Gatun plant was producing 
roughly 850,000-kilowatt hours a month from 6400 barrels of oil by the spring of 1910.66 
Consequently the stations output grew as the year progressed. Between August and December of 
1909, the station generated roughly 1,000,000 kWh. Between January 1, and June 30, 1910 
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production exploded to 4,314,586 kWh.67 Jumps like this resulted in a greater abundance of 
energy at a far cheaper cost, a formula for success in Panamanian construction.  A few months 
after the opening of the Gatun plant, its twin at Miraflores followed suit. The opening of the 
powerplants was crucial to attempts to mitigate the flow of entropy at the lock sites. Electricity’s 
was a consistent and reliable source of energy that could be directed to a variety of tasks. While 
it was relatively fixed in its distribution, the creation of an electricity-based plant at the locks 
allowed for regular, measured, and long-term applications of energy capable of creating and, 
more important, maintaining human altered landscapes in the fluid Panamanian environment. 
 These powerplants powered extremely complex infrastructures directed primarily 
towards the pouring of concrete, a material that could mitigate entropy by halting shifting soils 
and precluding the need for external injections of energy. As much of Panama’s entropy 
stemmed from the hydrological conditions of the region and rain’s capacity to erode and saturate 
soils, concrete, a fixed and impermeable structure, was essential to minimize the rate of entropy 
on the Isthmus and consequently minimize the amount of energy that needed to be infused into 
the Canal to maintain it. Concrete production took sand and gravel supplied by massive rock 
crushers from quarries near the lock sites and combined them with water and cement. The 
resulting concrete created static structures that withstood the erosive forces of Panama far more 
effectively than the fluid materials that naturally occurred in the region. As the lock sites were 
the lynchpin of the entire canal system it was imperative that they were created with a material 
that withstood the entropic challenges of Panama with only minimal injections of energy. 
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To this end, a massive plant was installed at the Pedro Miguel locks which mirrored that 
already at work in Gatun. Twelve 11.5-ton locomotives ran between storehouses and cranes at 
the lock. The locomotives carried two cars which held two buckets capable of carrying 64 cubic 
feet of concrete. Berm cranes at the storehouse loaded the buckets onto the locomotives which 
carried the concrete to the lock site. There, chamber cranes unloaded the full bucket and gave the 
locomotives an empty bucket to bring back to the storehouse to be refilled. The chamber cranes 
then poured the concrete where it was needed in the lock foundation.68 This method proved 
remarkably efficient and made rapid headway at both the Gatun and Pedro Miguel locks. While 
the plant was not fully installed at Pedro Miguel until July of 1910, it paid immediate dividends. 
Between September of 1909 and the end of the year, the Pacific division poured 166,868 cubic 
yards of concrete at Pedro Miguel.69 Gatun saw even more progress. Between July 1909 and 
June 1910 over 500,000 cubic yards of material were poured at the Atlantic locks.70 This process 
was so efficient that starting in April of 1910, the ICC began accepting offers from contractors 
for the construction of the lock gates and the machines that would control them. Ultimately the 
contract was awarded to McClintic-Marshall Construction Company of Pittsburgh, PA at a cost 
of $5,374,474.82 for the entire work.71  
Electricity powered the plant necessary to lay the foundation for the lock sites, but until 
they were complete entropy could still rear its ugly head. Slides and flooding grew problematic, 
particularly at the Gatun locks. The search for solid bedrock at the Atlantic terminus led to 
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excavation between 30-40 feet below sea-level in the lowest set of locks. The digging 
destabilized the surrounding banks and, after substantial flooding on November 11th and again on 
November 20th, the shovels at work on the locks were forced to abandon the work.72 Pumps 
struggled to deal with the flooded locks and ultimately the work was delayed by these continuing 
hydrological issues.73 The delay caused by these slides may have been longer were it not for the 
efforts of the six dredges at work on the Atlantic Division. Nearly 5,000,000 cubic yards of 
material was removed from the canal prism by these vessels.74  
For S.B. Williamson’s Pacific Division, dredging and pumping were crucial to the 
creation of the Canal, but traditional excavation played a larger role. The bulk of excavation at 
the Pedro Miguel Locks neared completion by June of 1910, despite two small slides.75 As the 
cut approached Miraflores, however, more work remained to be done. Shovels moved 99,703 
cubic yards from the trough between Pedro Miguel and Miraflores, while several more displaced 
285,354 cubic yards from the upper locks of Miraflores.76 These shovels were far less effective 
in the lower locks of Miraflores, where the presence of water forced engineers to use the suction 
dredge Sandpiper. As excavation shifted into the deeper water south of the Miraflores Locks, 
dredges again played a substantial role, removing 7,956,143 cubic yards of material.77  
The diverse prime movers at work at the locks suggested the complexity of the task at 
hand. Containing and mitigating the entropy of Panama required a broad array of energies and 
tools, each of which fulfilled a specific function in various environments around the locks. Given 
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the breadth of the local environment, it was unsurprising that this location should be the site at 
which energy sources were most broadly distributed. Electricity powered the plant that was 
laying the concrete structures of the locks themselves while coal and oil-fueled machines 
removed earth on land and on the water. But as one traveled away from the locks and moved 
inland towards the continental divide, where the focus of the work was focused almost 
exclusively on excavation, the energy regime became increasingly homogenous. 
In D.D. Gaillard’s Central Division, the bulk of energetic growth was confined to an 
increase in the human labor pool the Division had at its disposal as well as a monumental jump 
of nearly 100,000 tons of coal.78 While fossil fuels provided a tangible bellwether for the 
expansion of energy in the region, the greatest testament to the fact that the ICC had finally met 
its demands for energy may have been the decision to halt the importation of laborers in January 
of 1910 after bringing only 2,519 men to the Isthmus.79 The cessation of labor recruitment 
stemmed from several factors, the chief among them the fact that immigration outpaced 
emigration by 21,114. This glut of human energy precluded the necessity of importing additional 
laborers from abroad. Thanks to the influx of laborers the Commission was able to count a 
record of 38,767 employees on its rolls in March of 1910.80 The efficacy of mechanical labor had 
always been predicated by the availability of human labor. As such, the decision to halt the 
importation of laborers was an acknowledgment of the fact that the ICC had effectively met its 
perceived energetic needs on the Isthmus. Perhaps the most interesting part of this relationship 
was the way in which the growth, particularly in the gold rolls, accompanied the utilization of 
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more coal on the Isthmus. Mechanics in charge of the maintenance of machines accounted for 
nearly three-quarters of all hourly gold employees on the Isthmus by 1910.81 Their increase in 
numbers directly correlated with the expansion of mechanical labor at work in Panama.  
The muscles making their way to the interior of Panama found themselves overshadowed 
quite literally by the continuing influx of mechanized labor that sought to establish control over 
the Culebra Cut.  Over the course of the year, the Central Division alone consumed 187,326 tons 
of coal.82 This injection of fuel immediately paid dividends as the Central Division removed 
17,558,364 cubic yards of the 19,903,000 cubic yards excavated across the Isthmus during the 
year.83 This was due in large part to the continuing increase in shovels that the division had at its 
disposal. During 1910 the Central Division employed: two 45-ton Bucyrus, fourteen 70-ton 
Bucyrus, 32 95-ton Bucyrus, two Marion Model-60s, and 11 Marion Model-91s. Engineers were 
also becoming increasingly skilled at maximizing their efficiency, further increasing the 
efficiency of the machines. In 1908 shovels had averaged 121.4 cubic yards excavated per hour 
under steam. By 1909 that figure had jumped to 150.46, and it climbed again to 155.8 in 1910.84 
Increases in coal consumption were in large part responsible for the growth in energy that 
dominated the Isthmus during the year, but oil too saw a steady increase in use. It was the 
dominant source of fuel at power plants and was also increasingly being used for excavation and 
transportation. The greatest testament to the importance of oil was the Mechanical Division’s 
decision to create a position for a traveling engineer, who inspected all facilities on the Isthmus 
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to provide guidance on the efficient and economical use of oil.85 Indeed the program proved so 
successful that by the end of the year a second engineer had been appointed to serve in a similar 
function.86  
The 100,000-ton increase in coal consumption and the increase in employment that took 
place between July 1909 and June 1910 allowed the ICC to finally reach a pool of energy it was 
comfortable with. The increase in energy and efficiency suggested that it was possible to break 
through the Continental Divide and complete the excavation in the Culebra Cut. While 
continuing landslides indicated that Panama’s entropy would remain a problem, the massive 
amounts of energy at work in the Isthmus were more than capable of keeping it in check.87 As to 
the long-term stability of the region, the creation of power plants at Gatun and Miraflores held 
the promise of a steady and continuous supply of energy that could be used to mitigate entropy's 
long-term consequences. The ICC had reached its energy apex, now all that was left to do was 
divide the Isthmus and unite the world. 
Plateauing Power 
Given the sheer scale of the increase in energy consumption that had taken place by July 
1, 1910, it was unsurprising that energy plateaued in 1911. The stabilization of energy 
consumption was most acute in those sources of energy that had been most important to canal 
construction up to this point in time: coal, and human labor. In many ways, the decline reflected 
the fact that Goethals had finally been able to maximize the ICC’s energy consumption had an 
adequate volume of energy to fully realize the vision of interoceanic transit. And yet when 
looking at individual energy regimes, 1911 continued the incessant trend of electricity and oil 
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slowly laying claim to more of the Isthmian energy network. As excavation wound down in most 
areas outside of the Culebra Cut, the ICC turned to the energy sources more efficient and 
economic at maintaining and constructing fixed landscapes rather than excavating them. Coal 
still dwarfed the utilization of any other source of energy; however, electricity and oil's centrality 
to the work was increasingly obvious.88  
Despite the relative stability that marked the year, the most marked distinction was the 
drastic increase in oil consumption which now accounted for more than a third of the energy 
consumed in the Isthmus. More and more Panama Railroad Locomotives used oil as their 
primary source of fuel, and the ICC itself saw a drastic uptick in its oil consumption thanks in 
large part to the rise in fixed engines and plants.89 Ultimately, oil was simply more economical 
than coal. Coal still cost roughly $6 per ton thanks to its substantial shipping costs. At $1.10 a 
barrel, the ICC could purchase the equivalent of one ton of coal (four barrels) for only $4.40. 
These significant savings led Goethals to prefer oil to coal and warranted more investment in this 
source of energy.90  
The plateauing of energy sources on the Isthmus also extended to human energy. 
Quartermaster C.A. Devol was pleased to note that, "This past year has been the first since the 
inception of the work that no contract laborers have been brought to the Isthmus by the 
Commission. The last shipment was of men received was in January 1910, over a year and a half 
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ago."91 As a result, the number of laborers stayed relatively static, peaking in January of 1911 
with a total of 37,271 employees, just below the total from the fiscal year 1910.92 Here too the 
ICC had met their energetic needs, however, there were some signs of trouble on the horizon. 
Turnover remained problematic for silver and gold laborers alike, forcing the Quartermaster's 
Department to constantly be on the lookout for new employees. In previous years this problem 
had been irrelevant due to the volume of immigrants coming to the Isthmus; however, 1911 saw 
a significant decrease in potential laborers as immigration only outpaced emigration by 4,910 
over the course of the year compared to 21,114 the previous year.93 While this trend did not 
immediately endanger the work, it did point to the fact that laborers came to Panama only when 
there was an established need for their work.  
 Little had changed in D.D. Gaillard’s Central Division where steam shovels and coal 
waged their war of attrition against the entropy of the Panamanian landscape. As the Cut grew 
deeper, the material which machines were excavating grew increasingly diverse and varied. 
Goethals suggested that this was the chief challenge in creating the Cut, arguing that, “The 
geological formation of the Isthmus is very irregular and the character of material encountered in 
the Cut is constantly changing, so that it is impossible to determine in advance where slides and 
breaks are liable to occur, or when they do occur, the slopes which they will ultimately 
assume.”94 This complexity kept engineers guessing and meant that as they altered the 
environment they subsequently destabilized it by breaking into materials and formations that 
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could not support the banks of the Cut on their own. As a result, the Bucyruses generated more 
work for themselves with every shovelful that they removed. 
These slides regularly hindered work in the Cut, forcing Gaillard to divert resources to try 
to contain them. Despite the fact that the Central Division set a new record by removing 
18,552,644 cubic yards between July 1910 and July 1911, they were also forced to add another 
4,676,278 cubic yards to the amount of excavation that needed to be done.95 Gaillard attributed 
this increase to "the unexpected development of slides beyond the limits assumed when making 
former estimates, especially in the two large slides at Culebra."96 During the course of the year 
the Culebra slide, which was 7.3 acres at the  beginning of the year, had extended to 46.6 acres, 
rivaling the 47.1 acres of the Cucaracha slide.97 While slides remained a nuisance in the Cut, the 
utilization of 193,977 tons of coal by the Division allowed the mechanical labor force to keep 
pace. Indeed, the Division had managed to effectively halt the Cucaracha slide during the year.98 
Slides and coal consumption continued to grow in tandem, but the sheer volume of energy 
available to the Central Division meant that while slides could hinder the work, they never 
fundamentally threatened it.  
The development of the harbor facilities that would support the Canal suggested that 
coal's importance would linger on well into the future. The fall of 1910 marked the first serious 
planning for the development of port facilities at both the Atlantic and Pacific terminals. Among 
the chief concerns of engineers was the ability to fuel ships that were making their way through 
the locks. Preliminary reports varied in the exact details of what the harbor should look like. 
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However, there were several significant points of agreement, most of which revolved around the 
facilities’ capacities to store and deploy coal and oil. This desire was expressed in the initial 
legislation approving the Canal which decreed "These facilities were to include the storing and 
furnishing of coal and other fuel for use both afloat and ashore...".99 The ICC determined that it 
should construct two coaling stations, an Atlantic facility capable of holding roughly 200,000 
tons and a Pacific facility capable of holding roughly 50,000 tons. In addition, both sites would 
each also have storage for roughly 80,000 barrels of oil.100 The commitment to providing energy 
at the Canal itself directly addressed concerns that many Canal lobbyists had expressed about 
American energy security. Thanks to the administration of the Canal Zone, America could 
ensure that her military vessels in the region would always have access to reliable energy stores. 
Simultaneously, America could also compete with British coaling stations throughout Central 
and South America by allowing many ships to simply bypass them. These decisions showed that 
the ICC was acutely aware of the benefits offered by being the “crossroads of the world” and 
hoped to harness the energy windfall that could result. 
While coal carved up the Culebra Cut and captured the imaginations of energy 
speculators, it was oil and electricity that made their presence felt in the fixed engines and power 
plants dotting the Canal Zone. The massive growth in oil consumption during the year was 
reinforced by the fact that the ICC doubled down on its previous endeavor to ensure more 
efficient and economical use of the fuel by hiring another traveling agent to educate employees 
on the proper use of fuel oil. The original two employees occupying the post had been focused 
on fuel consumption in locomotives before also instructing engineers and firemen on handling 
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and properly firing oil. The new engineer had a far broader mandate. His duty "covered steam 
shovels, unloaders, spreaders, and all stationary plants, and was subsequently extended to the 
marine equipment."101 The increasing oversight on fuel oil consumption yielded immediate 
returns. The Las Cascadas air compressor plant showed savings of 3.5 percent, the Mount Hope 
pumping plant 22 percent, the Gorgona pumping plant about 15 percent and the Cucaracha 
pumping plant about 11 percent. On average the traveling engineers generated savings of roughly 
10 percent at nearly every site they visited.102 This increased efficiency only served to reinforce 
the economy of oil and suggested the ICC's growing reliance on this new source of fuel was not 
an aberration, but rather a sign of the oil's importance on the completion of the work. Oil had 
more utility and was far cheaper than coal, and, as a result, it was a more practical source of 
consistent energy to keep entropy at bay as the Canal aged.  
At the locks and at power plants located in the Panamanian interior, oil produced the 
electricity which illuminated towns, helped preserve food, and, at the lock sites, powered the 
incredibly complex machines responsible for the erection of the lock foundations. The three 
power plants located in the interior at Balboa, Empire, and Gorgona produced 4,911,134 kilowatt 
hours over the course of the year, a marked increase over their output from the preceding year.103 
Despite the increase in productivity these stations combined produced far less than the 6,797,714 
kWh produced at Miraflores and the 12,962,247 kWh produced at Gatun.104 The productivity of 
these sites was the result of two distinct factors. Both Miraflores and Gatun were larger than their 
counterparts in the interior and, as a result, had more turbines and generators. Additionally, the 
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larger size of the facilities allowed Miraflores and Gatun to generate their current from steam 
turbines while the powerplants at Empire and Gorgona relied on noncondensing engines and 
Balboa on condensing engines.105 This was deliberate. The ICC recognized that upon the 
completion of construction the interior would be abandoned, and so it was unnecessary to build 
up large permanent plants in this region.  
Miraflores and Gatun needed larger facilities to provide the power necessary to operate 
the massive construction plants at work on the canal locks. While minor slides continued to 
complicate work at both sites, excavation was ending. William Sibert was quick to point out that, 
at Gatun, shovel excavation was completed in the forebay, upper lock, middle lock, and lower 
lock during the year and by July of 1911, 2,085,000 cubic yards of concrete (68.34% of the total 
work) had been poured.106 S.B. Williamson was similarly bullish on their progress at Pedro 
Miguel. Here excavation was also effectively complete and 665,055 cubic yards of concrete had 
been placed. This progress was so substantive that the Division made the decision to break up 
some of the plant at Pedro Miguel and move it to Miraflores In December of 1910. By June of 
1911, 272,933 cubic yards of concrete had been laid at Miraflores, the bulk of it by the auxiliary 
plant.107 Perhaps the best testament to the efficacy of this process lay in the fact that in the spring 
of 1911 the ICC made the decision to begin on-site work on the lock gates themselves. In 
January, contractors commenced work on the gates at Gatun, and in March they began at Pedro 
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Miguel.108 These developments suggested just how effective the plants at Gatun and Miraflores 
were and hinted at the impact they would have in the Canal Zone moving forward. 
Miraflores and Gatun were constructed to last, and to play considerable roles in the long-
term operation of the Canal. By 1911, the ICC turned its attention to the question of how the 
massive locks would be opened and how ships would travel through them. Recognizing the 
resources already at his disposal, H.F. Hodges, the head of the First Division (which oversaw 
lock construction), sought to use the existing power plants at Gatun and Miraflores to provide the 
power necessary for both these tasks. Hodges suggested that the existing power plant at Gatun 
should gradually be replaced by a hydro-electric station constructed on Gatun Dam.109 While a 
hydro-electric plant was proposed as a means to provide power in the region as early as 1904, the 
tremendous progress on the Gatun Dam, made the proposal viable for the first time.110 If it could 
be brought to fruition, the hydroelectric plant would turn one of the greatest obstacles to the 
construction of Isthmian transit, the Chagres River, into an essential source of power for the 
operation of both sets of locks.111  
The ICC's emphasis on the hydroelectric plant was indicative of the organization’s 
shifting priorities. Coal was still imperative to the completion of the work in Culebra, but the 
terminals were increasingly relying on oil and electricity to meet their energetic needs. Shifting 
energy consumption served as an indicator of the shifting nature of canal excavation itself. The 
plateauing of coal consumption and the substantial rise of oil and electricity suggested that the 
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era of excavation was over. As July of 1911 dawned, the Canal had been transformed from an 
excavation to a construction project, one with a myriad of energies at its disposal. 
The Beginning of the End 
Starting in July of 1911 the energy decline that began during the previous year became 
even more pronounced. While the ICC still possessed a considerable volume of energy, coal 
consumption was dwindling. Oil and electricity meanwhile were constituting a far greater 
percentage of Panamanian energy.112 As excavation was completed throughout the Canal Zone, 
with the exception of the Culebra Cut, steam shovels and locomotives became less central to the 
creation of the Canal, and while dredges were still essential to the preparation of terminal 
facilities and lock approaches, the overall mechanical labor force of the ICC decreased over the 
next twelve months. Goethals’ focus was increasingly placed on the preparation of harbor 
facilities, the locks themselves, and the power plants that would support them. The disassembling 
of the mechanized labor force that had been so integral to the removal of earth and rock 
suggested that the end of the enterprise was rapidly approaching and by the following summer 
oil was making up over a third of the fossil fuel energy consumed in Panama.113  
The chief factor for the decline in coal was the tremendous progress that had been made 
in excavation. By July of 1912, estimates suggested that of the projected 125,735,000 cubic 
yards of dry material that needed to be removed to create the Canal, 108,309,364 cubic yards or 
roughly 86% had successfully been removed.114 This remarkable productivity rendered steam 
shovels, and the energy infrastructure supporting them, increasing irrelevant beyond the bounds 
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of the Culebra Cut. Sibert’s Atlantic Division announced that they had completed its excavation 
near Mindi and was going to rely primarily on dredges going forward.115 While minor slides at 
Pedro Miguel and Miraflores forced the Williamson’s Pacific Division to use steam shovels 
more heavily than the Atlantic Division, here too the bulk of dry excavation had been 
completed.116 In both cases, steam shovels were responsible for little more than mitigating slides 
and ensuring the stability of the landscape surrounding the locks. Actual work in the canal prism 
itself was almost exclusively the work of dredges. 
Gaillard and other leaders of the Central Division also made the tactical decision to 
gradually diminish their mechanical force. As the central part of the Isthmus was to be flooded 
upon the opening of the Canal, the Central Division needed to be able to remove its material as 
quickly as possible when the work ended.117 Much of this effort focused around limiting the size 
of their mechanical labor force. The Central Division took six shovels out of service during the 
fiscal year 1912 dropping the total number employed by the division from 52 to 46.118 
Simultaneously they removed 21.7 miles of auxiliary railroad tracks from the Cut.119 
Despite its dwindling mechanical labor force, Panamanian entropy remained a fierce 
obstacle to Gaillard and the Central Division in the Culebra Cut. The Division removed 
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16,476,769 cubic yards of material between July 1911 and June 1912, but it once again had to 
direct a significant amount of its resources to countering slides. 35.9% of the total amount of 
material removed had been deposited by slides, a figure significantly higher than the 30.07% that 
had been removed due to slides during the previous year.120 Entropy remained far from contained 
in the Culebra Cut. 
It was unsurprising that slides became more prevalent as the Cut deepened. Gaillard 
noted that this outcome “was anticipated”, but that it nonetheless proved extremely detrimental 
to the work as, “No plan of treatment for slides has proven thoroughly effective once they have 
developed, except that of excavating and hauling away the material composing the moving mass 
until the slide comes to rest upon reaching the angle of repose for the particular material in 
motion.”121 In principle, this approach seemed easy, but the inconsistent formations underlying 
the Cut meant that angles of repose could vary radically from one area of the Cut to the next.122 
The only way of adequately dealing with slides was an incessant process of trial and error as 
shovels simply removed material until banks stopped moving. While not an elegant solution, the 
tremendous amounts of coal still at work in Culebra afforded Gaillard an abundance of energy 
capable of mitigating the impact of these slides. While they were troubling, Gaillard suggested 
that slides were given "sensational importance" whenever they occurred and that, in reality, they 
were little more than inconveniences to the work.123  
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Goethals seemed equally confident in the progress of the work at the Canal's terminals. 
The Commission refined its plan for the creation of terminal facilities for fueling of ships and 
began constructing the coal pits and fuel tanks that would store energy for ships transiting the 
Canal. Cristobal, near the Atlantic terminus of the Canal, was dredged to hold a 200,000-ton 
coaling station. Two 40,000-barrel storage tanks were under construction on the mainland and 
pipes were created to transport the oil from the tanks to waiting ships. The plan for the Pacific 
terminus was slightly changed as the capacity of the facility at Balboa doubled from 50,000 tons 
to 100,000 tons to deal with the increased traffic expected from the West Coast. Here too, two 
40,000-barrel storage tanks were under construction to deal with ships relying on oil.124  
Miraflores and Gatun continued to provide the energy necessary for construction at the 
lock sites. The Gatun steam plant saw another massive jump in its energy output as it produced 
16,263,510 kWh, a jump of nearly 4,000,000 kWh over the previous year. The Miraflores plant 
also saw a modest increase in output as it generated 9,552,400 kWh for construction at the 
Pacific locks.125 At Gatun, construction on the locks was largely done and progress focused on 
the flare walls along the canal approach.126 Construction at Pedro Miguel met with similar 
success and more of the auxiliary plant was transferred to Miraflores to focus on the construction 
of the lock foundations there. The result was the most productive year of construction yet as 
751,540 cubic yards of concrete were poured at Miraflores.127 While there was still work to be 
                                                           
124 Rousseau, “Annual Report of the Second Division for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1912,” pg. 216. 
125 A.D. Faure, “Annual Report of Cost Keeping Accountant FY 1912,” August 31, 1912, USNA, RG 185, Collection PL 
153 31, Box 504: Folder: Annual Report of the Cost Keeping Accountant, Office of the Chief Engineer, 1910-1913, 
pg. 305. 
126 Sibert, “Annual Report of the Atlantic Division for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1912,” pg. 122. 




done, the rapid progress at the locks redirected the attention of Sibert and the Atlantic Division to 
developing the Gatun Hydro-electric plant that would power the locks themselves. 
The key to constructing the Gatun hydro-electric plant was completing the Gatun Dam. 
Material removed from the lock sites was used as fill for the massive structure, and by the end of 
the year nearly 20,000,000 cubic yards of material had been pumped and carried to the 
structure.128 Largely this work progressed without incident. The lone challenge facing the dam's 
completion was increasing concern that the angle of repose for the dam was too steep and could 
shift if the Chagres ran particularly strongly. In response, Sibert and his engineers lowered the 
dam's height while simultaneously making the slopes supporting it more gradual.129 These 
decisions provided a degree of stability for the dam and made it far more conducive to the 
creation of the power plant and by May of 1912, a steam shovel began working on gouging out 
the spillway where the hydroelectric plant would be located.130 
While undoubtedly important, selecting and preparing the site for the dam was only one 
part of the equation. In September of 1911, H.F. Hodges, head of the Engineering Division, 
shared the specifications for the electric equipment and explained how it would be connected to 
the dam. The main generator consisted of three 2,000 kW units powered by three 2250 kW 
turbines located along the spillway.131 The current would be conveyed by transmission lines to 
the locks themselves where a total of 36 transformers (sixteen at Gatun, eight at Pedro Miguel, 
and twelve at Miraflores) converted the 2,200 volts received from the power plant to 220 
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volts.132 This voltage powered 966 motors spread across the three locks that handled tasks 
ranging from opening and closing the lock gates to powering the electric locomotives that carried 
ships through the Canal. This complex network of wires, motors, and transformers ran 
throughout the foundations of the locks, forming copper arteries that would allow ships to transit 
the locks.133 While construction on these systems didn't begin in earnest until the summer of 
1912, the ICC awarded contracts for the hydraulic equipment to the Pelton Waterwheel 
Company, and the electrical equipment to General Electric in November of 1911. Delays in the 
delivery of the equipment prevented the ICC from beginning electrical work in earnest, but the 
decision to rely on electricity as the dominant source of power for the operation of the locks 
marked yet another example of the declining utility of coal. The electricity produced by the 
Chagres River was more efficient, economical, and theoretically reliable than what coal could 
produce.  
As the summer of 1912 arrived, dry excavation was complete nearly everywhere except 
for the Culebra Cut. Coal remained the chief source of fuel in the Cut where steam shovels 
continued to deal with the entropy of the Panamanian environment, but as the Canal approached 
completion, oil and electricity were increasingly dominating energy production and consumption 
throughout the Isthmus. The low cost of these energies and their capacity to provide consistent, 
economical sources of energy rendered them far more practical for long-term utilization. The 
chief development of the year, the acquisition of the materials for the Gatun hydroelectric plant, 
suggested that Panama would become an electrical Isthmus rather than a canal of coal. 
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The summer of 1912 brought with it a tangible decline in the overall consumption of 
energy. While human labor and animal labor both increased over the next year, thanks in large 
part to efforts to install the lock gates, coal consumption dropped significantly as the Gaillard’s 
Central Division approached the end of their work. These developments reflected the changing 
objectives of the ICC The Commission had largely completed the extensive landscape alteration 
necessary to create an aquatic passage across the Isthmus. The focus now was on adopting an 
energy infrastructure that could hold the entropy of the Isthmus at bay and maintain the 
consistent operation of the Canal itself. To this end, work focused on the construction of the 
Gatun hydroelectric station and the transmission line that would carry current between the 
Atlantic and Pacific terminals. This transition was also defined by an aggressive attempt to 
remove resources and laborers from the interior of the Canal Zone which would soon be the site 
of Gatun Lake. The emphasis placed on the creation of an electrical landscape and the attempts 
to eradicate the excavation infrastructure that had helped carve out the canal prism defined the 
final era of canal construction and paved the way for the opening of the Canal itself.   
The single greatest testament to the changing nature of work in the summer of 1912 was 
the first decline in the overall consumption of energy since the commencement of the work.134 
The overall decline in energy was fairly modest at only a little over 20,000 tons over the previous 
year, and yet the fact that energy consumption declined at all was a substantial but inevitable 
change. There were a variety of factors that contributed to this trend but particularly important 
was the fact that many of the machines that remained in service were relying on oil as their chief 
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source of fuel. By July of 1913, fifteen of the sixteen Panama Railroad Locomotives in mainline 
service had been converted to run on oil rather than coal.135 This, in conjunction with the 
declining importance of steam shovels, substantially cut into coal usage.  
 Ironically, the decline in coal was accompanied by a slight resurgence in the value of 
human and animal labor. In March of 1913, as work on the lock gates reached its peak, 44,733 
human laborers were at work on the Isthmus.136 This influx of labor pointed to one of the 
complications faced by the ICC during the final phase of construction. The installation of locks 
required a tremendous number of skilled craftsman capable of driving rivets and installing 
electrical equipment that required a level of prevision beyond the scope of mechanical labor.  
Intriguingly, it wasn’t just on the Canal that human labor increased. The Public Works 
Department on the Isthmus constructed roads to connect isolated townsites on the Isthmus with 
significant locations like Empire. Animal labor proved valuable to this task and, for the first time 
in five years, the ICC found itself purchasing pack animals to help pave roads and transport 
people and items.137 More difficult to obtain were human laborers willing to lay roads through 
swampy jungles. In response the Public Works department relied on a novel source of labor: 
convicts. While convict labor never became prevalent in Panama, the fact that it was used at all 
suggested that the ICC certainly still needed human energy even though construction was rapidly 
approaching its conclusion.138  
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 The number of laborers may have been growing at terminal facilities, but it was 
dwindling just about everywhere else. Even Gaillard’s Central Division saw a substantial decline 
in its energy consumption, labor force (both human and mechanical), and progress during the 
year. The Central Division managed to remove 12,828,086 cubic yards during the year, a figure 
considerably lower than that removed the preceding year. This decline in productivity was 
partially intentional as the Division shrank its mechanized labor force down to only 42 steam 
shovels.139  
And yet this optimism may have been somewhat premature. Slides continued to increase 
projections for the amount material to be removed. By July of 1913 engineers estimated that they 
needed to excavate an additional 9,280,237 cubic yards of material. Gaillard suggested that this 
substantial increase was "due to the development of new slides as the depth increased and to 
increased activity of slides already existing at the beginning of the fiscal year."140 Perhaps the 
most compelling argument for the lingering impact of the slides was the fact that of the 
12,828,086 cubic yards removed during the year, 5,899,200 cubic yards or 46.67 percent of the 
material removed was the result of slides.141 At the end of the previous fiscal year, the division 
had been confident that many of the slides, particularly the incessant Cucaracha slide had 
reached a stable angle of repose, but an increasingly perturbed Chief Engineer Goethals 
concluded simply that this, "had not been realized."142 
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 The continuing slides were little more than a nagging thorn in the side of construction 
until January 20th, 1913. On that day, "the basalt rocks broke and there slid into the Cut 
approximately 2,000,000 cubic yards of material extending completely across the Cut, topping 
the tracks on the 67-foot level and completely stopping the passage of trains from the north."143 
Gaillard attempted to deal with this issue by installing pipes to remove hydraulic material, but 
heavy rains in the days following saturated the soil, shifting it further, and snapped many of the 
pipes. To finally deal with the slide and remove the material the Division developed a split shift 
policy in which shovels worked in both the Cut and on slides for twelve-hour days. This 
approach allowed them to make headway but by the end of the year, they still anticipated the 
removal of nearly 6,000,000 cubic yards of material from the Culebra and Cucaracha slides 
alone.144  
These developments indicated that a new course of action was needed. Frustrated with 
the challenges presented by the continued reliance on dry excavation, in February of 1913, 
Goethals and his engineers proposed flooding the Cut the following October in hopes that slides 
would be easier to manage. Some viewed this plan with apprehension. Goethals noted that, "It 
has been the general belief that the effect of the water in the Cut would tend to retard slides and 
the experience below the Gatun locks in the sustaining power of water against slides fully 
justifies this belief; on the other hand the geologist is of the opinion that the water may to some 
extent develop new slides."145 Despite the risks, the incessant slides had substantially delayed the 
work in the Cut and suggested that a new tactic was needed to deal with Isthmian entropy.  
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Considerable work remained to be done before this ambitious plan could be put into 
action. Both the Pacific and Atlantic Locks were far from complete and the terminal facilities, 
which were now under construction, raised new questions about how the United States would 
determine who would have access to these potentially lucrative energy markets. Before the 
Commission could consider the completion of the work and the passage of ships through the 
locks they had to deal with these issues. 
The first issue that the ICC dealt with wasn't physical, but instead political. The 
construction of the fueling facilities at the canal terminals had garnered the interest of energy 
speculators looking to capitalize on the opportunity to distribute their fuel.146 The ICC was 
bombarded by requests from coal dealers who wanted to lease space to supply their coal to ships 
refueling at either facility. And yet there was no legislation that gave the United States authority 
to lease land apart from a 1909 ordinance allowing land to be used for agricultural purposes. The 
government was careful to note however that it did not intend to “exercise a monopoly of the 
coal business on the Isthmus.”147 To this end, they decided to allow companies and individuals to 
rent out space at the two handling facilities for a reasonable rental fee and a merchandise tax of 
five cents for each ton of coal sold.148 This policy mitigated their issue, but also pointed to the 
substantial energy markets created by the Canal’s opening. 
In addition to questions over the energy trade, the ICC also faced the task of completing 
the construction of its terminal facilities. Electricity still provided the dominant source of energy 
for the construction and maintenance of these facilities. The Miraflores powerplant remained 
productive, generating over 9,000,000 kilowatt hours between July of 1912 and June of 1913, but 
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the Gatun plant only produced 10,315,790 kilowatt hours during that same period.149 While this 
was a substantial decline in productivity, it pointed to the fact that much of the work being done 
by the construction plant at Gatun was effectively done. Simultaneously, the Gatun hydro-
electric plant was close to coming on line and the Atlantic division began transferring equipment 
to that facility.  
The major challenge facing the Pacific Division was the fact that it no longer existed. 
S.B. Williamson resigned in December of 1912 claiming that he had completed enough of the 
work to render a full division unnecessary. Goethals disagreed. The Chief engineer was incensed 
by what he saw as Williamson’s betrayal and reluctantly created the Fifth Division to finish the 
remaining construction.150 In some ways, Williamson may have been correct. During the 
remainder of the year, the Fifth Division poured an additional 58,262 cubic yards of concrete at 
Pedro Miguel, bringing the total to 906,187 cubic yards and leaving only specialized structures 
such as lighting towers and control sheds left to build.151 Miraflores faced some challenges with 
slides, particularly along the western wall, but here too construction progressed rapidly and by 
July 1913 the Fifth Division had nearly completed concrete work at Miraflores.152 
Sibert’s Atlantic Division operated far more smoothly than the Pacific Division. The 
advanced state of work on the locks meant that, except for cleaning up some slides and finishing 
a bit of the foundation, the Atlantic division focused on the completion of the Gatun Dam and the 
construction of the hydroelectric power plant that would provide the energy necessary to operate 
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both sets of locks. By July of 1913, the dam had been entirely filled and the concrete at the 
spillway was 98% completed.153 The quick work on the dam and the spillway opened the door 
for the creation of the power station itself.  Sibert initially focused on creating the superstructure 
in which the equipment would be housed. Work on this front moved swiftly and on May 16th, 
1913 erection of the superstructure began at the site. Over the course of the month, the Division 
installed 65% of the steel, cased the penstocks in concrete and completed much of the structural 
work for the generators.154 
Delays in the delivery of steel meant that electrical equipment was not installed until the 
summer of 1913. In the meantime, the ICC focused its attention on preparing the infrastructure 
that would carry the current from the hydroelectric station to the locks at both the Pacific and 
Atlantic terminals.155 At the Atlantic Locks, the Electrical Division began installation of the 
motors, switchboards, and breakers that distributed the power coming from the hydroelectric 
plant. By the end of the year, all electrical equipment necessary for the operation of the gates was 
delivered and nearly 25% of it was installed.156 This work was supplemented by a tremendous 
amount of ductwork at both facilities. The ICC placed orders for 2,372,110 feet of insulated 
wires to convey electricity through the facilities. By the end of the year, the order had been filled 
and the Division had already run over 400,000 feet through ducts at the lock sites and 
hydroelectric station.157 The massive amount of electrical work done  suggested just how close 
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construction was to  concluding and also reinforced the central role the hydroelectric station and 
Miraflores plant would play in the operation of the Canal.  
  All the duct work and cabling in the world was useless however without access to the 
electricity being generated at the hydroelectric plant. Arguably the most important development 
during the spring of 1913 was the decision to construct a 44,000-volt transmission line between 
Balboa and Cristobal, connecting the Gatun and Miraflores plants.158 This transmission line was 
crucial to the successful operation of the Canal as it provided redundancy should either of the 
power plants go offline. The line consisted of duplicate 3-phase lines draped atop 40-foot steel 
towers spaced in 300-foot intervals (200 feet along curves) alongside the Panama railroad. This 
line connected four substations located at Cristobal, Gatun, Miraflores, and Balboa, allowing the 
ICC to distribute power to each of those sites.159 Once this transmission line and the 
hydroelectric power plant were connected, the Canal Zone would have a steady reliable source of 
power that could both ensure the continued operation of the Canal itself and provide power and 
light throughout the Canal Zone.  
The creation of the transmission marked the energetic shift taking place in Panama. As 
energy consumption on the Isthmus decreased, the dream of connecting the oceans neared 
realization. Slides remained problematic, but the decision to flood the Culebra Cut in October of 
1913 suggested that the era of dry excavation was coming to an end. Meanwhile, a massive 
human labor force directed its substantial, and specialized energy at the tasks of erecting the 
locks gates and the electrical subsystems that controlled them. Perhaps most importantly the ICC 
made considerable progress on the installation of the Gatun hydroelectric station, and the 
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network of poles and wires that would carry its current throughout the Canal Zone. In this sense, 
1913 marked a passing of the torch. Coal still provided valuable energy to ships looking to refuel 
on their way through Panama, and still was essential to the operation of dredges and a few 
remaining steam shovels, but electricity and oil had established themselves as equally important 
in the energy network that powered the Canal Zone.  
The End of an Era 
  Woodrow Wilson's electrifying detonation of the Gamboa Dam and the subsequent 
flooding of the Culebra Cut may have been the most dramatic moment of the fall of 1913, but the 
most important development was the completion of the locks and the creation of the electrical 
infrastructure that operated them. Completing the Gatun hydroelectric station, and the 
transisthmian transmission line, as well as installing electrical equipment at the locks themselves 
soon became the primary focus of the work. In addition, the Commission expanded efforts begun 
during the previous fiscal year to remove material and manpower from the Isthmian interior in 
anticipation of the Canal's opening. For arguably the first time the ICC had to reckon with an 
overabundance of energy rather than a shortage of it.  
The dwindling nature of the work on the Isthmus was reflected in the sharp decline in 
energy consumption that started in July of 1913. This trend impacted nearly all facets of the 
Isthmian energy regime but was most prevalent in the coal and human energy that had been so 
crucial to excavation. The ICC made the decision to abolish Gaillard’s Central Division on 
October 10th, 1913, the same day the Gamboa Dam was blown.160 The closure of the 
Commission’s last major dry excavation force coincided with a stark decline in coal usage during 
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the next twelve months as coal consumption dipped by over 130,000 tons.161 The end of 
excavation and the near completion of the locks also catalyzed a decline in human labor on the 
Isthmus as well. At the beginning of July 1913, the labor force stood at 43,350 men; a year later, 
in July of 1914, it had dropped by nearly a third, down to 29,673, the lowest total since 
December of 1907.162 Whether tracked in manpower or machinery the trend during the fiscal 
year 1914 was the same, energy was leaving the Isthmus. 
Disassembling the massive network of muscle and machine that had driven Isthmian 
excavation for the last decade was a formidable task. The Supply Division noted that "To meet 
these changes, it has been necessary to transfer thousands of employees and millions of dollars' 
worth of material."163 The Division had to transport these men and material from the interior to 
port facilities and from there either back to America or other ports where they were in demand. 
The Mechanical Division and its primary repair facility at Gorgona were gradually taken out of 
service. Meanwhile the Division retired nearly 80 locomotives and 800 cars while losing 
manpower and closing facilities.164 Where it could, the ICC sought to get a return for its 
equipment. During the year they managed to sell eighteen of their steam shovels and 24 of their 
locomotives.165 The era of the steam fueled behemoths was ending. 
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Managing excess human energy also proved troubling. The sharp decline in employment 
on the Isthmus garnered a substantial emigration from Panama. For Americans, this was simple, 
as the ICC furnished them with tickets back to the States, but many West Indian laborers were 
either loath to return to the poverty-stricken islands they had left behind or simply couldn't afford 
passage back home. Seeing an opportunity to acquire cheap labor, the United Fruit Company set 
up a labor agent in the Canal Zone to recruit from the ranks of silver laborers. Roughly 2,000 
others made their way to Honduras in search of opportunity and thousands of others ventured to 
Costa Rica. Thousands more attempted to stay in Panama in hopes of obtaining long-term 
employment on the operation of the Canal.166 This created a challenge for the ICC which lacked 
adequate housing at the canal terminals. In response, the Commission created the village of La 
Boca. To keep the costs of construction down, the ICC simply removed buildings and homes 
from retired silver townsites and reassembled them at La Boca.167 The speed with which this 
allowed the ICC to construct the townsite was imperative given the brief timetable in which La 
Boca had to be ready to accommodate laborers.  
Despite the considerable resources invested in removing unnecessary components of the 
energy network in Panama, the chief focus during the year was the erection of the gates and 
locks, and the hydroelectric station and transmission line that supported them. Excavation 
continued after the Culebra Cut was filled in October, but dry excavation was conducted by only 
a small force of five shovels which worked mitigating the Culebra and Cucaracha slides.168 The 
heavy lifting fell mostly under the purview of the dredges, which now worked not only in the 
locks and approaches but also the Culebra Cut. The fleet had grown from a handful of ships to 
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upwards of twenty dredges of various makes and models. During the year they became the chief 
source of earthmoving for the ICC and removed 15,341,371 cubic yards of material.169 This 
substantial contribution effectively cleared the Canal. The only obstacle remaining in the way of 
the opening of the Isthmus was now the work being done at the locks and the hydroelectric 
station that supported it. 
Work on the electrical energy network continued to progress. Slow deliveries of steel and 
challenges in erecting the powerhouse on the Gatun spillway prevented the installation of 
electrical equipment at the hydroelectric station, but H.F. Hodges, the head of the First Division, 
was confident that as soon as these logistical obstacles were overcome things would progress 
rapidly.170 In the meantime, the Division directed its attention to constructing the transmission 
line and installing electrical equipment at the locks. In August of 1913, a group of 16 gold 
laborers and 305 silver laborers began drilling holes for the transmission towers and laying the 
concrete foundations. Simultaneously they distributed materials across the interior so that once 
these foundations were laid, they could be easily completed. By the end of the month they had 
finished 92 of the foundations and within just two months that number ballooned to 379.171 The 
rapid pace of the transmission line construction was cause for optimism and pointed to how far 
construction work in Panama had progressed.  
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The ICC had another reason to celebrate at the locks themselves. In January of 1914, the 
lock gates were fully installed at each of the three sets of locks. The Pedro Miguel gates were 
completed on the 8th, Miraflores on the 19th and Gatun on the 26th. The installation of the 
electrical equipment at the locks also progressed nicely. At Gatun, 88% of the equipment was 
installed and both Miraflores and Pedro Miguel sat at 86%.172 The concrete work was completed 
at all three locations during the course of the year with the exception of minor structures and 
finishing work necessary for lighting fixtures.173 Finally, the installation of the machinery and 
electrical system necessary for the operation of the miter gates also progressed well. All required 
equipment had been installed at Gatun in February of 1914, at Pedro Miguel in March of 1914, 
and at Miraflores in May of 1914. The locks were ready, the only question was when the 
electricity necessary to power them would be available. 
By March of 1914, the hydroelectric station was taking shape. The Hodges believed that 
the First Division had completed roughly 85% of the work on the station and was so optimistic 
that they could begin small-scale tests in April or May.174 This development accompanied by 
news that the transmission line was being constructed at a rapid pace. By the end of March, 
laborers had laid the foundations for 793 transmission towers and only 16 remained to be 
completed. Additionally, they had strung over 33 miles worth of transmission lines. Hodges was 
so enthused by this progress that he noted, "At the present rate of progress, the indications are 
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that the construction work on the transmission line will be nearly completed before the end of the 
month in April."175 
Despite a few hiccups, by June of 1914, the hydroelectric plant and the transmission line 
connecting it with the Miraflores plant were completed. The Transmission line ran 44.46 miles 
and consisted of 266 miles of 2/0 copper stranded wire and 88 miles of copper grounded wire.176 
The Gatun hydroelectric plant was completed. In anticipation of the plant’s opening, the ICC 
transferred one 1,500 kW turbo-generator sets and two water boilers from the Gatun steam 
power plant to the Miraflores power plant and finished installing them on June 1st. As a result, 
the Miraflores plant outproduced the Gatun plant for the first time, generating 16,352,732 
kilowatt hours compared to the Gatun plant's 6,824,556 kilowatt hours.177 While this 
arrangement was temporary and the hydroelectric plant was expected to begin supporting canal 
operations in July of 1914, the month of June suggested that both the transmission line and the 
Miraflores powerplant were up to the task of powering the Canal if necessary. The energy to 
power the gates was in order and the Panama Canal was ready to be unveiled to the world.  
The first vessel to make the voyage across the Panama Canal got little press. The 
Cristobal made the journey back and forth across the Isthmus on August 3, 1914, without any 
pageantry or prestige. This was intentional. The Cristobal was the sister ship to the Ancon, the 
War Department steamship set to make the official inaugural trip across the Isthmus two weeks 
later. Yet if the enthusiasm which greeted the Ancon as it set off on August 15th was any greater 
it was difficult to tell. While the Ancon held numerous dignitaries, it generated little press 
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internationally. In many newspapers, the Ancon's voyage fell to the bottom of the front page, or 
off it entirely. By August of 1914 papers in America looked east rather than south as the most 
powerful nations in the world prepared to fight and die on the fields of Europe. The opening of 
the Panama Canal, heralded by some as the greatest man-made structure ever, was relegated to 
little more than an afterthought.178 
Locked into Energy 
World War One may have drawn the public gaze away from the Canal, but the path 
between the seas still occupied a place of prominence on the global stage. Ships laden with coal, 
oil, food, metals and countless other materials soon flowed en masse through the towering locks 
of Gatun, Pedro Miguel, and Miraflores. The dream of interoceanic transportation had finally 
been realized. Over the course of a decade, the energy regime of the Canal had diversified, 
shifting from a reliance almost exclusively on human energy and coal to also include oil and 
electricity, sources of energy that were far more economical and efficient for fixed landscapes 
and power plants. The addition of these new energies also contributed to the massive 
proliferation of energy in which the sheer concentration of a broad array of energy sources 
provided enough power to finally mitigate the entropic tendencies that had defined the Isthmus 
for decades. As excavation wound down and the ICC focused its attention on the process of 
construction, oil and electricity became particularly significant as their steady, reliable, and 
economic energies proved perfect for the construction and operation of the locks. The flexibility 
afforded by the variety of energy sources employed by the ICC allowed the Commission to wield 
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whatever source of energy was best suited to tasks ranging from dredging harbors, to detonating 
rock formations, to constructing roads, housing, and power lines.  
And yet, while the entropic tendencies of Panama’s climate were mitigated, the fixed 
landscape of concrete and steel that was left behind faced its own limitations. The tension 
between energy’s capacity to impose order over the Panamanian landscape and the fixed nature 
of the order it imposed created challenges for the long-term viability of the Canal. Ironically, the 
limits of the Canal’s efficacy were foreshadowed by the events surrounding its opening. While 
World War One didn’t fundamentally challenge the role that the Canal played in international 
commerce, it did fundamentally change the nature of war. The growing importance of aerial 
combat created a new set of concerns for Canal security and suggested that as war became more 
complex so did threats to the Canal. 
Additionally, the energy proliferation that helped construct the Canal also hinted at its 
limitations. The growing importance of oil as a source of fuel was not isolated to the Canal. As 
the 20th century progressed oil was found to be increasingly abundant and efficient as a source of 
fuel for a variety of machines. The technological explosion that took place during WWI and the 
rise of the automobile in the first decades of the 20th century helped reinforce the growing 
primacy of oil and dictated that the transportation of substantial amounts of oil was imperative to 
international commerce. To most efficiently transport this new commodity, merchants 
recognized that it was far more economical to maximize the size of their vessels to carry as much 
petroleum as they could. The massive locks were by no means in danger of imminent 
obsolescence, but the increasing size of ships progressed far more rapidly than canal lobbyists 




In this sense energy proliferation took place far more rapidly than the landscape it created 
could hope to keep pace with. The creation of the Canal required a monumental marshaling of 
energies of all sorts, at no small cost to the United States government. And yet as ships became 
bigger and threats to the Canal began to come not only from the sea but also from the air, 
questions of the Canal's longevity soon emerged. The lack of available energy following the 
completion of the Canal, a product of entropy and an unwillingness on the part of the US 
government to continue their considerable investments in Panama, made alterations of the 
waterway impractical both energetically and economically. As war once again loomed on the 
horizon, new energy sources, security, and ship size combined to present a unique challenge to 
the Canal's operation. These factors suggested the U.S. needed to explore expansions to the 
Canal or even the possibility of constructing a new canal. As scientists, engineers, and politicians 







Chapter IV: The Canal, Fixed: The Limits of the Panama Canal: 1914-1947 
Roughly eight inches separated the hull of the USS Missouri from the concrete sides of 
the Miraflores Locks. On October 13, 1945, the battleship transited the Panama Canal, traveling 
from the Pacific en route to New York City where it was to take part in Navy Day celebrations. 
Commissioned in June of 1944, the Missouri became a symbol of American victory in WWII 
when Japanese officials signed the Japanese Instrument of Surrender on board the vessel on 
September 2, 1945. And yet the battleship was also a symbol of the challenge faced by the 
Panama Canal. The 887 by 108 foot battleship was one of the last US naval vessels specifically 
designed with the utilization of the Panama Canal in mind and reflected just how dramatically 
World War II had altered warfare.1 The Canal proved itself an invaluable asset to the American 
war effort. In 1945 alone, over 6000 American military vessels transited the Canal, constituting 
nearly 62% of total traffic for the year.2 And yet Canal Zone Governor Joseph Mehaffey was 
careful to point out that, "The services rendered by the Panama Canal in support of military 
operations were possible only because the Canal was never attacked or damaged."3 The 
emergence of aircraft carriers, saturation bombing, and atomic weaponry constituted an 
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existential threat to the Canal and pointed to a growing perception of obsolescence surrounding 
the only three-decade-old waterway.   
 These developments were a result of the steps Canal engineers had taken to establish 
permanence and stability over the unstable environment of the Canal. If entropy worked to 
disrupt that which energy had made possible, permanent structures made from concrete could 
mitigate landslides and siltation that would require considerable injections of energy to counter. 
Ironically, their success presented a fundamental challenge to the long-term utility of the Canal. 
The fixed Canal proved difficult to adapt and required an unprecedented investment of capital 
and energy to modernize. As ships grew larger, traffic more voluminous, and weapons more 
destructive, the rigidity of the Canal complicated both interoceanic commerce and American 
national security. 
These limitations did not arrive without warning. From its very opening, the Canal faced 
difficulties. Landslides remained problematic in the years following its opening, halting traffic 
for considerable periods. Perhaps more significantly, the first few decades of the Canal's life 
were defined by global upheavals and economic instability. The Canal had the misfortune of 
opening alongside the outbreak of World War I. As chaos and conflict tore through Europe, 
international shipping waned, and the Canal failed to attract as much traffic as lobbyists had 
anticipated. The 1920s presented a golden age of sorts for the Canal. Booming markets in the 
United States led to growth in intercoastal shipping and Americans relied on the Canal to 
expedite this process. Globally, recovering European markets and expanding Asian markets also 
found the Canal an asset. This increase in traffic outpaced predictions of canal usage and raised 




The global depression of the 1930s mitigated these concerns somewhat but came with its 
own difficulties for the Canal as traffic again dropped.4 Global instability in the 1910s, ’20s, and 
’30s made predictions of the Canal's viability imprecise and generated more questions than 
answers. While they never presented an existential threat to the Canal in the same way that 
WWII did, WWI, the ’20s, and the Depression emphasized that the Canal didn’t exist in 
isolation, but instead was intimately interconnected with global markets and politics. As these 
forces collided in 1939 and the world found itself again drawn into an unprecedented conflict, 
the Canal’s fate seemingly hung in the balance. 
 Emphasizing the shifting place the Canal had in the minds of Americans complicates the 
notion that the Canal was completed in 1914 and had a static existence from that point onwards.5 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Little over a decade after its completion, economists, 
engineers, administrators began to wonder about the lifespan of the path between the seas. As a 
result, the Canal was constantly being both ideologically and physically altered. Studies 
suggested fixes to the Canal's long-term viability issues, and the Panama Canal Company 
conducted repairs and maintenance to keep its waterway in working order.6  These attempts at 
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imposing order and realizing the Canal’s promise of restructuring global trade were reflective of 
the ongoing issues that pestered the waterway during its first few decades of operations and 
pointed to the need for continual maintenance and injections of energy to keep it running 
smoothly. 
At their core, these issues all stemmed from the same reality. The Canal's builders had 
met their task of imposing order on an entropic environment far too effectively. In hopes of 
keeping the shifting soils and mucks of Panama at bay, they relied on the stability afforded by 
concrete and steel. These materials fixed the Canal against the unwanted entropy of the Isthmus, 
but also fixed it against desired changes. It was impossible to increase the capacity of the entire 
canal without first overcoming the limitations placed on ship size and transit time imposed by the 
locks. This reality was troubling in the 1910s, ’20s, and ’30s when war and global upheaval 
suggested that the demands of global commerce may be just as fickle, if not more so, than the 
Panamanian environment. Changes in technology, ship size, and global trade occurred more 
rapidly than the canal locks could accommodate and foreshadowed the threats looming in the 
Canal's future. World War II manifested these threats as the dramatic implications of mechanized 
warfare and atomic technology were laid bare. These technologies presented an existential threat, 
both physically and ideologically, to the Canal. The waterway needed to adapt to remain 
relevant. The only question was whether the Panama Canal Company and the US government 
could overcome the fixed nature of the Canal itself. 
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Sliding out of the Gate: 1914-1930 
 When the Canal opened in August of 1914, it was heralded as the arrival of a new epoch. 
Canal advocates believed that the interoceanic passageway would usher in a new era of wealth 
and opportunity the world around. William MacCorkle, ex-governor of the state of West 
Virginia, expressed the enthusiasm of many, arguing that, thanks to the Canal, peoples “yellow, 
brown, and white- filled with the desires of new commerce, fired with new hope by the touch of 
the West, thrilled with new ideas of government and religion are all mingled in one tremendous 
combat for the mightiest markets vouchsafed to man since the stars sung together.”7 The 
implications were clear. Bridging the Isthmus had reorganized the world. Now it was time to 
capitalize on the opportunities the waterway offered. 
And yet the Canal's promise of wealth proved elusive. It was an old adversary that 
initially laid low the hopes of speculators. The incessant entropy of Panama once again caused 
slides in the Culebra (or as it came to be known "Gaillard") Cut. Throughout 1914 and early 
1915 the slides, while problematic, never halted traffic for more than a week. While this was 
frustrating, it didn't undermine the utility of the Canal. That changed on September 15, 1915, 
however. A massive slide in the Cut sent tons of material crashing into the Canal itself. 
Ultimately the Canal was practically inoperable until April of 1916, over six months after the 
slide had initially taken place.8 The slide served as a sobering reminder that while the 
Panamanian environment could be altered, it could never truly be controlled. This point was 
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reinforced by the continued occurrence of small slides over the coming years. Fortunately for the 
Panama Canal Company, future slides never halted traffic for more than a few days. This was not 
the end of the Canal's challenges, however. Warfare proved a far more difficult obstacle to 
overcome.  
 World War I’s capacity to overshadow the Canal went unmitigated in the years following 
the Canal’s opening. The spread of warfare dramatically impacted international commerce and 
prevented the Canal from asserting itself as dramatically as MacCorkle and others anticipated. 
Between 1914 and 1918, traffic through the Canal averaged between 1000 to 2000 vessels 
annually, peaking in 1918 when 2,460 ships transited the Canal carrying 7,526,000 tons of 
material.9 These modest numbers reflected the dramatic consequences that global instability 
could have on canal traffic. The fact that conflict was focused in Europe and that American 
manufacturing was primarily rooted on the East Coast at the time meant that interoceanic travel 
waned next to the centrality of Atlantic shipping. The Panama Canal had been built on the hope 
that global trade routes were dynamic and would evolve to meet demand, its architects hadn't 
assumed that those forces could route traffic away from the Canal as well. The silver lining, 
however, was that, apart from the slides, the fault lay not with the Canal itself, but rather with the 
powers utilizing it. Global conflict focused traffic elsewhere, but in the recovery that followed 
World War I, the Canal stood poised to be a crucial part of the global economy. 
The 1920s saw the value of the Canal asserted with remarkable efficacy. Americans 
accounted for over 30% of the traffic flowing through the Canal during the decade, and as the 
American economy ballooned in the 1920s so too did Canal traffic.10 But it wasn’t the United 
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States alone that was responsible for the glut of vessels pouring through the Isthmus. The 
postwar recovery saw Europe using the Canal extensively to access raw materials in the Pacific. 
Meanwhile, Japan’s emergence on the world stage was accompanied by an increase in vessels 
seeking Asian markets.11 All of these forces coalesced to consistently increase traffic during the 
postwar years. Between 1920 and 1930 net vessel tonnage increased by nearly 20,000,000 tons 
and traffic increased threefold, peaking in 1929 when 7,800 ships used the Canal. Growth was so 
dramatic that, only 15 years after the opening of the Canal, many began to wonder when 
additional facilities would be required to handle the increase in traffic.12  
 The emergence of the Panama Canal was tied as much to energy as it was to postwar 
economic booms. While many commodities made their way between Atlantic and Pacific during 
the decade, petroleum dominated international shipping throughout the decade. Rich oil fields in 
California catalyzed an economic boom in which tens of millions of tons of oil were shipped 
from the Pacific to the Atlantic.13 11,000,000 tons of petroleum crossed the Isthmus in 1924 
alone. While it dwindled as the decade progressed, petroleum remained the single biggest 
commodity in Panama Canal traffic.14 Indeed, oil was so central to the Panama route that when 
studies were made to predict future traffic trends, most projections analyzed oil independently as 
they were concerned that integrating it with other commodities would skew their projections.15 
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Oil provided the energy to fuel these booming economies and helped the Canal attain a central 
place among the trade routes of the world.  
As the 1920s gave way to the 1930s and the global economy collapsed, the Canal found 
itself once again at the mercy of forces beyond its control. Traffic through the Canal declined, 
and those ships that did make their way through the locks seldom carried a full load of cargo. 
Traffic fell precipitously during the first few years of the 1930s, bottoming out at 5,490 transits 
in 1933.16 At no point during the Depression did traffic drop to the anemic levels it had been at 
during World War I but the substantial drop in utilization did shake faith in the Canal’s economic 
stability. As the 1930s went on, traffic recovered, nearly reaching the levels it had been at in the 
late 1920s by 1939.17 The Canal had once again managed to weather the storm. 
And yet instability was the defining characteristic of the Canal's first two decades of 
existence. The slides that had halted traffic in 1915 and 1916 pointed to the need for continual 
maintenance of the waterway to retain its utility. Diplomatic and economic entropy in the form 
of warfare, economic booms, and relapses all pointed to the tenuousness of the Canal's position 
on the global stage. Thanks to this chaos, it was difficult for administrators to determine how 
effective the Canal truly was. If the Canal were going to see the rapid expansions in traffic that 
had characterized the 1920's, then it was imperative that studies be made into potential 
expansions and additions immediately. If, on the other hand, the 1920s were an aberration and 
the 1930s were indicative of the future the Canal could handle traffic for the foreseeable future. 
Starting in the 1920s, economists, military officials, and policymakers sought to unravel the 
enigma that was the Canal's place in the world. In the process, they restructured the Canal, 
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generally ideologically as the Canal's concrete structure resisted change, but at times even the 
waterway itself was altered in the name of increasing capacity.  
Damming Studies and New Locks 
Thanks in large part to the unpredictability of the interwar years, the Panama Canal 
Company and the US Government spent a considerable amount of resources trying to understand 
the role the Canal was destined to play in international commerce. Starting in 1924, the Canal 
was the subject of regular studies to determine its capacity and develop plans for its expansion. 
Thanks to the volatility of the data academics had at their disposal, the bulk of these studies 
failed to accurately predict traffic trends and, as a result, few tangible steps were actually taken 
to expand the Canal. More often than not, the only alterations made to the Canal were regularly 
scheduled lock overhauls conducted every four years. As the 1930s emerged, however, the 
government became more proactive in restructuring the Canal, providing the funds and resources 
to carry out two substantial Canal alteration projects: the Madden Dam, and the Third Locks 
projects. These two projects sought to expand the capacity of the Panama Canal in anticipation of 
the larger ships, and greater volume of traffic that loomed on the horizon. The world was 
changing, and the Canal struggled to change with it. 
Long-term traffic projections were initiated as early as the construction of the Canal. 
Emory Johnson, an economist contracted by the Isthmian Canal Commission was the first to 
compile a projection for future canal traffic in 1904. Johnson revised his estimates in 1912, 
closer to the Canal's opening to account for the adoption of a lock-style level canal. A decade 
later Major Clarence Ridley, an engineer working on the Canal, applied the rate of growth in 
traffic from the Suez Canal to the Panama Canal. Finally, a paper by Lieutenant Hans Kramer 




1928.18 While important, these initial estimates tended to shy away from the topic of when the 
Canal would reach its capacity. They suggested the Canal would not approach this problem until 
some amorphous date in the 1960s or later. As a result, while they were valuable, they didn't 
constitute a call to action, but rather a more detached analysis of the Canal's value. 
As the true scope of the expansion of interoceanic commerce made itself felt during the 
1920s however, studies into traffic became far more concerned with the need to expand Canal 
facilities. In 1929 Congress passed a Joint resolution to conduct a study into the capacity of the 
Canal and the potential development of Canal facilities to accommodate growths in traffic.19 The 
studies explored a variety of topics surrounding the Canal's utility, including the most substantial 
projection of future canal traffic yet undertaken. Sydney Williamson's 1931 study was the first 
written with a stated objective of assessing the potential need for expanded facilities. Williamson 
combined the relationships of Panama shipping to world trade, the past growth of Panama traffic, 
and the relation of Panama traffic to Suez traffic to determine the potential growth of Canal 
traffic. Using these three measurements Williamson concluded that the Canal would see 
74,145,000 net tons of traffic over 16,757 transits by the late 1960s, a level of traffic that 
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exceeded the Canal's capacity.20 The implication was clear. If action was not taken, the Canal 
would effectively be obsolete in a few decades time. This study helped catalyze the first major 
canal alteration since the waterway’s construction: the creation of Madden Dam.  
By the 1930s, ship size was not a pressing concern. Instead, the major limitation faced by 
the waterway was maintaining an adequate water supply. The genius of the lock canal was that it 
was operated by gravity. Gatun Lake, created by the damming of the Chagres River, provided the 
water to fill the locks. Culverts running through the concrete substructure of the locks themselves 
were opened to allow water to flow from the lake into the locks. This process was repeated for 
each set of locks, allowing ships to rise to the height of Gatun Lake as they entered the Canal, 
and gradually return to sea-level as they exited it.21 Panama’s rainy climate allowed this system 
to work, generally, but in years of light rainfall traffic occasionally needed to be slowed or halted 
due to a lack of water.22 As traffic increased in the 1920s, the water level of Gatun Lake came 
under increased scrutiny as the biggest threat to canal operation. The building of Madden Dam in 
1935 created Madden Lake (known as Alajuela Lake after control of the Canal reverted back to 
Panama), a reservoir that provided an emergency supply of water in case of a drought, and also 
served as the perfect site for an additional hydroelectric station.23 For the first time, Canal 
administrators dealt with the limitations of the Canal with substantial alterations to the physical 
canal, setting a precedent that spanned decades. 
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Spurred on by the success of the Madden Dam, Canal administrators showed an interest 
in undertaking additional concrete changes to the Canal's capacity by tackling the limitations of 
the locks themselves. Lock dimensions were an increasing topic of conversation during the 
1930s as ship size steadily increased. The Navy had long held the view that the locks afforded a 
reasonable cap on ship size. But in 1930 and 1931 military officials began advocating for larger 
locks. In 1930 and 1931 the Navy Department and U.S. Army Interoceanic Canal Board 
submitted reports recommending expanded lock dimensions of 1300 feet by 145 feet and 1200 
feet by 125 feet respectively.24 These security concerns soon spilled over into commercial 
shipping as well. While Madden Dam was approaching completion in 1935, the Normandie was 
constructed. At 1029 feet long and possessing a beam of 117.9 feet, the Normandie was the first 
commercial vessel incapable of navigating the locks. Within five years it was joined by the 
Queen Mary (1936) and Queen Elizabeth (1940).25 The once gargantuan locks seemed to be 
shrinking next to the huge new vessels making their way around the world's oceans. 
There were only a small number of vessels too large to fit in the concrete locks, but the 
rigidity of the Canal was becoming increasingly problematic thanks to the fact that ship size was 
impacting the Canal’s capacity to undertake double lockages. Ultimately, the Canal's capacity 
was controlled by the speed at which ships could pass through the locks.26 An obvious way to 
increase the efficiency with which ships could traverse the Isthmus was to have two ships 
journey through the locks in tandem. In the late 1930s, the Canal averaged roughly 1.08 ships per 
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lockage, meaning that the vast majority of ships transiting the Canal were locked individually. It 
was suggested that in order to meet the capacity for expanding traffic it might be necessary to 
accommodate 1.77 ships per lockage.27 Consequently, it wasn’t necessarily massive vessels of 
over 1000 feet that concerned engineers as much as the growing percentage of vessels between 
500-600 feet which were unable to pass through the existing locks in tandem.28 The combined 
pressure presented by the expansion of naval and commercial vessels too wide to transit the 
locks, and an increasing number of ships which were too long to make tandem lockages 
highlighted the need for larger locks themselves.  
The challenge of expanding the locks was obvious. The concrete locks at Gatun, 
Miraflores, and Pedro Miguel had been constructed to last. As a result, it was prohibitively 
expensive to expand them. The mechanical infrastructure behind the Canal's operation needed to 
be entirely removed and rebuilt to accomplish such a task, a proposal which necessitated sharp 
restrictions in traffic in the Canal. While the concrete locks mitigated problems stemming from 
entropy, their utility was undermined and constricted by the expansion of ship dimensions. 
Congress acted quickly in hopes of heading this problem off at the pass. In 1929, early in the 
discussions for Canal expansion, Congress passed Public Resolution 99, which charged the 
President to determine the practicality and potential cost of, "such additional locks and other 
facilities in the Panama Canal as may be necessary to provide for the future needs of interoceanic 
shipping."29 The study lasted several years and while it did suggest that the government consider 
the creation of a new set of locks 1200 feet long by 125 feet wide and 42.5 feet deep, when 
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Governor Julian Schlay submitted his final report in 1934, he determined that the creation of the 
Madden Dam had rendered a third set of locks unnecessary until at least 1970.30 
The Governor’s optimism proved less than contagious. Less than two years after Schlay 
submitted his report Congress passed Public Resolution 85 which authorized the Panama Canal 
Governor to investigate a means of expanding the capacity of the Canal for international 
shipping. The report, submitted in February of 1939, argued that the United States should begin 
construction on a third set of larger locks within the next ten to twelve years at a cost of 
$277,000,000. Not content to delay any longer, Congress passed Public Resolution No. 391 in 
August of 1939 which granted the Third Locks project an initial budget of $15,000,000 dollars to 
begin surveys and excavation. Less than a year later, on July 1, 1940, the dredge Cascadas began 
subaqueous dredging on the Atlantic approach.31 The expansion of the Panama Canal was 
underway and the potential of overcoming the limitations of the locks was the closest it would be 
for half a century. 
Construction progressed rapidly in 1940 and 1941. The Special Engineering Division, 
created in 1939 to oversee the construction of the Third Locks Project, settled on lock 
dimensions of 1200 feet by 140 feet by 45 feet and began excavation at the lock sites.32 The 
locks were positioned adjacent to the existing locks and were expected to use similar machinery. 
The planning completed, excavation was carried out at a rapid pace in hopes of meeting a 
condensed construction timetable of five years.33 By 1942 excavation and dredging at the 
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Atlantic Locks and approach were complete and the Pacific Locks had only 1,345,000 cubic 
yards left to excavate. What the Third Locks Project could not have anticipated however was the 
speed with which WWII would spread. Pulled into the war by the Japanese attack at Pearl 
Harbor, the United States militarization necessitated cuts to the Third Locks Project.34 On May 
25, 1942, the Secretary of War effectively halted the project, allowing excavation of the Lock 
sites to continue, but preventing the construction of the lock facilities themselves.35 
Initially, the intention was to continue the work upon the cessation of hostilities, and yet 
WWII resulted in such drastic developments in warfare that the Third Locks Project was itself 
deemed an imperfect solution to the long-term viability of the Canal. The Third Locks Project 
then was the last gasp of a dying world, one in which vessels with beams of 110 feet were a 
rarity and threats to the Canal resided primarily in naval vessels and invading armies. While 
there were whispers of the Canal's obsolescence in the 1920s and 1930s, there were no 
existential threats to its existence. World War II ushered in a dangerous new world in which 
aerial combat became a crucial component of warfare. This development presented new 
challenges to the lock canal. The concrete locks and dams that had mitigated the entropy of 
Panamanian environment and made the interoceanic highway possible were incredibly 
susceptible to a new form of energy, one which could shatter concrete, bend steel, and render the 
Canal impassible for years at a time.  
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Aircraft Carriers and Atoms 
 As oil-fueled war machines spread around the world in the early 1940s, it became 
increasingly apparent that warfare had fundamentally changed. The prevalence of mechanized 
warfare ushered in a faster, more mobile, and increasingly aggressive style of conflict that 
seemed alien to the static fortifications and trench lines of World War I. A fixed concrete and 
steel structure dotted with immobile fortifications; the Panama Canal found itself woefully 
unprepared for this development. The locks of the Canal had been constructed to withstand 
attack from naval shellings and invading armies. It was completely unequipped to deal with the 
prevalence of aerial combat and the aircraft carriers and atomic bombs that accompanied it. The 
complexity and the rigidity of the locks, once the source of the Canal’s salvation, had become its 
single greatest vulnerability. James Stratton, the Chief Engineer of the Special Engineering 
Division of the Panama Canal, admitted that, in light of advances in aerial warfare, “no 
reasonable amount of structural alteration would greatly decrease the vulnerability of the present 
locks."36 The efficacy of the Panama Canal was once again under siege, this time however 
obsolescence didn’t reside in a vague future date; it had arrived. 
The first challenge to the Canal's utility was one that had been foreseen but had arrived 
far earlier than anticipated: the arrival of military vessels that could not transit the Canal. In a 
report to Congress, Governor Mehaffey noted that "Until World War II, the present lock 
chamber width of 110 feet and length of 1000 feet were accepted as a rigid limitation on the 
design of U.S. Navy ships. However, several U.S. warships constructed during the war exceed 
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the dimensions of the present locks and are therefore unable to utilize the Canal."37 The warships 
guilty of ignoring the confines of the Canal were the aircraft carriers that proved so crucial to 
combat in the Pacific. The unique demands of island hopping, namely the need to deploy short-
ranged aircraft with radical mobility in a theater where land was sparse and airfields practically 
nonexistent, catalyzed the shift towards aircraft carrier battlegroups. The US quickly recognized 
the utility of these vessels and Essex- and, towards the end of the war, Midway- class carriers 
became the backbone of the American Navy.38  
While older Yorktown class carriers could transit the locks, the newer carriers dwarfed the 
locks. The massive CVB class had a length of 1190 feet and a beam of 130 feet, and its flight 
deck and gun emplacements led to an actual width of over 150 feet. While smaller, with a length 
of only 962 feet and a beam of 106 feet, the C-2 couldn't transit the locks thanks to the 160 foot 
width of its flight deck.39 These carriers were among the first ships incapable of utilizing the 
locks, but the Navy acknowledged that larger ships would likely become increasingly prevalent. 
A 1946 Navy Department report stated that "The size of future naval vessels is of necessity a 
matter of conjecture. The trend in design may well develop towards holding to present sizes or 
even to smaller vessels and lead away from mammoth ship construction, but at the present time, 
a tendency towards smaller vessels has not actually developed. In fact, the trend towards 
increased dimensions still continues."40 In this context, the limited size of the locks grew 
increasingly problematic.   
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The concrete foundation of the locks and the proximity of the lock lanes meant that it was 
impossible to accommodate aircraft carriers and other large vessels without completely 
rebuilding the locks themselves. But military officials felt that maintaining the status quo was 
equally unacceptable. WWII had both laid bare the Canal's limitations and reinforced the need 
for expedited transit between the seas. Governor Mehaffey expressed this tension explicitly, 
writing, "Transportation facilities were a limiting factor during World War II, and the loss of the 
Canal might well have resulted in grave consequences. It probably would have restricted military 
activities and no doubt would have prolonged the war."41 Ultimately the Canal presented the 
American military with a sort of catch-22. The Canal had proven itself invaluable to the war 
effort, so much so that during the war years the bulk of traffic utilizing Canal facilities was 
military in origin. And yet simultaneously, the Canal seemed incapable of dealing with the 
changing nature of military combat.  
Aircraft carriers may have pointed to the practical limitations of the existing Canal, but 
the rise of unprecedented bombing campaigns, both conventional and atomic, could eradicate the 
Canal altogether. Mehaffey cautioned that "The vulnerability of the present Canal to any modern 
weapons is so marked that dependence cannot be placed on its use in war, and for this reason, the 
Canal as it exists today cannot be considered as meeting the future needs of national defense."42 
The Canal’s susceptibility to aerial attacks came from the vulnerability of two crucial features, 
the locks and dams. While these structures contained the entropy of the Panamanian 
environment, they were fragile in the face of the explosive power of bombs. Mehaffey didn’t 
mince words when expressing his concerns, writing, “Irreparable damage to a lock canal could 
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be inflicted by the hit of a single atomic bomb. Multiple attacks with this weapon, or with 
conventional weapons in combination, would mean the loss of use of the Canal for four years."43 
Both the locks or the dam could be damaged beyond repair, taking years to rebuild. In the case of 
an attack on the dam, it would also drain the artificially constructed summit lake, meaning that 
before the Canal could be used again the dam needed to be rebuilt and the lake refilled. The 
result would be years without an interoceanic passage, an unacceptable reality. 
While atomic bombs constituted the chief threat to the Canal, conventional bombs still 
held the potential to destroy the Canal. Conventional explosives expanded in destructive capacity 
during the war. New explosives like the ten-ton "blockbuster" were more than capable of 
shattering concrete and shredding steel.44 Additionally, aircraft carriers allowed hostile forces to 
mobilize considerable numbers of aircraft in areas previously thought isolated and inaccessible. 
This meant that a hostile force could theoretically carry out sustained bombing in nearly any 
location including the Canal Zone.45 The Canal, while it was equipped with fortifications and 
defensive structures, could not withstand such a substantial attack. Conventional explosives 
could create craters hundreds of feet wide, more than wide enough to encompass both lanes of 
locks.46 While these conventional bombs were dangerous, however, they paled in comparison 
next to the destructive capability of nuclear weaponry.  
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The dropping of the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki pulled the world into a 
frightening new era. Fission energy was radically more powerful than any source of energy 
humanity had previously harnessed and when applied to the task of destruction it became, in the 
words of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, "the destroyer of worlds." Oppenheimer's description 
proved prophetic, if perhaps a bit too sophisticated to describe the brutal efficiency of nuclear 
explosions. Conventional explosions could crack concrete and bend steel, atomic explosions 
could shatter or vaporize concrete and melt steel, leaving thousand-foot craters in their wake.47 
What chance did the Canal have in the face of the destroyer of worlds? 
The short answer was none. While it was possible that the Canal could recover from the 
damage rendered by a conventional bomb, engineers were resigned to the fact that, "the damage 
caused by the atomic bomb crater would be so extensive that it would be improbable that any 
attempt would be made to repair the lock for further use during the time of war."48 Advances in 
the offensive capacity of warfare had advanced more rapidly than the fixed Canal and its 
increasingly modest locks could accommodate. This pointed to the tension that stalked the Canal 
throughout the decades following its development. Restructuring the Panamanian landscape to 
create a canal had taken a decade, millions of dollars, and unprecedented volumes of energy, yet 
left in its wake a fixed and static waterway. This meant that alterations to the Canal were 
impractical to the point of requiring an equally, if not more extensive investment of energy than 
had been required to construct the Canal in the first placed. As a result, the Canal that faced the 
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prospect of nuclear annihilation in the aftermath of WWII remained a structure created for an era 
in which, “critical forms of attack were envisioned as naval gunfire directed against the locks and 
enemy forces moving overland to capture the Canal intact."49 The Canal needed to be 
modernized, and the unique challenges presented by WWII laid the defects of the waterway bare. 
In response, the government mobilized its resources to try to conclusively deal with these 
limitations and overcome the fixed limitations of the Canal that had hindered it over the past 
three decades. 
Reimagining the Canal 
The passage of Public Law 280 on December 28, 1945 was the culmination of the studies 
initiated in the 1920s and 1930s. Building on those studies, particularly the 1929 and 1939 
studies that paved the way to the Madden Dam and Third Locks projects, Public Law 280 sought 
to modernize the Canal. The role that WWII played in impacting this process was undeniable. 
When construction on the Third Locks was halted in 1942, it was assumed that work would 
resume at the end of the war. And yet due to the development of aircraft carriers, saturation 
bombing, and atomic weaponry, it was decided that "The requirements of capacity and security 
have changed radically since 1939 when the Third Locks project was conceived."50 The new 
studies would need to completely reimagine the Canal in order to ensure its relevance and utility 
in the coming decades. To this end Congress charged Governor Joseph Mehaffey, under the 
guidance of the Secretary of War, with examining plans to improve passage between the oceans 
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either by renovating the existing Canal, constructing a new canal in Panama, or finding another 
route that could be used to facilitate interoceanic shipping.51 The quest for a new canal had 
commenced. 
Mehaffey was well suited to this task. Born in Ohio in 1889, Mehaffey attended West 
Point before continuing his education at the Army’s Engineering School. After completing his 
degree in 1913, Mehaffey was posted around the world, overseeing engineering projects in 
Alaska, France, and Panama over the decades before being promoted Brigadier General in 1942. 
Mehaffey’s broad-ranging experience and history with Panama made him well suited to serve as 
Governor of the Canal Zone, a post to which he was appointed in 1944.52 While talented, 
Mehaffey, busy with the administration of the Canal, couldn’t dedicate all his time to the Canal 
Study. To this post was appointed a talented Army Officer, Colonel James Stratton. Stratton’s 
career trajectory paralleled Mehaffey’s in many ways. Born in Connecticut in 1898, Stratton 
attended West Point during WWI, enlisting in the Army Corps of Engineers after graduating. 
During the interwar years, Stratton worked on a variety of projects around the nation but showed 
a natural proclivity towards lock and dam engineering, helping build such structures in New 
Hampshire, Colorado, and on the Mississippi River. Stratton served with distinction in WWII, 
earning both the Legion of Merit and Distinguished Service Cross. After a brief stint 
reorganizing the Civil Works Program of the Corps of Engineers, he was transferred to Panama 
to take the lead on the studies for a new Isthmian canal in early 1946.53 
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Under the leadership of Stratton, the studies began in earnest. Stratton unified civilian 
and military personnel from a variety of backgrounds to carry out an extensive review of the 
literature on the Isthmus and to conduct studies to determine the feasibility of a new canal. While 
the sheer abundance of personnel led to competing visions of how the studies should progress, 
they eventually settled on four key criteria that would shape their quest for a new canal. After 
extensive study they determined, 
 A. At no stage of the operation should we have less canal capacity that at 
present. B. The canal capacity should be increased as quickly as possible to 
accommodate the largest naval vessels. C. At no stage should the security of the 
canal either from a structural or military point of view be less than at present. D. 
The sequence of operations should be such that work could be terminated at any 
time without jeopardizing the capacity or security of the canal.54 
 
With these four criteria in place, the engineers began an extensive program of study including 
experiments into the security of the Canal, reviews and comprehensive estimates of future traffic 
patterns, potential construction plans for lock and sea-level canals, plans for alternative sites for 
an Isthmian canal, and analyses of the costs of each route. Over the next two years, scientists and 
engineers from universities like Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania came together under 
the umbrella of Public Law 280 to attempt to deal with the shortcomings of the existing Canal, 
and finally, find a way to restructure the fixed locks that had remained unchanged over the 
previous three decades. 
Understanding Atoms 
 Unsurprisingly, one of the challenges that Stratton directed the bulk of his resources 
towards, and personally involved himself in, was the determination of the threat presented by 
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atomic and conventional explosives. While there was ample data on the destructive capacity of 
conventional weapons, the increase in the explosive yields of conventional weapons raised 
questions about the accuracy of scaling models when applied to new bombs. More concerning 
was the complete lack of information on the impact of an atomic attack. To better understand 
these phenomena Stratton appointed a Board of Consulting Engineers, who conducted a variety 
of tests to determine not only the destructive capabilities of these new weapons but also how they 
would impact the unique Panamanian environment. Explosive tests, sandbox studies, scaling 
models, slope stability analyses, and data from larger explosions in the United States all helped 
scientists gain a better understanding of these weapons and the threat they presented to the Canal. 
The Board held a series of conferences in the Canal Zone and at Harvard University in 
July, September, and October of 1946 to explore these questions. The engineers’ objective was 
to better understand how the unique geological formations of Panama would respond to 
conventional and atomic bombing.55 Their chief challenge was assessing the sheer diversity of 
terrain along the narrow stretch of land. In response to a question regarding the capacity to 
mitigate slope failures due to bombings one of the consultants provided an exasperated response, 
claiming, “When you have such a heterogeneous geologic formation as in Panama, I doubt 
whether anybody could give an unqualified answer, except one which would be applicable to a 
very limited bracket rather than to a total stretch of 50 miles."56 Given that they couldn’t answer 
questions about the impact of bombs without first understanding the geological realities of the 
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region, the consultants began a concentrated study to better understand the formations that made 
up the Canal Zone. 
 The final report on the geological formations in the Canal Zone identified over a dozen 
different formations ranging from Atlantic and Pacific Muck- weak, silty substances that were 
easily excavated but highly viscous- to the hard but brittle shales of the Culebra region.57 In 
many ways the report merely reinforced what the consultants already knew: the Canal Zone had 
a diverse array of soil compositions, each of which reacted to dynamic forces differently. And 
yet the report also displayed a considerable growth in the geological knowledge of the Canal 
Zone. The continual shock at the slides that plagued the Culebra Cut during Canal construction 
suggested that in the 1910s engineers were relying on trial and error to determine the stability of 
Isthmian soils. By 1947 their understanding of the local environment had evolved to the point 
that they could proactively plan slopes and cuts that could withstand or at least mitigate the force 
of explosions. This was a substantial step forward and helped Stratton and his engineers craft 
tests and formulas that helped them gain a better understanding of how explosive forces could 
unleash the entropy of the Panamanian environment.   
The notion of conducting on-site tests in Panamanian formations was surprisingly a novel 
one in 1946. Certainly, the ICC had used tremendous amounts of explosives in the creation of the 
Canal, but since that point in time, there had been no experiments to understand how exactly 
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formations, particularly the Cucaracha and Culebra formations, responded to dynamic forces.58 
The 1946 tests consisted of a series of seven detonations in the Cucaracha formation. Engineers 
detonated three 25-pound charges, three 75-pound charges and a single charge of 200-pounds. 
While modest in size, the tests provided valuable data for the engineers. They suggested that the 
consultants’ scaling formulas were accurate, at least as far as conventional explosives were 
concerned. In addition, they reinforced just how dramatic the impacts unleashed by explosives 
could be on the Panamanian Landscape. Reports of the tests warned, "Since Cucaracha is classed 
as rock, its tendency to crater as severely as clay was wholly unexpected."59 These findings 
served to reinforce the security concerns of the existing Canal and provided indications of just 
how extensive security measures would need to be to create a waterway resistant to bombing. 
These localized, on-site explosions were supplemented by a series of laboratory tests that 
provided broader data on explosions at various Canal facilities. Among the most frequently 
utilized of these tests were so-called "sandbox explosions" in which a four-foot by four-foot box, 
filled with a foot of sand, was molded into small-scale replicas of Canal features which were 
then subjected to controlled explosions. Scientists observed the craters left by these explosions 
and used the data to determine the potential hazards presented by high yield explosives. The tests 
reinforced the findings of the Cucaracha blasts and the engineers again concluded that crater size 
and diameter tended to be larger than anticipated.60 Engineers used this data to try to determine 
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how susceptible the locks were to destruction in an attack. The findings were grim. The 
consensus was that a 40,000-pound bomb could damage locks and gates if it exploded at a 
distance of 70 feet, a 100,000-pound bomb at a distance of 100 feet and 400,000-pound bomb at 
a distance of 1,500 feet. A direct hit against any of the locks or bays would destroy the structure 
in question.61 By any metric, conventional explosions held the potential to completely eradicate 
the value of a lock canal. 
Conventional explosives were certainly a threat to the Canal, and yet they could be 
quantified, assessed and understood. Atomic explosives were a completely unknown entity. 
Their destructive power had only been unleashed a handful of times to seemingly cataclysmic 
effect. Thanks in part to the secrecy that shrouded nuclear weapons, their effects remained a 
product of conjecture and guesswork. While they gained access to some classified information to 
conduct their studies, Stratton and his underlings also found that they frequently ventured into 
the realm of the unknown in their studies of nuclear energy. This was not a cause for comfort. 
While studies were conducted into ways to safeguard the Canal against nuclear weapons, 
scientists became increasingly aware that they were undertaking an impossible task. The energy 
presented by the atom was so massive that no canal would be safe from its devastating 
consequences. 
The threat of the atomic bomb cast a shadow over the 1947 study. In Colonel Stratton's 
welcome to the Board of Consulting Engineers, he identified the atomic bomb as the single most 
pressing threat to the Canal and emphasized that any plan for canal security would need to 
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mitigate the damage such a bomb could cause.62 With this imperative in mind, the consultants 
attempted to conduct experiments and collect data that would allow them to fully understand the 
consequences of an atomic detonation.  
Studies into the carnage unleashed by an atomic bomb were entirely speculative and the 
consultants were quick to point out that they could only really anticipate the physical destruction 
rendered by the weapon rather than the consequences of radiation.63 Further complicating 
matters was the fact that no one knew quite how rapidly the yield of atomic bombs would 
expand. James Darling, one of the consulting engineers, didn’t mince words when cautioning his 
fellow engineers, "The limitations of these data are readily recognized when one realizes that the 
present atomic bomb (Nagasaki type) is the equivalent of 20,000 tons of TNT and that future 
bombs may be 10 to 1000 times more powerful."64 Despite these qualifiers, the consultants 
attempted to summarize the destructive capacity of the atomic bomb in the Canal. They worked 
with the data available to them, using the Nagasaki detonation as their guide and applying its 
force to the Panamanian environment. 
Their focus wasn’t necessarily on what would happen if an atomic attack was launched 
on a canal structure. It was a foregone conclusion that a direct hit from a nuclear weapon would 
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vaporize the locks or dam if they were hit, rendering the Canal useless until they were repaired.65 
Instead, the consultants' primary concern was gauging how long it would take to recover from a 
strike on the Canal prism. As had been the case with conventional explosions, the size of the 
crater left behind depended on the material in which it detonated. H.M. Westergaard, a professor 
at Harvard and one of the consulting engineers tackling the atomic issue suggested that a 40 kt 
bomb would create a crater roughly 1,188 feet in diameter in marine muck, 943 feet in diameter 
in the Cucaracha formation, 848 feet in Gatun sandstone, and roughly 642 ft in some of the 
rockier regions of the Continental Divide.66 Westergaard’s figures were optimistic in comparison 
to the figures put forward by Darling, who suggested that a detonation would create a crater 450 
feet deep and up to 1,550 feet wide in clay and that this explosion would be considerably bigger 
in muck and less cohesive material.67 
Debating whether Darling or Westergaard’s estimates were correct was an exercise in 
semantics. The more pressing issue was the fact that by any objective estimate the crater left by 
an atomic bomb would likely be wider than the Canal itself. The consultants estimated that a 
Nagasaki type explosion would displace anywhere between 1,000,000 and 2,700,000 cubic yards 
of material if it struck the Canal in muddier, more viscous terrain. They estimated that in the best 
circumstances this would take seven to eighteen days to fully dredge and that was assuming that 
no structures were damaged in the attack. If the bomb struck the rockier terrain of the 
Continental Divide it would likely displace at least 2,000,000 cubic yards of material and could 
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easily take 40 days or longer to repair.68 These figures led the consulting engineers to determine 
that it was impossible to fully mitigate the danger presented by the atomic bomb. Instead, they 
sought to better understand the chief dangers it presented. To this end, they characterized the 
potential types of attacks the Canal might suffer in order to determine which would be the most 
devastating. After several weeks of discussion and debate, they settled on four categories of 
attack, ranked in order of the threat they presented. The most pressing concern was a crater in the 
canal prism as they worried this would block the entirety of the Canal and would create lips that 
would need to be removed before the Canal could reopen. Slides resulting from craters within the 
Canal were next on the list. While not as devastating as the crater itself, slides could still block 
part of the waterway, complicating the recovery effort. Next in magnitude were slides resulting 
from explosions outside the canal prism. While it wouldn't block the entire Canal, the consulting 
engineers were concerned that such an attack could cause slopes to fail, blocking part of the 
passage. Finally, they identified airblast as the least destructive force associated with an atomic 
detonation. While airblast could still cause slope failure it would likely only erode a small part of 
the slope and would not permanently halt traffic.69  
The studies conducted by the consulting engineers into the dangers presented by 
conventional and atomic bombs forced the Canal to reckon with an uncomfortable reality: it was 
effectively impossible to protect the existing Canal from the dangers constituted by these new 
weapons. A direct hit on any structure could close the Canal for years and the unprecedented 
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yields provided by nuclear energy meant that even an attack on the canal prism could block 
traffic for weeks or months at a time. While troubling, this information also helped the engineers 
focus their attempts at renovating the existing Canal. They accepted the fact that they could not 
prevent bombing from damaging the Canal. Instead, they focused their attention on creating 
structures, either by renovating the existing Canal or creating a new one, that mitigated the 
impacts of bombs. The plans for both lock-style and sea-level canals, motivated by the concerns 
expressed by the consulting engineers, would modernize the Canal, rendering it secure and 
ideally a crucial part of both America's national security and economic interests for decades to 
come. 
Locked In 
Now that Stratton and the consulting engineers had identified the major threats to the 
Canal, they focused their attention on the creation of a waterway that could meet the capacity 
needs of interoceanic commerce and provide adequate security. This was no small task, and they 
cast a broad net when searching for potential solutions to their issues. One of the most creative 
solutions was the creation of a ship railway that would carry vessels overland from ocean to 
ocean. Ultimately this idea didn’t bear fruit due to the fact that it addressed neither the capacity 
nor security demands of interoceanic transit.70 More realistic was the search for routes outside of 
Panama. The consultants examined possible routes in Colombia, Nicaragua, and Mexico 
amongst other locations. While some of these routes were alluring, the infrastructure already in 
place in Panama led them to decide that at the present time this Isthmus was the best site for the 
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new canal.71 The next question was whether they should build a sea-level canal or if a lock canal 
was still the best waterway for the Isthmus. 
The consultants organized their vision for a lock canal into three distinct plans. Plan I 
maximized the capacity of the current lock canal by improving facilities, widening the Gaillard 
Cut, and limiting the necessity for regular lock overhauls. Plan I did not include any increase in 
the size of the locks nor did it improve the security of the Canal, focusing exclusively on 
maximizing traffic to extend the point at which the Canal reached capacity beyond 1964.72 Plan 
II included all of these changes to maximize capacity, but added improvements that would 
increase the size of the locks, allowing larger ships to transit the Canal. In addition, Plan II also 
made modest security improvements to the Canal by separating lock sites, reinforcing structures, 
and adding defensive structures.73 Plan III was the most ambitious of the lock-style plans. This 
plan increased capacity and the ability for larger ships to transit the Canal, but also included the 
most robust levels of security that could be afforded a lock canal.74 The three different plans all 
presented their own merits. As the consulting engineers began examining these plans, they soon 
recognized that they all also suffered from considerable shortcomings. 
Plan I was the most modest of the three lock canal plans. With a price tag of only 
$129,983,000, it was also the most economical and, as a result, potentially the most feasible plan. 
Plan I focused on maximizing the efficiency of the current lock canal. There were several areas 
where the engineers felt they could make relatively modest alterations to the existing Canal and 
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significantly increase its capacity. One of the most frequently discussed solutions was the 
widening of the Gaillard Cut, the narrowest point of the Canal and the most difficult to navigate. 
At only 300 feet wide it wasn't uncommon for traffic in the Cut to be limited to a single ship 
moving one way at a time.75 This would be accompanied by a series of traffic aids and 
navigational tools that would help ships navigate in fog and other adverse conditions.  
The bigger focus of Plan I was to modernize the existing locks to preclude the need for 
four-year overhauls of each lock. The overhauls were the chief factor limiting the capacity of the 
existing locks. Lock overhauls were conducted every two years, alternating between Pacific and 
Atlantic locks. During these overhauls traffic was confined to a single lane, resulting in a 
maximum of only 27 lockages over the course of a day.76 Renovating the locks to avoid these 
delays would substantially increase the capacity of the Canal, allowing it to meet the projected 
needs of interoceanic commerce for decades to come. Despite this, the consultants were reluctant 
to support Plan I. While it was economical, the plan failed to address the security concerns or 
provide passage for larger vessels. In addition, the obsolescence of the existing structure was 
blatant. General Hans Kramer expressed the concerns of many of the consulting engineers when 
he stated, "The present locks are over 30 years old and before the adoption and execution of any 
of these plans they will be somewhat older. They have served well and are continuing to serve 
well but are undergoing obsolescence and admittedly are inadequate in size for universal use. It 
is poor overall economy to put money into an investment which already has definite bottlenecks 
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and limitations.”77 Despite its economy, Plan I simply failed to address the issues plaguing the 
Canal. 
Plan II presented a middle ground between the lock canal plans. At $1,632,275,000, Plan 
II was considerably more expensive than Plan I, but allowed larger vessels to transit the locks 
and added a degree of security as well. Plan II explored several projects to accomplish these 
objectives including a complete redesign of the existing locks or the creation of a third set of 
locks, similar to the Third Locks plan of 1939. One of the most ambitious components of the 
plan was the creation of a Pacific Lake at the Miraflores Locks. Unlike the Atlantic Locks, all 
three of which were at Gatun, the Pacific Locks were split. Ships passed through two sets of 
locks at Miraflores before entering Miraflores Lake, a small body of water which didn’t have 
enough room for mooring sites. From there ships passed through a single set of locks at Pedro 
Miguel. There was nowhere for ships to moor until they reached Gamboa several miles inland. 
Engineers proposed the creation of a third set of locks at Miraflores and the creation of a Pacific 
Locks Lake that would speed up traffic and allow vessels to moor at the Pacific end of the locks 
as well.78 In addition to the increased capacity, this plan provided increased security by spreading 
the locks out and creating larger, reinforced structures. While Plan II met capacity for the 
foreseeable future, concerns remained about the vulnerability of the Canal to attack. Even with 
added safety features it did not meet the mandate set by Stratton.  
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Ultimately, the consultants looked to Plan III, the most ambitious, and, with a price tag of 
$2,307,686,000, by far the most expensive of the lock canal plans.79 Plan III was proof that 
security did not come cheap, but it seemed as though the ambitious plan might be the best long-
term investment for the Canal. Utilizing many of the same measures as Plans I and II including 
an increase in traffic capacity and the size of vessels, Plan III also directed considerable 
resources towards the development of new, reinforced, and diffused facilities, as well as 
defensive fortifications to help the Canal withstand any attack. The consultants were optimistic 
about Plan III's security features, arguing that the current Canal would be completely irrelevant 
in comparison to " a lock type of canal provided with two new two-lane locks at both ends of the 
canal, each lock within itself to be invulnerable to the bomb of the largest size likely to be used 
in saturation bombing..."80 Furthermore, they were optimistic that, "We have shown that these 
two capacity deficiencies, volume and ship size, can be overcome with an improved lock 
canal."81 The implication was clear. Despite its exorbitant price range, Plan III came the closest 
to meeting the mandate set forth in Public Law 280. 
And yet closest was not quite close enough. The consultants were confident that a lock 
canal that would meet the needs of both traffic and ship size over the coming decades could be 
constructed. Despite this, regardless of how strong they made the walls of the locks of a lock 
canal, there was no way that the structure could withstand the hit of the largest conventional 
bombs, let alone an atomic bomb.82 Much of this vulnerability stemmed from the fact that the 
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lock canal was an inherently fragile construct. The need for specialized facilities in the forms of 
locks and a summit lake created too many potential targets to be effectively defended from a 
concentrated enemy attack. Ultimately it was Mehaffey who delivered the final verdict on the 
lock canal. In his report to Congress, he wrote, "Lock structures and a summit lake are essential 
elements of a lock canal. Because these features can be damaged or destroyed, and traffic 
interrupted for such long periods of time as to make the canal undependable in war, it follows 
that no lock canal can meet fully the future needs of national defense."83 No lock canal, 
regardless of how stringent its defenses were, could ever truly be safe. If the consultants wanted 
to construct a truly secure canal they would need to look elsewhere, possibly to the past, to find 
their answer. 
The Search for a Sea-Level Canal 
 If the issue with a lock canal was that it was susceptible to destruction due to the presence 
of locks and a summit lake, the best course of action was to get rid of those liabilities. A sea-
level canal possessed none of these limitations and could easily meet the capacity needs laid out 
in Public Law 280. With this in mind, the consultants dedicated the majority of their time to the 
development of a sea-level canal plan. The sea-level canal met all the needs required of the 
waterway and the consultants were optimistic that it could be built. With a price tag of 
$2,482,810,000 the sea-level canal was by far the most expensive plan put forth by the 
consulting engineers, and yet the fact that it only cost about $200,000,000 more than Plan III for 
a lock canal did indicate that it would provide the most worthwhile long-term investment for the 
future.84 As a result, the Board of Consulting Engineers and Governor Mehaffey recommended 
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the sea-level canal wholeheartedly. Ultimately, however, the steep price tag attached to the sea-
level canal and concerns about developing the technology and obtaining the energy necessary to 
make it a reality prevented it from being realized in 1947. 
Initially, the proposal for a sea-level canal was met with considerable optimism. Several 
plans for its development were put forward including the creation of a sea-level canal that would 
run parallel to the existing lock canal, but eventually the consultants adopted what was known as 
the "Panama sea-level conversion route." This plan would gradually alter the existing lock canal, 
lowering the bottom of Gatun Lake to create a sea-level route. This was not a new idea. French 
construction in the 1870s had been focused on the creation of a sea-level canal and initial 
American’s briefly explored a sea-level canal before President Roosevelt, at the suggestion of 
John Stevens, overruled the Isthmian Canal Commission and mandated the construction of a lock 
canal instead.85 By 1947 the assumption was that technology and available energy had advanced 
far enough that a sea-level canal was no longer a foolish fantasy, but rather a realistic alternative 
to the increasingly obsolete lock canal.  
 Plans for the size of the channel itself varied widely. The Board of Consulting Engineers 
suggested that the navigable prism should be as wide as it could feasibly be while still retaining a 
degree of economy. The rationale for this was twofold. On the one hand, the engineers hoped to 
appease the Navy. History had shown that the Navy tended to continually ask for increases in 
channel size. Admiral Ben Moreell, the Chief of the Naval Department of Yards and Docks and 
the Chief of Civil Engineers of the Navy, as well as the member of the Board of Consulting 
Engineers with the most familiarity with Navy politics, somewhat playfully suggested "Our 
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experience in Pearl Harbor is interesting. I believe we started out using a 500-foot channel... and 
the ship operators insisted we widen it to 750'; then to 1000'. Of course, they had in mind getting 
out quickly, at very high speed, but I think you will find that no matter what width of canal you 
decide upon, the Navy will probably consider it insufficient."86 In addition to appeasing the 
Navy, the size of the canal prism would have a substantial bearing on the Canal’s resiliency in 
the face of attack. The wider the Canal channel was, the less likely an attack would be to close it. 
Wilson Binger, the consulting engineer most versed in slope stability dynamics, went so far as to 
suggest, "It is not thought that at this time that any design other than making the Canal wider 
than the crater diameter could protect against such a closure.”87 The consulting engineers 
ultimately settled on a navigable channel 600 feet wide and at least 60 feet deep.88 This met all 
the needs laid out by Public Law 280 and ensured the Canal’s relevance for the foreseeable 
future. 
 The plan for the Panama Sea-Level Conversion route was met with near universal 
approval by the Board of Consulting Engineers and by Mehaffey himself. The sea-level canal 
had the highest capacity of any of the routes with the potential to transit 174 vessels per day, a 
figure that nearly doubled the highest projections for traffic by the year 2000.89 A sea-level canal 
would transit the largest vessels on the oceans with ease and could do so far more rapidly than a 
lock canal. Most importantly the sea-level canal seemed the only plan capable of adequately 
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dealing with the threat of attack by conventional or nuclear bombing. The Board of Consulting 
Engineers was quite explicit in their suggestions to Governor Mehaffey, stating, "There is no 
absolutely secure canal in the sense that there would be no appreciable damage if the enemy 
were to have his will. But this much is certain- no matter what gauge of effort it is assumed that 
the enemy will apply, the answer will be the same: The sea-level canal can take it; the lock type 
canal, be it at Panama or elsewhere, cannot."90 While a bit more diplomatic, Mehaffey shared a 
similar sentiment in his final report to Congress, writing, "A sea-level canal constitutes the only 
means of meeting adequately the future needs of both interoceanic commerce and national 
defense. Such a canal can be obtained most effectively and economically by converting the 
Panama Canal to a sea-level waterway."91 In both cases, the consultants and the Governor made 
their preference for a sea-level clear.  
The Limitations of Panama 
The blatant preference for the sea-level canal expressed by those who had worked most 
closely on the project raises an interesting question. Why was such a waterway never built? 
Public Law 280 was passed with the intention of yielding actionable results and the previous 
projects at Madden Dam and the work on the Third Locks suggested that there was the political 
will to undertake a modernization of the Canal. While the sea-level canal was expensive, it also 
was comparable in cost to the most advanced lock canal and bore considerable long-term 
advantages over every competing route. In essence, it seemed the best possible solution to the 
myriad of problems plaguing the Panama Canal. And yet the situation was far more complicated 
                                                           
90 James Stratton, Selection of Route in Panama and Vicinity and Determination of Type of Canal, located in 
O’Shaughnessy, P.S. “United States Isthmian Canal Studies- 1947 Under Public Law 280 79th Congress, 1st Session: 
Proceedings of the Meeting of the Board of Consulting Engineers at Diablo Heights: February 11-18, 1947,” pg. E-
315. 
91 Mehaffey, Joseph. “Digest Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal Rendered in Accordance with Public Law 




than the consultants' suggestions implied. The concrete infrastructure that had been emplaced in 
1914 needed to be undone in order to create a sea-level canal and doing so would yield 
considerable challenges including flooding, slides, and an acute lack of energy. In addition, 
engineers still needed to find a way to gouge out the remarkable volume of material that lay in 
the way of a sea-level waterway. All these uncertainties rendered the sea-level canal, at least for 
the moment, an untenable proposition.   
 The consulting engineers and Governor Mehaffey were unified in their belief that a sea-
level canal could be created. Mehaffey brushed aside caution, writing, "The construction of a 
sea-level canal across the Isthmus of Panama, although one of the largest projects ever 
contemplated, would present no more unusual problems than those which were met and 
overcome in the original construction."92 Perhaps Mehaffey was unaware of just how close the 
American attempt to construct a canal had come to failure, but his assurances rang somewhat 
hollow in the face of the considerable engineering challenges presented by the excavation of a 
new sea-level canal. First and foremost was the exorbitant cost and power requirements 
necessary for the creation of a new sea-level canal. Of the proposed $2,482,810,000 budget set 
out in the proposal, over half the funding was intended to cover the cost of excavation with 
$1,047,986,000 directed towards dry excavation and additional 398,376,000 set aside for 
dredging.93 This steep investment stemmed from the sheer volume of material that needed to be 
removed to create a sea-level canal. Estimates suggested that excavation required the removal of 
1,070,000,000 cubic yards of material, of which 750,000,000 cubic yards would be removed in 
dry excavation and the remaining 320,000,000 cubic yards through dredging. This figure was 
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more than three times higher than the total amount of material removed to construct the existing 
canal three decades earlier.94  
It was not only the sheer volume of excavation work that was concerning, but also the 
methods that would be implemented to accomplish this gargantuan task. For dry excavation, 
engineers predicted that shovels capable of excavating 25 cubic yards of material in a single 
scoop were necessary. These massive machines would be accompanied by smaller 5 cubic yard 
shovels. Blasting would loosen material which could then be removed by shovels or dragnets.95 
While an imposing task, the technology for dry excavation at least existed. The same could not 
be said for dredging. Initially, the dredging plan had been predicated on the gradual draining of 
Gatun Lake. Dredges would excavate as much as they could reach over the canal prism. Gatun 
Lake would then be lowered, giving the dredges access to more material. After several 
successive passes, this process would conceivably yield a working sea-level canal. The catch was 
that this approach was time-consuming and expensive. The consultants found it far more 
appealing to pursue deep dredging, which required the development of specialized dredges 
capable of dredging at depths of up to 145 feet.96 There was optimism that such dredges could be 
developed, but at the time the plan was made the technology didn't exist.  
If excavation proved feasible and a new sea-level canal was constructed, the removal of 
the existing structures in the lock canal would simultaneously unleash the entropy they held at 
bay, forcing the sea-level canal to deal with the issues of slides and flooding that had plagued 
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previous construction projects. Slides were an unavoidable result of construction in Panama and 
the Culebra and Cucaracha slides were very much in the minds of the consulting engineers. 
While they were confident that their understanding of slope dynamics had evolved over the 
intervening three decades, slope stability remained a concern, particularly in the continental 
divide. Of the 1,000,000,000 cubic yards to be removed, nearly 30% was concentrated in a 4-
mile section of the Isthmus in the region of Culebra.97 Accomplishing this task required 
unprecedented cuts of up to 600 feet in the Continental Divide.98 Given the region's propensity 
for slides, the ability to create such deep cuts while still retaining stable slopes was a challenge. 
This sentiment was cast in even starker terms by the concern for an atomic attack which loomed 
over the entirety of the studies. Steep slopes would slide far more easily than flatter slopes in the 
event of an explosion. And yet flattening slopes increased the already extensive demands for 
power and capital that accompanied a sea-level canal.  
It was not only in the realm of slope instability where Panama’s entropy complicated 
construction efforts. One of the major benefits of a lock canal was that it precluded the need to 
deal with the floods that had vexed infrastructural projects in Panama in the 1800s. The Gatun 
and later Madden Dams had held floodwaters at bay, turning what had been a liability into Gatun 
Lake, one of the key components of the Canal’s infrastructure. Creating a sea-level canal 
required the removal of Gatun Lake, however, and consequently would unleash the destructive 
potential of floods once more. While floods wouldn't have the potential to destroy the Canal 
itself they could create dangerous cross-currents, rendering the Canal unnavigable until flooding 
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stopped.99 The engineers' solution to the problem was the construction of a dam to supplement 
the Madden Dam and contain the Chagres, as well as the creation of the "East Diversion" and 
"West Diversion" a collection of dams, locks, reservoirs, and channels that would redirect water 
away from the sea-level canal.100 While these projects made flood control viable, they also 
included extensive environmental engineering. The reliability and efficacy of these systems were 
by no means certain, and Panama's track record for wreaking havoc with the best-laid plans 
suggested just how tenuous the sea-level canal's success may have been.  
In addition to engineering challenges, the sea-level also was a victim of the energy 
crunches that had complicated construction projects in the Transit Zone for decades. The sheer 
scale of the project meant that it would have a far more voracious energy appetite than the lock 
canal had in the early 1900s. Meeting this need required the importation and creation of 
tremendous amounts of human labor, mechanical labor, and electrical energy.   
 Human labor and mechanical labor were perhaps the most easily obtained sources of 
energy for the creation of a sea-level canal. By 1946 there was a workforce of 24,150 involved in 
the operation of the Panama Canal. Estimates suggested that by the peak year of construction this 
figure would balloon to nearly 51,730 workers.101 This was a formidable figure to be sure, but 
the engineers were confident that, as had been the case with the construction of the original 
Canal, with enough incentives they could attract the necessary number of laborers. They 
harkened back to the same methods of labor recruitment that had served the ICC so well in the 
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early 1900s, suggesting that, "Skilled and technical personnel would be obtained from the United 
States. The unskilled employees would be largely indigenous to the Caribbean area."102 
 The consultants were also optimistic about their ability to obtain the mechanized labor 
necessary to construct the Canal. There were questions as to whether suitable deep-water dredges 
could be developed for use in the deep dredging scheme, but stage dredging presented a reliable 
alternative should the worst come to pass. To successfully complete dredging in ten to twelve 
years they required four suction dredges, two dipper dredges, eight Vulcan drill boats, and 37 
rotary drill boats. These 51 vessels would be supplemented by numerous scows, and tugs to help 
with the removal and dumping of material.103 The demands for a dry excavation force were far 
more amorphous and never advanced beyond preliminary assurances that adequate plant could 
be obtained if necessary. Indeed, most reports had a fairly optimistic outlook on getting the 
necessary equipment for dry excavation, in one instance going so far as to state that, “a wide 
choice of equipment of various types and sizes is available.”104 In any case, it was at least 
feasible that the human and mechanical labor necessary to construct the new waterway could be 
obtained, albeit at considerable cost.  
The more vexing challenge was obtaining the necessary stores of electrical energy to 
support the excavation and construction of the sea-level canal. Again, this challenge was 
primarily the result of the need to remove the Gatun Dam and lower the height of Gatun and 
Madden Lakes. In addition to keeping floodwaters at bay, the dams provided the bulk of energy 
                                                           
102 Rose, Dye, et al., Construction Planning and Methods, located in, “Proceedings of the American Society of Civil 
Engineers: Vol. 74, No. 4:  Panama Canal: The Sea-level Project,” pg. 613. 
103 F.S. Brown, Panama Canal Sea-level Conversion, located in Various. “United States Isthmian Canal Studies- 1947 
Under Public Law 280 79th Congress, 1st Session: Discussion Presented at the Meeting of the Board of Consulting 
Engineers July 28 to 31, 1946,” pg. 11. 




in the Canal Zone. By 1946 Gatun hydroelectric plant was running without issue and had seen 
the addition of another turbine and generator, bringing its output up to 22,640 kW. The more 
recently constructed Madden Dam had an output of 30,000 kW. While a series of diesel plants 
provided supplementary power in case of emergency, the hydroelectric stations were the chief 
source of energy in the Canal Zone.105 Losing roughly 52,000 kW of generating power would 
significantly hinder the creation of the sea-level canal, a task engineers anticipated would require 
the generation of 116,800 kW of energy to meet the demands of construction and supply an 
adequate reserve.106 This left the sea-level canal in a sort of energy limbo. The east and west 
diversions diffused water so much that constructing a hydroelectric facility to replace the energy 
lost at Gatun and Miraflores was deemed impractical. The only option was the creation of new 
power plants operating on costly fossil fuels, a proposal that would drive the sea-level canal’s 
costs even higher.  
 Due to the inability to overcome the engineering, entropic, and energetic challenges that 
stood in the way of the sea-level canal, the plan set forth in Public Law 280 never came to 
fruition. The sea-level canal presented an unprecedented undertaking, and while it was alluring 
to the Board of Consulting Engineers and Governor Mehaffey, questions regarding the feasibility 
of the project were simply too substantial to warrant a nearly $2.5 billion-dollar investment, 
regardless of the benefits that might accompany the project. The idea was, for the time being, 
laid to rest, and despite growing concerns about its obsolescence, the thirty-year-old Panama 
Canal moved into the Postwar era. 
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End of an Era 
The interwar years showed that the Panama Canal had aged far more rapidly than anyone 
could have anticipated. The waterway had weathered the ebbs and flows of commerce and war, 
and as time went on concerns about the Canal's longevity began to grow alongside the volume 
and size of ships passing through its fixed locks. The delicate structures that allowed the Canal to 
operate and held the entropy of Panama at bay were increasingly seen as a liability, bottlenecks 
that were being outpaced by the development of new technologies and larger vessels. During the 
1920s and 1930s, these discussions suggested that the Canal's obsolescence was approaching but 
still resided in some abstract, far off date. The same could not be said of the 1940s. The rapid 
development of military armaments that took place in WWII, culminating with the development 
of the atomic bomb, rendered the Canal's shortcomings more immediate than ever before. The 
fixed nature of the Canal may have been able to stand up to the entropy of Panama, but it was no 
match for the power of the atom. 
With this reality in mind, the government sought to conduct studies to determine the best 
method to fix the Canal. Under the guidance of Governor Joseph Mehaffey and Colonel James 
Stratton, a group of over 100 consulting engineers came together to determine the future needs 
for security and capacity in an interoceanic canal. After nearly two years of tests, conferences, 
and debates they suggested emphatically that the only way to fix the Canal was to unfix it. By 
demolishing the locks and summit lake that rendered a lock canal vulnerable to bombing attacks 
and creating a sea-level canal it was possible to create a waterway that could meet the needs of 
both America's military and interoceanic shipping.  
Ultimately, the sea-level canal proved ill-fated. The ambitious plan to eradicate the lock 




excavation necessary to build the waterway required the use of unproven technologies. 
Additionally, the removal of the summit lake and the need to make steep cuts through the 
Continental Divide resurrected the potential that Panama's pesky proclivity for entropy could 
once more wreak havoc with American construction efforts. Finally, the significant challenges to 
obtaining enough energy to complete the project served as the nail in the coffin. It was a feasible, 
although admittedly imposing, task to obtain the human and mechanical labor necessary for 
construction but obtaining electrical energy for a sea-level canal was more vexing. Removing 
Gatun and Madden Lakes would simultaneously remove the utility of Gatun and Madden 
hydroelectric stations, the chief sources of energy production in Panama. While these stations 
could be replaced, the costs would be extensive, to say the least. Ultimately, the coalescence of 
these concerns proved prohibitive to the construction of the sea-level canal. 
And yet the sea-level canal was not dead. Indeed, its salvation ironically lay in the force 
which presented an existential threat to the existing Canal: atomic energy. The chief obstacle to 
the creation of the sea-level canal was that its reliance on conventional excavation, which 
accounted for over half of the total projected budget, rendered it excessively expensive. If a new, 
more economical source of energy could be directed towards the task of excavation the sea-level 
canal could rise again from the radioactive ashes. Interestingly, in his report on the potential 
dangers presented by a nuclear explosion, James Darling acknowledged that, "Although the 
atomic bomb was neither designed nor has it been used to produce earth-shaking and cratering 
effects, our studies should consider such use particularly since the main structure components, 




vulnerable to underground explosion effects as to air burst, if not more so."107 While Darling was 
primarily concerned about the devastation that could be unleashed by an underground explosion, 
his comments proved surprisingly insightful. A little more than a decade after Darling submitted 
his report, engineers would once again explore the consequences of underground nuclear 
explosives, except this time it would not be a faceless adversary who brought the bomb, but 
rather the engineers themselves
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Chapter V: A Radioactive Flash in the Pan: The Promise and Problems of Nuclear Energy 
in Panama, 1960-1970 
To the engineers meeting in Diablo Heights, Panama in February of 1947, nuclear energy 
presented an existential threat to the Panama Canal. They felt the danger constituted by a nuclear 
attack was so great that it was worth exploring the potential of replacing the barely three decades 
old Canal with a new, more resilient Isthmian canal.1 A decade later, scientists suggested 
purposefully detonating upwards of 300 nuclear explosives in Panama. Nuclear explosions still 
held the potential to destroy the Canal, but by 1960 scientists thought they might also be the key 
to its salvation. Scientists from the Atomic Energy Commission believed that the controlled 
detonation of nuclear explosives could provide a safe, cost-effective means of creating a new 
sea-level canal across Central America. Their faith in this plutonium panacea was so pronounced 
that they concluded, "It should be emphasized that it is considered feasible to construct the 
proposed canal with nuclear explosives and techniques presently available." 2  For the next 
decade, they conducted tests, experiments, and surveys to bring their vision to fruition. 
Despite the optimism of AEC scientists, a combination of technical challenges, 
Panamanian environmental realities, and public relations issues prevented this plutonium 
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pipedream from ever being realized.3 Over the last several decades, historians have explored 
Project Plowshare and the hunt for an atomic canal. They rightfully emphasize the hubris of 
American scientists and their unrealistic optimism about the future of nuclear engineering.4 
While effective, many of these books suggest that it was public opinion, primarily on the part of 
environmentalists, that doomed nuclear engineering. Public relations certainly played a role but 
did not exist in isolation. A focus on energy and the environment suggests that the linked 
challenges of crossing the continental divide and creating stable slopes doomed the atomic canal 
before environmentalists could enter the fray. Nuclear explosives and their awesome power 
impacted environments too dramatically, unleashing more entropy than they contained. 
The tension between nuclear energy’s promise and problems stemmed from its 
unprecedented efficiency. Nuclear fission and fusion (both reactions were present in the 
thermonuclear explosives used for nuclear excavation) were as radically alien to the combustion 
of oil and coal as those processes were to the oxidation of calories in human bodies. A single 
pound of uranium can produce as much heat as 2.5 million pounds of coal.5 As a result, for the 
first time, nuclear energy’s unprecedented capacity to “do work” forced policy makers and 
scientist to reckon with the limits of a new source of energy as much as its promise. This 
contrasted drastically with the relative lack of experimentation and foresight accompanying the 
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adoption of coal and oil; processes which saw the marginalization and death of thousands of 
Afro-Antilleans. And yet fossil fuels were silent killers. Explosions, drowning, and diseases were 
disassociated from the energy-oriented infrastructures and labor hierarchies that enabled them. 
The visceral terror that accompanied mushroom clouds afforded the dangers of thermonuclear 
explosions no such anonymity. In this context, the decision to shy away from nuclear excavation 
was not the result of atomic energy’s shortcomings, but rather its unrestrained power and the 
logistical challenges that accompanied it. 
In nuclear excavation this manifested itself in the inherent chaos of nuclear blasts. 
Scientists could certainly attempt to direct these weapons, emplacing and detonating them in a 
manner that improved the likelihood of desired outcomes, and yet there was a level of 
unpredictability that accompanied these blasts. One scientist described nuclear explosives as “too 
crude” to be used in tasks where a degree of precision was required.6 Another report emphasized 
that "It should be clearly understood that Plowshare is not concerned with slight, only marginal 
improvements of known procedures. Plowshare makes desirable changes in our environment 
possible that could not be contemplated before."7 Nuclear excavation was what Paul Josephson 
has dubbed a “brute force technology,” a heavy-handed attempt to impose order on a 
disorganized natural world.8 That scientists believed they could control the awesome potential of 
this reaction was a testament to their audacity and pride. 
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Ultimately, the fearsome energy contained in atomic reactions was a double-edged 
sword. While nuclear explosions could radically restructure the natural geography of a region, 
they completely lacked the ability to maintain environments. The explosive shockwaves that 
accompanied nuclear blasts would likely have destabilized the already fluid Panamanian 
landscape. In addition, the steep slopes characteristic of nuclear blasts were prone to catastrophic 
slope failures, particularly in places like Panama where heavy rains and saturated soils rendered 
inertia hard to maintain. These technical shortcomings of nuclear energy need to be placed 
alongside public relations failures in histories of the rise and fall of nuclear earthmoving to fully 
grasp the complexity of this new, and daunting energy regime. In nuclear energy, American 
scientists and engineers saw a means of finally liberating themselves from the limitations 
presented by the Panamanian environment, and yet their desire to assert control over the 
impenetrable swamps, mountains, and jungles of the Panamanian interior was vaporized by their 
inability to fully control the awesome energy that resided inside the atom. 
How Scientists Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Bomb 
 Nuclear energy’s presence in the 1947 report foreshadowed its crucial role in visions of 
canal expansion. As early as the 1920s policy makers considered the limitations of the Canal, 
and yet plans for substantial renovations of the Canal, let alone the creation of a new sea-level 
canal, were prohibitively expensive and time consuming. The sheer amount of energy and capital 
invested between 1904 and 1914 made additional investments an unsavory proposition. Yet the 
threat of nuclear war reshaped questions of canal efficiency into questions of canal existence. 
The unprecedented amount of energy released by nuclear bombs could completely and utterly 
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obliterate a lock type canal in less than an instant. Given the military and economic importance 
of the Canal such a possibility was unacceptable. However, the central problem of obtaining the 
massive amounts of energy necessary to reshape the Isthmus remained. How were engineers to 
carve through over one thousand feet of rock to create a sea-level canal? 
 A decade after the 1947 study, scientists began to think they might have found their 
answer. Nuclear energy was not only the problem, but also the solution. In February of 1957, 
nuclear scientists from several AEC affiliates met at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in 
Livermore, California for the “AEC Weapons Laboratory Symposium on Non-Military Uses of 
Nuclear and Thermonuclear Explosions.” For the first time, scientists came together to discuss 
theoretical applications of nuclear energy for non-military applications.9 Within a few short 
months of this program the AEC approved the organization of “Project Plowshare,” the study of 
potential uses for peaceful nuclear explosions.10 The awesome energy unleashed by nuclear 
reactions was simply too valuable to be reserved solely for military purposes. Nuclear energy 
could allow humanity to finally assert its control over the natural world through previously 
unimaginable engineering projects.  
 It didn’t take long for nuclear explosives to become an atomic elixir for the challenges 
facing the Canal. Studies on potential improvements to the Canal were conducted every few 
years following the 1947 study. Most simply reiterated already established realities: within a few 
decades the Canal would be incapable of dealing with increasing traffic, many ships would be 
too large to transit the Canal, and a lock canal was increasingly susceptible to subterfuge, 
sabotage, and military threats. As the 1950s progressed, these studies became increasingly 
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intrigued by the promise of nuclear engineering. The first group to seriously consider the nuclear 
alternative was a Board of Consultants appointed by Congress in 1957. In 1960, they formally 
presented their findings, suggesting that “the experimental development of excavation by nuclear 
explosives should be vigorously pushed by the appropriate government agency.”11 The idea of 
the nuclear canal had arrived. The rapid application of Plowshare’s ideas to the Panama problem 
was unsurprising. Unlike previous energy sources in Panama, nuclear energy had the power to 
level mountains and remove tons of material instantaneously, and, more importantly, to do so 
economically. Plowshare ushered in a new era, one in which American ingenuity, technological 
prowess, and a dash of hubris would finally bring the dream of a sea-level Panamanian canal to 
fruition.  
Plowshare scientists also found themselves lagging behind their Soviet counterparts in 
both the theoretical and practical development of nuclear engineering. The Soviets were gaining 
valuable data from a series of large chemical explosive projects. In 1956 they set off three blasts 
in China to improve access to mineral resources. Two years later they took their cratering 
experience further, detonating a row of charges to create a 1100-meter-long canal in the 
Pokrovsk Uralskii district. The canal drained a river which had been flooding local mines and 
simultaneously gave Soviet scientists vital information on detonation spacing for row charge 
explosions.12 Given the prestige that accompanied large scale engineering projects, the Soviets’ 
edge in engineering was unacceptable. Americans needed to clearly display their own prowess in 
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environmental engineering and a nuclear excavated sea-level canal across the Isthmus would 
assert American primacy in spectacular fashion. 
 To this end the Panama Canal Company (PCC) and AEC worked together to create the 
first substantial study of nuclear canal feasibility in January of 1960. The report was quite 
optimistic on the potential of nuclear explosives as an excavation tool, particularly given the fact 
that as of 1960 no non-military nuclear explosive had yet been detonated. But AEC scientists 
refused to see their enthusiasm smothered by such an insignificant obstacle as a lack of 
applicable experiments. They looked to four military nuclear explosions conducted between 
1951 and 1958 to determine the technical feasibility of nuclear excavation and supplemented this 
information with a series of chemical detonations.13 These data sets provided the basis of their 
cratering formulas and hopefully contributed enough theoretical data to allow them to predict 
challenges that could arise from detonating nuclear explosives in Central America. 
 Scientists found the potential of nuclear excavation promising for a variety of reasons. 
Their report suggested that, "A nuclear excavating technique has several advantages over 
conventional excavation methods. The most significant of these are lower costs, shorter 
construction times, less maintenance of the resulting canal, and reduced vulnerability to 
attack."14 These benefits resulted from the massive amounts of energy released by nuclear 
excavation. While blasting was frequently used in conventional excavation, chemical explosives 
merely loosened rock and soil, allowing mechanical excavation to proceed at a more rapid pace. 
Nuclear excavation expedited this process by combining the loosening of earth, rock, and soil 
with the act of excavation by ejecting the material out of the blast zone. Only minimal 
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mechanical labor was required after the detonation. Additionally, the massive yields of nuclear 
explosives were the only feasible means of cutting through the rocky Continental Divide which 
peaked at over 1000 feet above sea-level.  
The 1960 study emphasized two potential sites for the construction of a canal. The 
Sasardi-Morti Route (Route 17) ran about fifty miles through the Darien region of Eastern 
Panama. At just over 100 miles from the Canal this route was isolated enough to avoid damages 
to existing infrastructure. Route 17 required an estimated 250 individual explosives and a total 
yield of 120 megatons to be constructed. The Atrato-Truando route (Route 25) ran roughly 100 
miles through Northwestern Colombia, along the Panamanian border, and required 150 
individual explosives with a total yield of 150 megatons.15 Like Route 17, Route 25 was isolated, 
and had the added benefit of running alongside two rivers, which would make accessibility to the 
interior far easier. The report indicated that nuclear explosions provided enough energy for either 
route to be viable. 
 The energetic benefits of using nuclear explosions were accompanied by substantial 
financial benefits as well. Again, these were the direct result of the awesome potential held by 
the atom. By precluding the need for a massive mechanical labor force, the nuclear canal would 
cost a fraction of the price of conventional excavation. The AEC cautioned that their figures 
were purely speculative at this point but suggested that along the Sasardi-Morti route (Route 17) 
a nuclear excavated canal roughly 1000 feet wide could be constructed at roughly 25% of the 3.3 
billion dollars the 1947 report estimated for a 600-foot-wide, conventionally excavated sea-level 
                                                           




canal at the same site.16 With nuclear energy at their disposal, engineers could build larger, more 
efficient structures for substantially less.   
 These projections made the fervor surrounding nuclear excavation unsurprising. The 
power of the atom had the potential to enable previously unfeasible earthmoving projects with 
ease and reduce their prohibitively expensive costs. The AEC also suggested that nuclear 
explosives would allow the project to be completed in one-fifth the time it would take otherwise 
and, once it was completed, the sheer size of the canal would require only a small labor force to 
operate. Perhaps the most ironic benefit was that the nuclear canal would be far less susceptible 
to a nuclear attack because of its massive size and depth.17 Nuclear energy seemed to be the key 
to the Canal’s future and perhaps the future of mega-engineering. 
 This is not to say that the AEC was completely unaware of the hazards that accompanied 
nuclear explosives. They acknowledged that air blast, seismic events, and radioactive debris 
were all side effects of nuclear detonations, yet they suggested that these obstacles were 
inconsequential compared to the potential of nuclear excavation, concluding that, "A Trans-
Isthmian canal can be excavated with nuclear explosives with negligible damage to mankind and 
his means of livelihood.”18 Damage from air blast or seismic shock was a trifling concern and 
could be easily mitigated through experimentation. The AEC recommended the detonation of 
six, 2400-pound heavy explosives each month for a year to obtain the necessary data. The AEC 
neglected to seek Panamanians’ opinions on the subject of detonating explosives in their 
territory.19  
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Radiation, while problematic, was largely contained unground and could only endanger 
people if they, or the food they ate, came into direct contact with it. AEC scientists concluded 
that environmental studies could minimize any potential risk associated with radiation and 
furthermore that, given the aggressive nuclear tests being conducted by the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Soviet Union, any fallout associated with the creation of a new canal “would be 
only a very small fraction of the worldwide fallout even if not scavenged by dust.”20 In essence 
the radiation associated with peaceful nuclear explosives was just a drop in the bucket compared 
to military detonations and consequently wasn’t worth worrying about.  
The AEC was similarly nonchalant in dealing with local radiation. The small amount of 
radiation that was not trapped underground would not be concentrated enough to harm the 
general population, although as an added precaution “it would be desirable to protect human 
population up to 50 miles of the detonation during the fallout period (48 hours or more) to 
prevent ingestion of radioactivity and correspondingly higher exposure."21 After the prescribed 
forty-eight hour window the AEC felt that radiation would diffuse so much as to no longer be an 
issue. The only lingering challenge was ensuring that radiation didn’t contaminate any human 
food sources. To this end the AEC proposed a plan to control and monitor food production “in 
the canal, on the canal banks, and within a mile or two from the ends of the canal…”22 In the 
eyes of the AEC, radiation was a concern that required only minimal precautions. This laissez-
faire attitude was partially due to scientists’ faith in the development of new, low-fission, 
thermonuclear explosives which minimized the spread of highly radioactive materials. However, 
it also reflected an excessive sense of optimism that permeated many studies. The potential of 
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nuclear energy was so vast that any potential problems seemed trivial in contrast. This was 
particularly true during the earliest stages of nuclear canal planning when concrete information 
and knowledge had yet to be developed. Ultimately it was this lack of information that made 
nuclear detonation so appealing. 
The factors that the AEC failed to address in their report were a testament to their 
ignorant enthusiasm. While they were aware of radiation, air blast, and seismic shock, scientists 
failed to address two problems which, eventually, proved to be far more troubling to the 
realization of their atomic ambitions. The first of these issues was a lack of data and relevant 
tests. Of the four nuclear detonations the AEC used to write its report, three were in alluvium and 
one was in tuff. These media were dry, coarse, and loose, completely unlike the water saturated 
muck and rock native to Central America. While the AEC was confident in how cratering 
mechanics would work in the Nevada desert, they had little information of how craters would be 
formed and maintained in wet, heavy, compacted material. Their most substantive study of 
explosive mechanics in Panama stemmed from the 1947 study in which the Board of Consulting 
Engineers detonated a series of chemical explosives in materials ranging from marine muck to 
sandstone and basalt. That this data would apply to atomic explosions was highly suspect.23 
The second major issue was the AEC’s lack of local environmental knowledge. Since the 
creation of the railroad a century earlier, humans had struggled to control entropy. Mountains, 
hills, valleys, and swamps had to be eradicated before a sea-level canal could be created. Nuclear 
explosives seemed poised to finally be able to provide enough energy to overcome these physical 
barriers, however slides that covered railways and blocked the canal suggested that even if 
                                                           




engineers could gouge out a sea-level waterway, control over entropy remained elusive. In fact, 
nuclear explosives stood poised to complicate the clash against chaos due to the tremendous 
craters they left in their wake. Nuclear energy’s greatest asset in canal construction was that it 
would eject material entirely out of the canal prism, precluding the necessity of conventional 
excavation. The result was a deep crater with extremely steep raised lips. These unstable 
structures required only the slightest disturbance to generate spectacular slides and slope failures. 
Ultimately, the increased amount of material moved by nuclear explosives exacerbated the 
challenge of creating and maintaining stability in Panama 
In the alluvial material the AEC was familiar with, slope stability was an issue, but 
seldom resulted in catastrophic slope failures that compromised the integrity of the crater. What 
these scientists failed to realize was that the humid rainforests of Panama and Colombia were 
completely different animals than the dry desert of the Nevada Test Site. Craters created in 
Central America would be subject to pummeling rains which could saturate crater lips and slopes 
with water weight, eat away at the supporting banks, and result in catastrophic slope failure. The 
AEC seemed completely obtuse to these potential threats, writing that “The banks of a nuclearly 
excavated canal would be natural angles of repose and therefore would be stable. If minor slides 
occurred, the additional depth of a nuclearly excavated canal would provide a convenient local 
disposal area for the material."24 The AEC’s dismissal of slope stability wasn’t necessary 
surprising. At this early juncture, containing the spread of radiation and the energy contained in 
air blasts and ground shock seemed to be more pressing issues. However, this also pointed to the 
failure of imagination that plagued the AEC throughout Plowshare. 
                                                           




Of all the oversights made by the AEC, their lack of understanding of slope stability was 
the most egregious. Ironically, it was not issues of radiation, air blast, seismic shock, or even 
foreign policy that doomed the nuclear canal, although all certainly played a role in eroding 
confidence in the project. Instead it was the inability of scientists to obtain the necessary data and 
test results to determine if nuclear excavation was technically feasible that foreshadowed the 
obstacles that plagued Plowshare throughout its life. As the sun rose on Project Plowshare, 
scientists failed to fully acknowledge the limits of their control, largely because they had yet to 
fully comprehend them.  
An Era of Optimism 
While the AEC’s 1960 report didn’t result in the tests it had requested, it did engender a 
tremendous amount of enthusiasm. During the first few years of the sixties, three men took the 
lead in bringing the dream of a nuclear Panama to reality. Matthew (M.C.) Harrison, the 
Engineering and Construction Director of the Panama Canal Company, Ernest Graves, The 
Director of the U.S. Army Engineer Nuclear Cratering Group, and Bill Wray, Deputy Director of 
the U.S. Army Nuclear Cratering Group were integral to keeping the vision of a nuclear canal 
alive. Between 1962 and 1965, Graves, and Wray organized a series of tests at the Nevada Test 
site while Harrison worked on the logistics of getting information necessary to nuclear feasibility 
studies in Panama. All three faced the arduous test of lobbying for funding to carry out 
comprehensive tests. In the first half of the 1960s, these men played an essential role in 
promoting the nuclear canal and their efforts helped generate interest in a comprehensive study 
of the technology’s feasibility. 
Of the three, Graves was the most well versed with nuclear energy and unsurprisingly 




Graves was placed in charge of recruiting and training personnel for the construction of a nuclear 
reactor at Fort Belvoir, Virginia in 1954. Graves then briefly served as an engineer in Korea 
before he returned to nuclear research as an associate on Project Plowshare in 1959. He was then 
tasked with establishing the Nuclear Cratering Group (NCG) in the spring of 1962.25 Graves’ 
research connected to Panama prior to the creation of the NCG in 1962, but it was the creation of 
this entity that put him into contact with Harrison and led him to appoint Bill Wray as his 
Deputy.  
Despite not being directly involved in the 1960 study, Graves echoed its sentiments. In a 
1961 draft statement on nuclear excavation of a sea-level isthmian canal he wrote that not only 
did the technology seem to be feasible, but also that "Indications are that nuclear methods may 
save over one billion dollars in construction costs and can be used with complete safety to human 
life."26 Excited by the potential of this new technology, Graves immediately began plans for 
safety tests and on-site surveys in Panama. Bill Wray took Graves’ enthusiasm one step further 
by crafting a comprehensive budget for conducting site selections and field surveys. Wray’s 
proposal focused specifically on geology, meteorology, air blast propagation, and seismic forces. 
He believed these topics provided scientists with the information necessary to adequately deal 
with the issues of air blast, seismic shock, and radiation that had been identified in the 1960 
study.27  
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As 1962 progressed, Graves, Wray, and Harrison became increasingly committed to 
nuclear excavation. They were particularly excited by the execution of the .4 kt Danny Boy 
detonation on March 5, 1962. Danny Boy was remarkable for two reasons. It was the first test 
conducted in basalt and provided valuable information on how nuclear craters worked in rockier 
media like the Continental Divide. Danny Boy also was the first cratering test at the Nevada Test 
Site in nearly four years and suggested that interest in nuclear excavation was growing. There 
was no guarantee that a nuclear canal was imminent, but Graves struck a cautiously optimistic 
tone in a letter to Wray in which he wrote “There are two things I have learned about this 
Plowshare business. One is that it shows enough technical promise to be worth looking into. The 
other is that overcoming the political problems is going to be a long, slow process."28 Graves, 
Wray and Harrison recognize that public anxiety surrounding nuclear explosions was 
monumental. If they wanted to gain acceptance for nuclear engineering they needed to find ways 
to show that nuclear explosions were safe, and practical for peaceful applications.29 To this end, 
they set about trying to overcome these political challenges by focusing their attention on gaining 
legislative support for a substantial canal study which they hoped would both provide the 
information necessary to determine the best site for a new, nuclear canal, and also increase 
public support for the project.30  
While progress was slow, a series of developments bolstered their case. Increasing 
interest in nuclear excavation from the Kennedy Administration suggested that political obstacles 
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were crumbling. On April 30th, 1962, Kennedy directed the AEC and Army Corps of engineers 
to undertake a five-year study to determine the feasibility of nuclear excavation.31 A few months 
after the Administration’s announcement another nuclear test was held in July of 1962. At 104 
kt, Sedan was the largest test conducted by Plowshare and provided invaluable information about 
cratering mechanics from higher yield explosives. While fallout was higher than had been 
predicted, its spread was minimal and both air blast and ground shock were lower than 
anticipated. The one major issue which remained unresolved however was the steep angle of the 
crater slopes. The resulting crater was 320’ deep and 1200’ wide and the slopes were far more 
extreme than anticipated, varying from 30-35 degrees at a depth of 100-250’ below ground level 
and 40-45 degrees at depths of 50’ to ground level. These slopes were so extreme that one side of 
the crater saw a major slide in the lip and upper portion of the crater wall.32 It was increasingly 
obvious that slope stability needed to be dealt with for nuclear excavation to become a reality. 
Despite these obstacles, the Kennedy Administration’s support and the increasing 
resources directed towards Project Plowshare garnered the nuclear canal some allies in 
Washington. Herbert Bonner, a Democratic representative from North Carolina and longtime 
champion of the nuclear canal, introduced a bill to the House Committee on Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries on June 27, 1962. Less than two weeks later, on July 7th, Warren Magnusson, a 
Democratic senator from Washington, introduced an identical bill to the Senate Commerce 
Committee. Both bills failed to get out of committee during the 87th Congress, but their 
introduction initiated the process of Congressional recognition that Graves, Wray, and Harrison 
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had been promoting.33 Congressional support granted nuclear excavation an air of legitimacy and 
suggested that the technology was feasible enough to receive serious consideration.  
The next step for Graves, Wray, and Harrison was to justify their potential studies so that 
when the proposed bills made it out of committee they would be greeted with enthusiasm. At the 
Nevada Test Site, Graves focused on developing additional nuclear tests to refine the 
understanding of nuclear excavation mechanics, particularly in row charge detonations. Row 
charge detonation was the simultaneous detonation of several devices buried at regular intervals. 
The explosions’ energy forced the material outwards creating a long trench rather than a single 
crater. This excavation technique was imperative to the creation of a nuclear canal as scientists 
needed to find a way to dig trenches without refilling them with the debris of subsequent shots. 
While nuclear energy was awesome it was clumsy and brutish and thus could prove counter-
productive if its force was not adequately directed and harnessed. To this end, Graves and others 
at the AEC began planning “Buggy,” a row charge experiment of five, 10 kt explosives set for 
1964.34  
Meanwhile, in Panama, Harrison focused on the logistics of carrying out on-site surveys 
to determine the optimal site for a nuclear canal. Harrison felt deeply that he, Graves, and Wray 
needed to focus on the economic justifications for such a study if they intended to get 
congressional approval. They hoped to contrast the potential costs of nuclear excavation with 
those of conventional excavation to emphasize the dramatic financial benefits that accompanied 
the adoption of this new source of energy. The catch was that estimates of the cost of nuclear 
excavation were almost entirely speculative due to the lack of information about potential sites 
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for the new canal. Harrison proposed a $12 million-dollar study to deploy scientists and 
surveyors to Panama to identify a route. This also reflected a continuing trend in the deployment 
of American energy in Panama. Nuclear energy did not act in isolation. To unleash atomic 
energy, a vanguard of human energy had to first make its way into the interior to pave the way 
for the deployment of nuclear energy. Nuclear energy’s utility was still predicated on the 
capacity of human energy. While nuclear energy was exponentially more powerful than human 
energy it was also relatively specialized, being effective in Panama only as a brute force 
technology meant to reshape the environment on a drastic scale. This was a reality Harrison 
recognized all too well. Responding to Graves’ assessment of tests carried out at the Nevada Test 
Site, Harrison wrote, “It appears that you are raising Hell with the landscape there in Nevada—
with a little rainfall you might have some good swimming holes.”35 
Progress towards the adoption of nuclear engineering moved rapidly in Panama. In 
January of 1963, a group of AEC and NCG representatives descended on Panama to meet with 
members of the PCC and voice their support for the proposed studies on the Isthmus. The 
conference resulted in a more refined plan of study for Panama. Particularly important was the 
fact that, for the first time, scientists clearly expressed their awareness of the unique hydrological 
conditions in Panama, and the consequences that Panama’s humidity and rainfall could have on 
fallout distribution. This recognition marked a decided shift from the disinterested approach the 
AEC and NCG had previously taken in assessing the impact of Panama’s unique environment.36  
While nuclear energy’s potential was significant, it was mediated by environmental realities 
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which dictated its efficacy and shaped the consequences of its deployment. Unfortunately, 
scientists only seemed to be aware of this in the context of fallout distribution. They still failed to 
adequately acknowledge the impact that Panama’s propensity for entropy had on slope stability. 
The fault in this oversight did not lie exclusively with the AEC or NCG. Even those 
working in Panama, Harrison among them, seemed to underestimate the potential challenges that 
slope stability presented. Rather than concerning Harrison and his colleagues, the January 
meeting seemed to encourage them. In February of 1963, Graves suggested that support for a 
study in Washington was growing as “There is every indication that the Administration’s 
emphasis on our authorization bill, as demonstrated by the attitude of the Board of Directors, will 
continue."37 The success of Plowshare tests, and the international prestige offered by a practical 
example of nuclear excavation, became increasingly alluring to policy makers. Harrison too was 
growing excited. Shortly after receiving Graves’ message he received approval to send twelve 
technicians to Route 17, the most promising nuclear canal site in Panama.38 By the spring of 
1963 it seemed only a matter of time before Panama was bathed in the radioactive light of an 
atomic future. 
Unfortunately for nuclear advocates, this positivity decayed faster than the radionuclides 
scientists sought to harness. In October, negotiations surrounding the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
made the Kennedy Administration hesitant to conduct nuclear explosions, a position that 
contrasted starkly with the stance it had taken just a few months earlier. The Administration’s 
about face on atoms reflected a dirty truth; nuclear energy was perceived of as a weapon first, 
and a tool second. The awesome amounts of energy unleashed in nuclear reactions made it next 
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to impossible to avoid this reality. Nuclear excavation was an exercise in palatable devastation. 
Rather than turning the atom towards the task of creation, “Plowshare” sought to find places 
where destruction made landscapes more beneficial to humans. In this sense the application of 
nuclear energy was still an act of violence. Peaceful nuclear explosives simply directed this 
violent energy towards landscapes rather than people.39 The message was clear: it was laudable 
to turn one’s swords into plowshares, but plowshares could easily become swords once more. 
As 1963 ended it seemed that the best efforts of Graves, Wray, and Harrison had been for 
naught. On-site studies had not been carried out, information about the Panamanian landscape 
was dangerously spotty, slope stability had yet to be dealt with, and governmental support for 
Plowshare was evaporating. A dejected Graves asked "Will this kill nuclear excavation? I doubt 
it, but I have no idea under what penury the program will struggle on.”40 Graves’ frustrations 
were directed less at the government and the Limited Test Ban Treaty and more towards the lack 
of action taken by the AEC and PCC during 1962 and early 1963. Graves believed that if these 
organizations had pursued the nuclear canal more aggressively, they might have been able to 
weather the Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiations more effectively. As it stood, he sensed that 
his years of work on the project were going to amount to nothing. Graves might have been more 
dejected, had the Dodgers not tempered the blow. "Yes, there was joy at 436 Jackson Avenue 
when Koufax pitched that curve for a called third strike on Mantle and two out in the ninth 
inning of the fourth world series game," Graves admitted.  The AEC wasn’t conducting any 
blasts, but at least Mantle hadn’t either. 
                                                           
39 Graves, “Letter from Ernest Graves to Bill Wray, October 16, 1963” From USNA, RG 185, Collection A1 156, Box 





Riots, Radiation, and Foreign Relations 
The nuclear canal might have remained stagnant had a different energy not interceded. 
Anger, hostility, and resentment towards sixty years of American authority in the Canal Zone 
catalyzed a different sort of explosion on January 9th, 1964, as students from the Instituto 
Nacional stormed the Canal Zone, attempting to raise their flag at a Canal Zone high school. 
Canal Zone police were instructed not to interfere, but several Zonians resisted and, in the 
ensuing scuffle, the Panamanian flag the students brought was ripped. Over the next three days 
violent clashes broke out along the Canal Zone border between Zonians and Panamanians. By 
the time the violence ended, twenty-eight people lay dead and Panamanian President Roberto 
Chiari broke relations with the US until an alternative to the 1903 treaty was negotiated. The fate 
of the Canal hung in the balance.41 
President Johnson quickly acquiesced to Chiari’s concerns by opening renegotiation of 
the treaty, a process that spanned three administrations and lasted nearly fifteen years. The 
question of what was to become of the Panama Canal lay at the center of these negotiations. In 
this context, a new nuclear excavated sea-level canal took on greater importance. A sea-level 
canal was a more efficient waterway and could be operated by a relatively small number of 
American employees, mitigating conflict between Panamanians and Americans in Panama. 
Tensions between Americans and Panamanians pointed to one of the major complications 
regarding human energy. Human energy in Panama was intimately entwined with international 
concerns. American laborers, while allegedly essential to the operation of the Canal, were also 
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seen as manifestations of unwanted American influence in Panama. A more energy efficient sea-
level canal that relied less on American manpower could assuage this problem by removing 
many laborers from Panama. An estimate from a 1964 report suggested that a sea-level canal 
could be operated with as few as 200 Americans, a dramatic departure from the thousands who 
were currently working on the Canal.42 The Martyr’s Day Riots, as they would come to be 
called, breathed new life into the nuclear canal, suggesting that, remarkably, detonating nuclear 
explosives in Panama could actually improve relations between the two countries. 
The need for an alternative to the Panama Canal kicked studies for a new canal into high 
gear. The AEC, PCC, and Army Corps of Engineers began compiling all the information they 
could find on Panama and revised their earlier estimates for the feasibility, cost, and location of a 
new canal. The PCC released a report in 1964 detailing the current state of the Canal. The study 
dealt with a variety of concerns including cost comparisons between sea-level and lock canals, 
potential upgrades to modernize the Canal, the potential of creating a new canal by conventional 
excavation, and the nuclear canal. Interestingly however, while scientists and engineers remained 
enthused about the potential of nuclear excavation, they had grown more reserved in their 
optimism. The report emphasized the fact that "Tests and studies to date support earlier 
conclusions that the construction of a sea-level canal by nuclear methods is feasible.” However, 
they also acknowledged that "Further nuclear device development and testing are necessary to 
assess positively the effectiveness, economy, and safety of nuclear explosives in applications of 
the magnitude that would be required in constructing a sea-level canal."43  
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Scientists were becoming increasingly aware of the limitations of their knowledge and 
the fact that much of the energy released in a thermonuclear explosion was effectively 
uncontrollable. Consequently, the lack of concrete examples and nuclear cratering explosions to 
draw from was a vexing problem for engineers. Danny Boy and Sedan presented a wealth of 
information, but questions about row charges and slope stability had been gauged only with 
chemical explosives and had still been almost exclusively carried out in loose alluvial desert 
soil.44 For a nuclear canal to be deemed technically feasible more nuclear explosions were 
necessary.  
Despite these limitations, by 1964 the PCC felt far more comfortable predicting a 
construction program than they had in previous studies. Engineers envisioned three-phases of 
construction. An initial period of detailed studies along the proposed blast site would obtain data 
on topics ranging from rainfall totals to population densities among the inhabitants of the 
proposed canal site. Simultaneously, the company would mobilize the necessary labor and 
material along the proposed canal site. Once engineers felt comfortable with their data, they 
would begin construction of essential facilities, including access roads to the centerline, the 
drilling of emplacement holes, and construction of storage facilities for the nuclear devices and 
housing for the workers. Those individuals, both hired workers and indigenous peoples, living 
next to the blast sites would be relocated to an area outside of the projected fallout zone and the 
detonations would take place on a rolling basis over the span of one to two years. Once all the 
detonations were carried out, conventional construction would take place to stabilize canal walls, 
construct navigational aids, tidal barriers, and support buildings; and dredge the final sections of 
                                                           




the canal. All said and done this project would take roughly seven years to complete and 
engineers were confident that cost and time would be similar along both routes.45 
The 1964 report emphasized several areas of concern. Similar to the 1960 report, 
scientists emphasized the need for environmental tests and meteorology to gauge the spread of 
radiation as well as the potential impacts of air blast and ground shock. Additionally, by 1964, 
scientists were far more aware of the public relations concerns that accompanied nuclear 
engineering, the substantial amount of conventional energy and construction that would be 
necessary to enable nuclear excavation, and the dramatic role that slope stability played in 
mitigating the efficacy of a new sea-level canal. Scientists were recognizing not only the benefits 
of nuclear excavation, but also its significant limitations. However, they were disheartened by 
these challenges. The report suggested that "Undesirable side effects often accompany a new and 
revolutionary technological advance. Development of a deeper understanding of the basic 
scientific phenomenon and improvement of equipment generally lead to adequate control and 
open the way to broader acceptance and use. Significant progress along these lines has already 
been made in nuclear excavation."46 Their optimism might have been well founded on the topics 
of air blast, ground shock, and radiation, however slope stability, political hurdles, and the local 
environment of Panama were far more vexing concerns. 
Air blast, ground shock and radiation were still governed by the same perceptions in 1964 
as they had been in 1960. All three were deemed manageable so long as the necessary data was 
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obtained to determine their spread. Containing Air blast was fairly straightforward. The massive 
amounts of energy released in an atomic detonation released a shockwave that was strong 
enough to break glass and cause damage at distances of up to 300 miles.47 There was nothing that 
could be done to mitigate these concerns at locations close to the blast site, however at greater 
distances air blast conveyance correlated with winds and jet streams. On a windy day these 
forces carried the air blast hundreds of miles. In a small location like Panama this was an 
unacceptable possibility, particularly if the air blast was carried west to Panama City. The AEC 
suggested conducting rocket wind measurements in which rockets carried chaff to an altitude of 
200,000 feet before releasing it. Radar stations tracked the chaff’s descent, determining average 
windspeeds based on the chaff’s trajectory.48 Using this data scientists could select dates and 
times for detonations that minimized the area impacted by air blast. That some air blast would 
cause damage was merely a side effect of atomic energy’s awesome power; the trick was 
minimizing it. 
While air blast was conveyed through the relatively open medium of air, ground shock 
travelled through the earth itself. To gain an understanding of the impact of ground shock, 
surveyors and geologists needed to determine the geological make up of proposed canal sites. 
This required a substantial investment of human and mechanical energy to get access to interior 
regions of both routes and to bore holes to acquire the necessary geological data. As was the case 
with air blast, ground shock was an unavoidable side effect of the awesome power of atomic 
bombs. The underground explosions sent powerful shockwaves through the ground, creating 
significant reverberations throughout the earth that could crack foundations and cause structural 
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damage dozens of miles away. Understanding ground shock transmission through various media 
was crucial to determining how it would spread in Panama, and the steps necessary to protect 
nearby structures.49 
Scientists seemed most optimistic about the question of radiation. They emphasized that 
the most hazardous radioactive particles were a function of fission reactions. The thermonuclear 
bombs used for nuclear excavation were catalyzed by a fission reaction, but fission only had to 
provide enough energy to begin the fusion reaction, a process which released far less malignant 
radionuclides. Scientists were confident in the progress they had made in this area, suggesting 
“Improvements in nuclear explosives design since 1959 studies have materially reduced the 
amount of radioactivity which would be deposited as fallout near the project.”50 By making less 
of the yield of the explosive come from fission, scientists could minimize fallout without 
sacrificing efficiency. Additionally, scientists clung to the claim that underground detonations 
mitigated the spread of radioactive materials. While they did acknowledge that groundwater 
might play more of a role in conveying radiation than they thought, they were confident that 
cratering formation rendered much of the radiation inaccessible to plant, animal, and, most 
importantly, human life.51  
Between 1960 and 1964, scientists’ concerns about controlling the negative impacts of 
nuclear explosives remained static. While they acknowledged that air blast, ground shock, and 
radiation created problems, they found nuclear energy so alluring that they assumed, perhaps 
correctly, that proper meteorological, hydrological, geological, and environmental studies 
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allowed them to execute nuclear explosions safely, or at least safely enough to make these risks 
well worth the potential rewards that this revolutionary new technology offered. Despite this 
enthusiasm, several lingering issues remained. One of the most dramatic shifts between 1960 and 
1964 was the growing awareness of the less direct hindrances that accompanied nuclear 
excavation. Concerns over political obstacles, slope integrity, and the environmental realities of 
the tropical environments were addressed in meaningful ways for the first time in 1964. While 
scientists still felt comfortable in their ability to make nuclear explosions a viable source of 
energy, they were beginning to recognize the limits of their control. 
Slope stability had been a problem for nuclear excavation since its inception. However, it 
failed to garner much attention throughout the early 1960s. Slope stability was seen as an 
afterthought in the 1960 report and even though some scientists began discussing it in the 
aftermath of the Danny Boy and Sedan explosions, the issue still failed to carry the same clout as 
air blast, ground shock, and radiation. The 1964 report marked a departure from this rather 
dismissive attitude as scientists began to acknowledge that slope stability wasn’t merely an 
inconvenience, but rather a potentially catastrophic issue that could undermine the nuclear canal.  
Steep slopes were a direct result of cratering mechanics. As the underground explosions 
expanded, the surface became the only area where the extreme pressure could escape. Thus, 
much of the energy of the detonation was channeled upwards resulting in more extreme slopes 
than in conventional excavation. Consequently, nuclear detonation was infeasible in swampy 
lowland areas where saturated soils and muds could not retain the parabola of the canal prism. 
For this reason, scientists admitted that nuclear excavation was impractical along much of Route 




deepen and widen these river channels to make them navigable.52 This conclusion differed from 
earlier reports that suggested the universal applicability of nuclear excavations. Scientists were 
starting to realize that this new form of energy significantly altered landscapes in the short term 
but was incapable of maintaining them over time. 
In the rockier terrain that spanned Route 17, nuclear energy seemed to be more practical 
for excavation, however, here too uncertainty clouded optimism. Two major issues concerned 
scientists along Route 17. First was the small yield of the Danny Boy test. At only .4 kt Danny 
Boy had less than 1% of the yield of the smallest devices (100 kt) scientists intended to use to 
excavate the new canal which were themselves only 1% of the largest explosions (10 Mt).53  
Danny Boy provided the only data on how nuclear cratering operated in rocky media and 
scientists had no idea if their scaling models applied to exponentially larger detonations. This 
created an array of problems, but perhaps the most substantial was whether crater slopes would 
be stable in explosions of higher yields. This issue was complicated by the fact that the basalt in 
Nevada had far lower moisture content than the rocky clay shales of Panama. Scientists were 
forced to admit that “a serious question arises as to whether these weaker, saturated rocks will 
stand on the same steep slopes as the Danny Boy crater, particularly as the scale increases and 
the slopes become much higher."54 It was very possible that nuclear explosions simply altered 
environments to an effectively unsustainable extent: an untenable proposition in a tropical 
environment where landslides were common and stability was difficult to maintain.  
Scientists identified six potential causes of slope failures in Panama and acknowledged 
that should such failures transpire they could destroy the economic and energetic advantages of 
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nuclear excavation. Scientists pointed to a variety of potential issues including geological 
failures from weak formations, terrain failures on sloping landscapes, rebound failures from 
cratering, liquefaction failures from the loss of strength of saturated materials, hydraulic failures 
from slopes undercut by rushing waters, or fractures induced by the explosion itself.55 In essence, 
a lot could go wrong. By 1964, Bill Wray was growing increasingly concerned about the issue of 
slope stability. In a letter to Ernest Graves in March of 1964, he admitted "The more I think 
about the problem of slope stability in the deep cuts we would plan to make, the more I am 
concerned about the likelihood of major failures requiring the movement, by conventional 
equipment, of some rather large quantities of rubble."56 Again the root of the problem lay in the 
sheer amount of energy released by nuclear explosives. Wray pointed to projections suggesting 
that in high risk areas, particularly through the Continental Divide, the explosions could create 
crater lips up to 700 feet tall. Wray believed the presence of so much rubble was a recipe for 
disaster. 
The discussion then wasn’t oriented around the question of whether slope instability was 
possible- it certainly was- but rather the consequences that would result from a large slide. One 
camp suggested that the Canal itself would be so large that a slope failure could only temporarily 
block a small section of the waterway. In 1960 this view was commonplace, but by 1964 more 
scientists were concerned with a complete blockage of the Canal and the cessation of all traffic. 
This growing chorus of voices suggested that to minimize the risk of catastrophic slope failure 
conventional excavation was necessary to create more gradual slopes. They predicted that fully 
halting the potential threat of slope failure required the conventional excavation of up to one 
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billion cubic yards of material. The mutated fly in the ointment was that "Remedial construction 
of this magnitude would essentially wipe out the advantage of nuclear excavation."57  Slope 
failures possessed the potential bury nuclear excavation. Nuclear energy’s economy stemmed 
from the fact that it not only broke up rock and soil, but also ejected them from the canal prism, 
minimizing the need for conventional excavation. If slope instability necessitated a tremendous 
investment of mechanical energy it would eradicate the economic advantages that made nuclear 
excavation appealing. 
The issue of slope stability also reflected a broader lack of knowledge about the ways 
nuclear explosives would operate in the Panamanian environment. To successfully create a sea-
level canal across Panama, engineers needed to cut through the rugged mountainous terrain of 
the Continental Divide. In the Darien region where Route 17 was planned, this required blasting 
through terrain over 1000 feet above sea level. Nuclear energy could certainly accomplish this 
task; indeed, it could do so with an economy and efficiency unrivaled by any conventional 
energy source. The catch was that doing so required tremendous amounts of energy and 
consequently would release tremendous amounts of entropy. Scientists suggested that felling the 
Continental Divide would require the detonation of several substantial nuclear devices with 
yields upwards of 10 Mt if not more.  
Increasing the yield of explosives was not a problem. Indeed, nuclear explosives were 
tremendous beneficiaries of economies of scale. As the yield of the device went up the 
concurrent cost per BTU of energy declined significantly.58 For instance, a 2 Mt nuclear device 
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cost $0.075 per million BTU’s while a 10 kt device cost $8.75 per million BTU’s.59 The issue 
stemmed from the fact that increases in device yields also resulted in greater impacts from air 
blast, ground shock, and radiation. The key was to try to find a sort of thermonuclear goldilocks 
zone where leveling the Continental Divide was financially viable but wouldn’t harm Panama 
City only 110 miles away. They begrudgingly conceded that one of their biggest worries was 
“The uncertainty about our ability to blast the section of a channel through the highest levels of 
the continental divide with a single nuclear explosive of safe yield."60 This proved to be one of 
the ironic realities of the Panamanian environment. Its lack of land was a tremendous asset to 
excavation of a canal as it could be crossed far more easily than a larger country- Route 25 
through Colombia for example would span over 100 miles compared to Route 17’s 45 miles- 
however, this also meant that there was no location in Panama that was truly isolated enough for 
scientists to deploy their full arsenal of atomic energy.  
The final issues facing the nuclear canal were the political and public relations obstacles 
that lay in its path. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty continued to challenge the feasibility of nuclear 
excavation, particularly in Panama. One of the central tenets of the Treaty was that fallout from a 
nuclear detonation had to be contained within the territory of the country in which the explosion 
took place. In the Nevada Testing Site (NTS) this was inconvenient; in Panama it was 
impossible. In Nevada the AEC found that regulations imposed by the treaty significantly limited 
both the size and number of experimental explosions they could undertake. One projection from 
February of 1964 suggested that under these conditions it would take roughly 16 years to 
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establish the technical feasibility of nuclear excavation.61 In Panama the problem was more 
pronounced. At the proposed canal site, the Isthmus had a width of less than 50 miles. Even 
under the best weather conditions it was impossible to keep fallout from drifting over 
international waters, thus violating the stipulations of the treaty.62 The only way to create a 
nuclear canal while still abiding by the treaty was to renegotiate or amend the treaty to create an 
exception for peaceful nuclear explosions. 
Unsurprisingly, the proponents of the nuclear canal were not going to have their 
enthusiasm dampened by minor obstacles like internationally ratified treaties. They were 
confident that the treaty could be easily amended. They even assumed that the Soviet Union 
would be enthusiastic to exempt peaceful nuclear explosives so they could advance their own 
nuclear excavation program. In a hearing before the Senate Commerce Committee AEC 
Chairman Glenn Seaborg suggested that if other countries saw smaller explosions that didn’t 
violate the guidelines of the treaty they would see the practicality of nuclear excavation and 
“would also be able to assure themselves that nuclear excavation does not provide us an 
opportunity to obtain weapons information that cannot already be obtained by underground 
weapons tests.”63 Seaborg implied that if other countries felt assured of this they would be more 
open to amending the treaty, allowing for the larger tests required to determine the feasibility of 
nuclear excavation. 
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This optimism permeated agencies affiliated with the project and led them to be 
somewhat dismissive of the broader public concerns about fallout and radiation. In that same 
hearing with the Senate Commerce Committee, John S. Kelly, the AEC’s director of the Division 
of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, suggested that it would be possible to limit radiation from 
explosives to just 1% of their 1962 levels, effectively rendering radiation a moot point. Senator 
Philip Hart from Michigan sought to blunt Kelly’s optimism by pointing out that concerns over 
radiation would not go away so easily. "There is going to be plenty of gnashing of teeth,” Hart 
commented, “and that doesn't mean they are communist inspired or anything else."64 Despite the 
best efforts of Hart and others to open the eyes of scientists to the widespread concerns the 
public held regarding nuclear energy, scientists remained aloof and at times condescending in 
their understanding of the issue. On the topic of public concern, they suggested “The safety 
issues, particularly those dealing with radioactivity, are not well understood by the general 
public. This lack of knowledge forms the basis for a natural resistance to the execution of a 
project such as this one.” The 1964 report went as far as to identify the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
as a symptom of this public ignorance, claiming, “The wide acceptance of the Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty is ample testimony to the general nature and seriousness of this problem.”65 The dismissal 
of public concerns reflected the inability of nuclear scientists to realistically acknowledge that 
shortcomings of nuclear energy. The sheer potential offered by the technology seemed to 
outweigh any potential suggestion that it might be flawed or impractical. It appeared they were 
blinded by the light. Ernest Graves suggested that perhaps there was a more practical reason for 
this optimism. In a letter to Bill Wray he wrote that while he was at times overwhelmed by the 
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obstacles that lay in their path, “Great endeavors require a fundamental faith in the ability of 
man."66 The line between necessary optimism and naïve faith was razor thin. 
Despite the unfortunate side effects of nuclear excavation, the awesome amounts of 
energy the technology could provide, accompanied by the growing reality that the current canal 
was both practically and politically inconvenient, led the federal government to throw its full 
weight behind the proposed nuclear canal. As 1964 progressed both the Senate and House 
considered bills to provide funding for on-site surveys in Panama and Colombia. This process 
kicked off the final phase in the quest for the nuclear canal, a phase which started with optimism, 
but soon revealed the task of harnessing the atom was far more daunting than anyone anticipated. 
Congressional Debates and Missed Dates 
The debates regarding on-site tests and the creation of the Atlantic Pacific Interoceanic 
Canal Study Commission (ICSC) were surprisingly muted given the controversy surrounding 
nuclear detonations. By September of 1964 the bill made its way through Congress and the ICSC 
had been given $17.5 million dollars to conduct its study.67 Unlike the organizations previously 
tasked with determining the feasibility of a nuclear canal, the ICSC was a civilian run 
organization. Robert Anderson was named Chairman of the Commission as well as the lead 
negotiator in the search for a new treaty with Panama. John Sheffey served as the Commission’s 
Executive Director, overseeing organization and logistics. Alongside these two were four other 
members: Robert Storey, Milton Eisenhower, General Kenneth Fields, and Raymond Hill. These 
six men were tasked with a variety of charges, including determining the capacity of the existing 
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canal, potential sites for a new canal, and finally assessing the technical feasibility of using 
nuclear explosives to create a new sea-level Isthmian canal.68 
Despite their best efforts, progress on the study itself was slowed by a variety of obstacles 
that all centered around one issue: the rainy season. Despite technological developments in 
harnessing new sources of energy, Americans in the 1960s still faced the same challenge that 
G.M. Totten had faced over a century earlier. The rains of Panama between April and December 
effectively slowed work to a crawl. The proposed plan of study for the Commission suggested 
that "Under these adverse circumstances which will increase costs, we will get considerably less 
field data for our programed resources."69 This issue complicated the fact that the ICSC was also 
working on a fixed schedule and was expected to submit its findings to the President by June 
30th, 1968.70 In essence this left them with four dry seasons to compile their information and 
determine the best course of action for a new canal. A series of delays and budget issues soon 
rendered this goal untenable.  
The dry season of 1965 was a wash from the very beginning. The ICSC was not approved 
until September of 1964 and didn’t appoint all six of its members until early 1965. It was 
impossible to employ surveyors, scientists, and engineers and obtain the materials necessary to 
construct facilities in the interior on such short notice. Additionally, the Commission had to 
negotiate rights of access with Panama before they could even consider sending personnel into 
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the region.71 These two challenges meant that throughout 1965 much of the ICSC’s work 
focused on tasks that could be done domestically. The only major attempt to obtain on-site 
information was the deployment of Field Director Alex Sutton to Panama for brief surveys. 
Sutton’s initial report was not optimistic and even senior members of the Panama Canal 
Company recognized the challenges the survey faced. In response to Sutton’s report, Canal Zone 
Governor Robert Fleming wrote, “Without immediate access to work areas, without helicopter 
resupply, without adequate potable water, without preparation and conditioning of the native 
population, the field parties' energies and endeavors will be concentrated on survival with a 
consequent detriment to the basic mission of the surveys."72 The Panamanian interior still 
demanded tremendous investments of energy to breach, particularly during the wet season.  
Because of these challenges the ICSC made only gradual progress during 1965. 
Commission members made their way to Panama in August of 1965, and in October of that year 
they visited the Nevada Test Site to get information on Plowshare’s progress.73 Nuclear device 
development was also stalling. The Limited Test Ban Treaty and a popular perception of nuclear 
explosives as doomsday devices limited public acceptance of any nuclear detonation. 
Consequently, AEC scientists were forced to focus on theoretical cratering formulas using data 
from previous nuclear detonations and chemical explosives to extrapolate the outcomes of larger 
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detonations.74 Meanwhile, the AEC hired consultants from MIT and Duke to try to deal with the 
vexing issue of slope stability. These studies focused particularly on the challenges of creating 
stable slopes in the weak, saturated rocks that were common to Panama. While they made some 
headway in exploring potential ways of generating more gradual slopes and promoting stability 
in weak media, they were forced to admit that "It becomes obvious that no valid stability analysis 
can be made without adequate site data."75 Until more nuclear tests could be conducted, or access 
to proposed canal sites could be obtained, scientists could only speculate on the consequences of 
deploying atomic energy. 
Despite these challenges, the ICSC separated itself from its predecessors by taking public 
concerns about nuclear explosives seriously and developing an informal program to assuage 
public misgivings. The ICSC undertook a "Study of Public Information Aspects of Sea-Level 
Canal Construction" which intended to “anticipate and evaluate the public reaction to each of the 
courses of action under the consideration by the Commission and to weigh the influence of 
public opinion on the feasibility of each." Additionally, the Commission adopted a policy of 
responding to requests for unclassified information as expeditiously and thoroughly as possible.76 
These new practices marked a tangible shift from the approach of earlier organizations. Public 
fears about nuclear explosions were no longer dismissed as hallmarks of ignorance but 
acknowledged as legitimate concerns. This more realistic interpretation of the challenges 
presented by public resistance to nuclear energy reflected the ICSC’s far more nuanced and 
cautious interpretation of the feasibility of nuclear engineering. Consequently, while the 
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Commission failed to accomplish much in 1965 it did distinguish itself from its predecessors by 
suggesting that policy makers were no longer as enthralled by the promise of nuclear excavation 
as they had once been.  
The ICSC’s slow progress continued as the dry season of 1966 approached. In this case 
stagnation stemmed not from the Commission, but rather from Panama and Colombia’s 
reluctance to grant Americans access to their territory.77 This too reflected the political 
limitations to the deployment of atomic energy. The concerns of Panama and Colombia were 
two-fold. Both countries were reluctant to make concessions to the American government 
considering the ongoing conflict over the status of the existing canal. More concerning to both 
governments was the future potential of Americans detonating nuclear devices in their territorial 
borders. Colombian accounts suggested they weren’t worried about on-site surveys per se, but 
rather the fact that these surveys were ostensibly conducted to gauge the feasibility of nuclear 
engineering. Colombia was intrigued by the potential of a new sea-level canal; they were far 
warier of this canal being excavated with nuclear energy.78 Panama had similar reservations 
about nuclear energy. Sheffey testified before the Senate that Panama wanted to see a substantial 
demonstration of the technology first “But they very clearly indicated that they don't want to be 
the guinea pig for this.”79 Surprisingly, Isthmian nations weren’t lining up to have nearly 200 Mt 
of nuclear explosives detonated within their borders. 
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Finally, by the dry season of 1967, site surveys were able to begin in earnest in Panama. 
Panama agreed to rights of access in February of 1966 (still too late to carry out substantial work 
that dry season) and Colombia finally agreed in 1967 (too late to carry out substantial work 
during that dry season). Yet the loss of two dry seasons in Panama and three in Colombia made 
the July 1968 deadline for report submission impossible to meet. A hearing was held in June of 
1967 to push the date back. In addition, the ICSC also requested an additional $7 million dollars 
to cover the costs of more extensive surveys.80 While the Senate denied the ICSC’s funding 
request, the organization was granted an extension of its work until December 1, 1969 largely 
because of issues in the AEC.81 
The Senate was hesitant to act on the ICSC’s request, particularly for increased funding, 
thanks in large part to the hiatus of nuclear detonations. The AEC had not carried out an 
underground nuclear explosive test in nearly four years and, as a result, technical information on 
the potential of nuclear engineering had stalled. The ICSC found it impossible to fulfill its task of 
gauging the feasibility of nuclear excavation without this information. John Kelly, the Chair of 
the Division of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions for the AEC, suggested that not only could the AEC 
not determine whether nuclear excavation was feasible for a new canal, they couldn’t determine 
if it was feasible at all at higher yields. Kelly suggested that "To demonstrate the feasibility of 
nuclear excavation, we must have the capability to more accurately predict the characteristics of 
craters produced by nuclear explosives. Experience to date indicates that an empirically based 
predictive capability does not suffice for higher yield detonations or for detonations in different 
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media.”82 The unpredictability and uncontrollable nature of nuclear energy was too substantial to 
deploy without more tests. 
And yet, despite the lack of data, many scientists felt that the adoption of nuclear 
excavation was a foregone conclusion. The disconnect between atomic enthusiasts and the 
general apprehension surrounding nuclear explosions remained vast. An AEC contracted report 
on the economics of peaceful nuclear explosives suggested that the technology was simply too 
promising to abandon despite its risks. The report stated that “Even if Plowshare should be 
rejected for the immediate future, the needs of the human race, in view of its vast and rapid 
increase in numbers and the developing shortages of resources accessible by conventional means 
eventually will force the use of this technology upon the world."83 This logic suggested that the 
hazards of nuclear excavation were insignificant next to the demands of human development. An 
exponentially more powerful source of energy needed to be adopted regardless of costs for 
humanity to thrive. In some ways this sentiment reflected earlier trends in the adoption of new 
energy regimes in Panama. Loss of life had been justified in both railroad and canal construction 
on the grounds that these developments were essential to the bettering of the human condition. 
And yet when this metric was applied to nuclear energy the sheer amount of energy that was in 
play complicated matters. Coal, oil, and chemical explosives all lacked the sheer destructive 
potential of nuclear reactions. The visceral power within the atom ensured that it was held to a 
different standard than other technologies, a standard that many worried could not be met. 
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Despite growing concerns regarding Plowshare, the quest for peaceful nuclear explosions 
was not dead. Indeed, it rose from the irradiated ashes of the Nevada Desert again in 1968 to 
carry out a series of tests which suggested that the dream of the nuclear canal could finally be 
realized. The Cabriolet and Buggy tests, conducted in January and March respectively, were the 
cause of this excitement.84 Buggy was particularly important. For the first time the AEC had 
conducted a nuclear row charge experiment and proven, at least on a small scale, that the 
technique created a trench. Members of the ICSC were pleased to report that both tests had 
“results that equaled or exceeded expectations."85 These tests also increased Congressional 
approval of the ICSC as hearings were held in the House in March and in the Senate in April to 
again extend the deadline for report submission, this time to December 1, 1970, and increase 
ICSC funding. An excited Robert Anderson suggested that these tests would allow the ICSC to 
finally gauge the feasibility of a nuclear canal.86   
Despite the rosy outlook for nuclear excavation, several issues remained unresolved. The 
AEC had four additional tests planned, yet their record suggested that planned tests didn’t always 
yield conducted tests. More problematic was the reality that, despite the best efforts of the AEC, 
nuclear energy could not be fully contained. Substantial relocation programs needed to be 
implemented before detonations took place. The utilization of thermonuclear explosives in 
Panama would require the forced removal of at least 40,000 people from the rainforest 
surrounding Route 17.87 The major issue was that the potential evacuees were native members of 
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the Choco and Cuna tribes. Engineers were worried that these individuals viewed their lands 
with “primitive cultural attachments that could not be easily overcome.”88 Removing the Choco 
and Cuna from their ancestral lands was problematic not so much from its technical infeasibility, 
but rather the public relations nightmare that would inevitably result.  
The importance of these removals could not be overstated. The AEC’s first attempt at a 
practical application of Plowshare had proposed the use of a nuclear explosion to create a deep-
water harbor in Alaska. This project, codenamed Chariot, aimed to both provide a functional 
harbor and unequivocally display the utility of nuclear excavation. It never happened. Scientists, 
concerned with how the blast could impact local ecology and the Inuit who relied on it, raised the 
alarm and public sentiment quickly turned against the program.89 Alaska Senator Bob Bartlett 
cautioned the ICSC that "I am not going to pose this as a question, but there has always been this 
thought in my mind, and I compare the relatively small population in the Cape Thompson 
undertaking with the very considerable population down in Central America, and I apprehend 
that there is a distinct possibility that those people who oppose this sort of thing will be 
tremendously more active in this situation than they were in the Alaska one."90 Relocation was 
not an issue that could be solved by experimentation or tests, and it had the potential to thwart 
any canal across the Isthmus. 
Despite the concerns about relocation, the ICSC moved ahead at a remarkable pace in the 
months following Cabriolet and Buggy. Site surveys on Route 17 in Panama were effectively 
completed during the dry season of 1967 and data analysis was already underway by 1968. The 
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ICSC also managed to obtain rights of access in Colombia and was able to hit the ground 
running in 1968. This onsite data answered crucial questions about the meteorology, hydrology, 
and geology in both regions and helped engineers gain a better understanding of where and when 
nuclear energy could be implemented. They believed that field work on both sites could be 
completed by the end of the year, giving them time to compile data and obtain more information 
from the AEC about its cratering experiments.91 Remarkably, even the AEC seemed poised to 
meet its deadline, carrying out another nuclear detonation, Schooner, in December of 1968.92 
The nuclear canal seemed to be closer at hand than it had been in years. 
More Sizzle than Substance 
As the ICSC entered 1969 and prepared to complete its studies, the enthusiasm that had 
accompanied the nuclear excavation tests in early 1968 rapidly evaporated. Budget cuts limited 
personnel numbers on the Isthmus and halted Plowshare experiments in the US. Meanwhile 
questions remained about technical feasibility issues. Slope stability had yet to be dealt with and 
scientists could not guarantee that they could successfully cut through the Continental Divide in 
Panama with explosions of a safe yield. These questions were further complicated by the reality 
that any sort of nuclear excavation required the relocation of tens of thousands of people, a 
proposal that demanded the investment of tremendous political and financial capital. The verdict 
on nuclear excavation was still out, but it did not look promising.  
As 1969 began, the AEC and ICSC encountered a test that could not be overcome by 
experimentation and theory: budget cuts. Less than a month into his first term, Richard Nixon 
delivered on his campaign promises to limit government excess by cutting the number of 
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government employees.93 While Nixon’s mandate impacted the entire federal government, its 
impacts were felt acutely in Panama where nearly every service was operated by the federal 
government. The result was a freeze in new hiring, an emphasis on internal promotion, and a 
constant review of necessary personnel.94 In this climate, theoretical studies for a new canal were 
not a priority. 
The ICSC approached its deadline as these cuts came into effect and, in many areas, the 
organization had already completed on-site surveys and data collection studies. As a result, it 
was not directly impacted by budget cuts. However, personnel cuts did substantially impact the 
progress of Plowshare. Unfortunately for the AEC, the Schooner test in December of 1968 was 
the last test conducted under the purview of Plowshare and marked the end of the development 
of the safe, high yield explosives necessary for canal construction. While the ICSC could 
interpret chemical explosions, theoretical work, and scaling models, the lack of a large-scale tests 
meant that they could not confidently determine the feasibility of nuclear excavation. Cabriolet, 
Buggy, and Schooner provided exciting new information, but scaling accuracy remained 
elusive.95  
Despite these substantial roadblocks to the adoption of the nuclear canal, the AEC 
remained obliviously optimistic about the program. An AEC report from August of 1970 
parroted many of the results from early findings. While the report accepted that the Continental 
Divide rendered Route 17 unviable it clung to the hope that Route 25 through Colombia 
provided a cost-effective site of a canal. The study suggested that Route 25 was even more 
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isolated from major population centers than Route 17, mitigating issues of ground shock and air 
blast. It indicated that slope stability wouldn’t be as big an issue in Colombia and that the tests in 
1968 had given them far more information regarding the formation of slopes. Finally, the report 
echoed earlier findings that claimed radiation was a nonfactor due to the creation of cleaner 
explosives.96 A perplexed John Sheffey wrote a letter to Chairman Robert Anderson stating, 
“Note that this evaluation is considerably more optimistic than that of the commission, i.e., fewer 
explosives and lesser total yields required for canal excavation than estimated by the Corps of 
Engineers. It is also downplaying the problems of nuclear excavation."97 In the face of seemingly 
conclusive evidence to the contrary, the AEC still saw the viability of nuclear explosives through 
rose colored glasses. 
Unfortunately for the AEC, the findings of the ICSC overshadowed nuclear optimism 
when they finally delivered their report the President on December 1, 1970. The Commission 
expressed itself unequivocally, writing, “Unfortunately, neither the technical feasibility nor the 
international acceptability of such an application of nuclear excavation has been established at 
this date.” While they acknowledged that nuclear explosions might become viable for large scale 
construction projects at some point in the future, they cautioned the President that “no current 
decision on United States canal policy should be made in the expectation that nuclear excavation 
technology will be available for canal construction.”98 The nuclear canal was dead in the water 
with no sign of help on the horizon. 
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The rationale for the ICSC’s decision was unsurprising. They lacked the information 
necessary to justify nuclear excavation. Interestingly, their concerns had little to do with 
questions of air blast, ground shock, and radiation as they felt “extensive knowledge” of these 
phenomena was available from earlier nuclear tests.99 Instead the ICSC emphasized the fact that 
"The higher yield nuclear cratering experiments of the magnitude required for the Isthmian canal 
excavation, however, remain to be carried out."100 The ICSC’s acknowledgment of these 
limitations was a remarkable shift from the position taken by the AEC, which assumed that any 
obstacle could be overcome with future experimentation and improvisation. The ICSC, more 
focused on the practical application of the technology to real world situations, quickly 
recognized that such an approach wasn’t sustainable given the economic, political, and societal 
constraints surrounding the adoption of nuclear energy. While nuclear explosions could cut 
through earth and rock, they were incapable of cutting through bureaucratic red tape. 
In addition to a lack of information, the ICSC also identified several major problems that 
had yet to be dealt with. Unsurprisingly, these concerns were focused on slope stability, public 
acceptance, and the unique challenges presented by the Panamanian environment, forces which 
had become increasingly central to the Isthmian canal discussion since 1964.  
Slope stability remained the chief obstacle to technical feasibility. Scientific 
understanding of slope stability had improved over the course of the 1960s and yet there were 
still no solutions to this problem. In coastal and swampy areas saturated soils would simply erode 
over time, or flash floods would sweep them away with terrible efficiency. These landscapes 
were too fluid to have stability imposed on them and so nuclear excavation was considered 
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infeasible for many areas, particularly along the Atrato and Truando rivers of Route 25. 
Conversely, rocky areas were too rigid to effectively use nuclear engineering. Nuclear explosives 
left sheer slopes in rocky terrain. If these slopes were subjected to high levels of water, extreme 
weight, or even the shock of subsequent detonations they could fracture, creating catastrophic 
slope failures.101  Nuclear energy had an awesome potential to restructure landscapes, yet in 
doing so it often made it next to impossible to maintain them. Humans simply could not control 
the power of the atom.  
The central obstacle presented by the Panamanian environment remained the challenging 
issue of crossing the Continental Divide. The interior of the Isthmus was comprised almost 
entirely of rock and, while nuclear energy could certainly remove this material, questions 
remained over whether the high yield explosives required to level the Continental Divide could 
be safely used. This was certainly tied to questions over fallout, air blast, and ground shock, but 
increasingly it was linked with questions over slope stability. For the canal to work it needed to 
level one thousand feet of rock while simultaneously creating slopes at stable angles. The ICSC 
determine that "Such slopes cannot be produced by single-row explosive excavation and the 
chemical explosive experiments conducted this far indicate that it is unlikely that multiple-row 
techniques can be developed to produce flatter slopes."102 Ultimately a new canal through 
Panama was technically infeasible thanks to the varied terrain of the region. The landscape was 
too fluid for the technology to work. 
The issue of slope stability was exacerbated by continued public relations challenges that 
had dogged the technology since its inception. The ICSC’s appreciation of these concerns made 
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them uniquely qualified to gauge the impact that they had on the creation of an atomic canal. 
While they suggested that these obstacles could be overcome if nuclear excavation was proven 
technically feasible, the lack of progress on Plowshare rendered the potential for public 
acceptance of nuclear engineering moot. If anything, the 1970 study showed that public relations 
concerns were growing even more complicated. The ICSC argued that concerns about radiation 
release were becoming entwined with questions of foreign policy and domestic dissent. The 
Limited Test Ban Treaty had been joined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty 
of Tlatelolco as obstacles to the international acceptance of nuclear detonations, and both 
Panama and Colombia were growing skeptical of nuclear earthmoving.103 While the ICSC 
reported that considerable foreign relations, education, and reimbursement campaigns could 
overcome this resistance, they worried that “the political and financial costs to the United States 
in obtaining such acceptance could offset any potential saving in construction costs and gains in 
intangible benefits.”104 Unless nuclear energy’s utility could outpace the technology’s hazards, 
public opinion would continue to work against it. 
The message of the ICSC was clear. Nuclear excavation, while promising, remained far 
too unproven to be used on the monumental scale demanded by an Isthmian canal project. This 
was not to say that the ICSC rejected nuclear energy outright. They adamantly suggested that 
they believed eventually this technology might pay tremendous dividends.105 Unfortunately, the 
risk of testing this new technology in Panama was unacceptable. Nuclear excavation was too 
unproven and the task too great. The dream of an atomic canal was, at least for the present, put to 
rest. 
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The Beginning of the End 
Ten years of studies doomed the quest for a nuclear canal. The lack of progress on a 
feasible nuclear technology and a broad array of public concerns relegated nuclear excavation to 
the realm of science fiction. The idea reemerged in the 1970s, however, the ICSC’s decision 
dealt a significant blow to nuclear engineering that it never fully recovered from. Plowshare 
lingered on throughout the early 1970s but received no funds for large scale experiments after 
1970. After several years of private studies and schemes to keep the program alive, Plowshare 
was effectively defunded entirely in 1974.106 
It's ironic that the decision to shy away from nuclear excavation in Panama was primarily 
reflective of the awesome power of this new source of energy. Atomic energy’s tremendous 
yields and uncontrollable nature created a series of unique challenges stemming from nuclear 
explosions’ overabundance of energy rather than dearth of it. Nuclear explosions altered 
landscapes too radically, creating steep sloped banks that were recipes for disaster in the entropic 
Panamanian landscape. The hubris of some scientists allowed them to discount the concerns of 
environmentalists and citizens as ignorance or a lack of understanding, but they could not 
overlook the fact that the technology was fundamentally untenable in the Panamanian 
environment. While public resistance and political challenges certainly impacted the decision to 
shy away from nuclear earthmoving, technical infeasibility ultimately vaporized the project. As 
the ICSC suggested, public and political relations issues could be overcome, but before this 
could be accomplished the utility of nuclear earthmoving had to be established. The AEC’s 
inability to do this made a public relations campaign a moot point.107 
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The decision to avoid nuclear energy was a remarkable development in the history of 
American energy in Panama. This was the first time that a new source of energy lay untouched 
by Americans seeking to restructure the Panamanian environment. A decade of admittedly 
inconsistent study preceded the decision to abandon nuclear technology and, while at times the 
AEC’s optimism towards nuclear energy seemed insulated from real world realities, the ultimate 
decision to shy away from Plowshare was indicative of a realization of the limits of a new energy 
regime rather than a single-minded focus on its benefits.  
Unlike coal and oil, which also certainly possessed destructive side effects, the 
consequences of nuclear energy were brutal and explicit. The unrestrained destruction that 
accompanied nuclear excavations proved an insurmountable obstacle to feasibility regardless of 
how much energy the federal government brought to bear on it. Nuclear explosions were too 
instantaneous and powerful to be safely and effectively controlled. The potential side effects of a 
failed or even successful nuclear detonation were equal to the awesome energy the new 
technology promised. Rob Nixon’s idea of “slow violence” is useful in understanding this 
tension.108 Compared to the problems associated with coal or oil, the potential hazards of nuclear 
exaction were literally explosive. Nuclear skepticism didn’t stop with nuclear excavation. 
Thanks to the disasters of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, hostility towards nuclear energy 
grew to encompass nuclear power plants as well. This movement rightfully identified the dangers 
that came from the application of nuclear energy, and yet it’s worth noting that the fervor 
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directed against nuclear energy allowed fossil fuels and their insidious byproducts to continue to 
flourish in the radioactive shade cast by the mushroom cloud.  
Ultimately the ICSC’s 1970 report spelled the end of not only the atomic canal, but also 
American hegemony over the Canal itself. The ICSC suggested that the US explore conventional 
excavation of a sea-level canal, but with an estimated price tag of $2.88 billion dollars the 
venture constituted a significant financial risk.109 A slowing economy and an increasingly 
expensive foreign policy made such a price tag hard to justify. While the treaty negotiations that 
had begun in the 1960s had not yet borne fruit, Panama had clearly indicated that the status quo 
was unacceptable, and that the governance of both the Canal and the Canal Zone needed to 
change. These discussions defined the 1970s, setting the stage for the next chapter in the 
complex energy history of the Canal Zone. While nuclear energy might have been the focus of 
attention during the 1960s, fossil fuels still ruled the Canal behind the scenes. The discovery of 
oil on Alaska’s northern shore in 1968 pushed fossil fuels to the forefront. As America was 
forced to reckon with the limits of its thirst for energy domestically, Panama’s importance as an 
energy highway came to impact treaty discussions, suggesting that the importance of American 
energy in Panama was far from finished even though nuclear excavation had proven to be little 
more than a radioactive flash in the pan. 
 
  
                                                           





Chapter VI: A Crude Form of Survival: Alaskan Petroleum and Panamanian Pipelines: 
1945-1990 
 Barrow, Alaska (or as it is known today Utqiagvik) was hardly a war zone. And yet it 
was to Barrow, the northernmost town in the United States, that Navy Lieutenant W.T. Foran 
ventured in the spring of 1944. Foran was leading the Navy’s survey of Naval Petroleum Reserve 
No. 4 which ran through northern Alaska. For the next several years the Navy, U.S. Geological 
Survey, and Arctic Contractors sent hundreds of researchers to the inhospitable landscape to 
search for signs of oil.1 As Foran and others trudged through the arctic tundra, construction 
workers employed by Williams Brothers Corporation laid an oil pipeline from the Gatun tank 
farm near the Atlantic terminus of the Panama Canal to the Arraijan tank farm near the Pacific 
terminus.2 Separated by over 5000 miles, the two developments seemed to be isolated from one 
another, and yet two decades later their fates became inextricably entwined. The discovery of a 
massive oil field near Prudhoe Bay on Alaska's north shore catalyzed an energy bonanza in 
which companies sought to determine the most economical means of transporting millions upon 
millions of barrels of Alaska North Slope (ANS) oil to markets around the world. Panama once 
again was the centerpiece of one of the most lucrative trades in the world, and yet in wedding 
itself to the ANS oil trade Panama encountered a new source of entropy. One connected not only 
to physical forces, but also the instable and erratic nature of the global oil trade and diplomatic 
crises. Questions about the Canal’s utility, domestic developments in the US and Panama, 
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diplomatic disputes, and shifting global markets all threatened to undermine the potential 
benefits that accompanied ANS oil shipments. 
 Since WWII, questions of the Canal’s obsolescence dogged the waterway, emerging from 
hibernation a few times every decade before being subdued by more immediate concerns. The 
failure of nuclear excavation and the sea-level canal project seemed to provide a conclusive end 
to these debates by suggesting that, while the Canal had limitations, there was simply no feasible 
way of economically restructuring the waterway. Petroleum complicated this narrative. Long 
among the most important commodities to transit the Canal, petroleum provided economic 
arguments for the continued relevancy of the Canal, and yet as oil production boomed during the 
postwar years the Canal's inability to transit the largest tankers was a sobering reminder of its 
limitations. It was perhaps unsurprising then that the Canal became the site of a new set of 
interoceanic transportation networks, passages specially tailored and designed for the 
transportation of oil: pipelines. The emergence of Panamanian pipelines emphasized both the 
continued geographic importance of Panama itself and the challenges presented by the confines 
of the lock canal. 
 The complexity that defined Panama's relationship with petroleum was exacerbated by 
the increasingly volatile relationship between Panama and the United States. The fallout of the 
Marty's Day riots reverberated through the next decade-and-a-half as, starting in 1964, the 
Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations sought to renegotiate treaties between the two 
nations. Among Panama's chief concerns during these negotiations was a desire to capitalize on 
the financial opportunities offered by its position as a global crossroads. Ambassador Ellsworth 
Bunker, one of the lead negotiators of the new treaties, was quick to note that as early as 1975 




the cost of transporting petroleum across the Isthmus."3 In this sense, Panama's own economic 
ambitions also called the Canal's utility into question. Panama's frustration with the small 
financial benefit it extracted from tolls led it to pursue alternative methods of transporting 
petroleum products across the Isthmus. In the years following the Treaties’ ratification in 1979, 
Panama doubled down on this commitment, creating a pipeline that proved immensely valuable 
to the nation until the late 1980s. 
 Ultimately, the expansion of the global oil trade proved a bit of an enigma. It certainly 
made Panama once more a focal point of global commerce, but the financial benefits that 
accompanied oil ebbed and flowed, as fluid as oil itself. By becoming a crossroads for ANS oil, 
Panama once again reasserted its intimate relationship with energy and accepted the entropic 
consequences that accompanied it. Unlike previous eras of the Transit Zone’s history however, 
the entropy was no longer solely physical, but rather diplomatic and economic. The erosion of 
diplomatic ties between the two nations threatened to undermine the ANS oil trade and even 
after new treaties were negotiated in 1979 the rise of General Manuel Noriega, a man whose 
volatility made him entropy personified, caused the oil boom to come crashing down. 
 The postwar years gave rise to an increasingly global energy market that emphasizes the 
connections between seemingly disparate regions on an unprecedented scale. As Daniel Yergin 
has pointed out, the quest for energy stability is inherently beset by unforeseen “surprises” which 
have the potential to radically alter the global status quo.4 Riots, dictators, international incidents, 
and economic developments could easily restructure global energy networks. In wedding itself to 
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ANS oil, Panama was also subjecting itself to a globalized world in which developments 5000 
miles or more away could dramatically alter the status quo at home. This unpredictable 
relationship between America, Panama, and petroleum shaped the postwar era. Petroleum seeped 
into discussions of the Canal's future and emerged as the dominant source of energy impacting 
the Canal in the 1970s and '80s. These developments ushered in the final chapter of American 
energy in Panama. While the relationship between the two nations changed during the era, the 
incessant importance of energy remained.  
The Promise of Alaska 
Alaska's potential as a site for crude oil extraction had been well established by the 
1940s. The U.S. Geology Survey itself noted in January of 1945 that "Indications of oil in Alaska 
are widespread and have been well known for many years” before qualifying its statement by 
acknowledging, “investigations of potential oil areas by the Geological Survey have been 
deferred in recent years because of even more pressing duties."5 Katalla, located about 150 miles 
east of Anchorage had been tapped as early as 1902, producing 154,000 barrels during the three 
decades it was in operation.6 And yet by the 1940s, this was the only source of Alaskan oil. The 
abundance of reserves in California forestalled the relative expense of transporting oil from 
Alaska to energy-hungry markets in the Atlantic and the lack of a demand for the product meant 
that energy speculators looked for easier ways to turn a profit. Here too, WWII radically altered 
the status quo. The war effort’s insatiable demand for oil rapidly dried up wells in California to 
the extent that in July of 1944, Secretary of the Interior and Petroleum Advisor for the War 
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Harold Ickes bluntly declared “we are running out of oil.”7 Such pessimistic assertions of 
America’s energy security were far from universal, but even the most optimistic projections were 
accompanied by a growing realization that existing reserves were finite. In light of these 
concerns it was unsurprising that the Navy began exploring Northern Alaska with renewed vigor 
in 1944 in hopes of finding a supply of oil that could meet demand for years to come. 
 Created by Executive Order in 1923, Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 (or as it came to be 
known “PET 4”) consisted of a 150-mile-wide stretch of land bound by the Arctic Ocean to the 
North and the Brooks Range to the south. From its western boundary at Icy Cape the parcel 
extended all the way to the Colville River in the east. The Reserve contained over 35,000 square 
miles of the most rugged terrain on Earth and, with the exception of a few anecdotal reports of 
oil seepages along the northern coastline, it was unexplored by the Navy.8 Small scale 
reconnaissance surveys were undertaken between 1923-1926 but even these provided only basic 
topographical and geological data.9 As a result, when Lieutenant Foran launched his preliminary 
investigation on March 21, 1944, he and his party were quite literally entering uncharted 
territory. Despite this, the reconnaissance survey found indications of oil and, upon returning, 
Foran immediately recommended the Navy conduct a full-scale investigation into the region. 
Foran suggested there was an unusual abundance of seepages throughout the area and, 
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furthermore, he believed there were indications of productive oil-bearing strata at relatively 
shallow levels. In his mind, the potential of the area was simply too robust to ignore.10  
 Interestingly, it was at this moment that Alaskan oil forged its first connection with the 
Panama Canal. One of Foran’s chief advocates in the Navy was Rear Admiral Ben Moreell, the 
chief of the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks, who would go on to participate in the 1947 
Isthmian Canal Studies commissioned under Public Law 280. Upon Foran’s return, Moreell 
wrote a memo in which he argued that investigations into the potential of PET 4 should begin 
immediately. Moreell was so enthused about Foran’s initial findings that he suggested not only 
full-scale reconnaissance but also the drilling of core holes and exploratory wells as well as 
dispatching survey and reconnaissance parties to scout potential pipeline sites. While Moreell 
wasn’t thinking explicitly about Panama in 1944, he was careful to point out that it was 
important that the reconnaissance parties determine whether it would be economical to get oil out 
of the Reserve.11 After several months of navigating political red tape, the project received 
formal approval and, on July 20, 1944, 196 Seabees and 235 stevedores set out from Tacoma, 
Washington en route to Barrow under the command of Lieutenant Command W.H. Rex.12 
 Work progressed slowly. The remainder of 1944 consisted primarily of attempts to 
construct a camp at Barrow and obtain all the materials and supplies necessary to conduct the 
studies. As a result, while some geological and topographical information was gathered during 
the year, the more intensive ventures, particularly the drilling of exploratory wells, needed to 
wait until 1945. As work began in 1945 the expedition was forced to reckon with new 
challenges. Political jockeying between members of the Navy and surveyors of the U.S. 
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Geological Survey sidelined much of the work. These two entities both wanted to assert their 
ownership over the project and, as a result, personal rivalries hindered the work. The passage of 
a $9,000,000 appropriation for the exploration rendered this question moot as the Navy and 
Geological Survey used the funding to hire Arctic Contractors, a consulting firm consisting of 
several companies formed specifically to help with the PET 4 surveys.13 As 1945 came to an end, 
the shift towards a civilian-contractor model promised to ease the tensions between the Navy and 
Geological Survey and a year's worth of work in Arctic conditions had also familiarized 
engineers with the peculiarities of drilling in icy conditions.14 
 The shift from a military to a civilian-run project coincided with transitions in the 
oversight of the project as well. While Moreell was still nominally involved in the project, direct 
oversite was transferred to an operating committee headed by Commodore W.G. Greenman and 
consisting of members of the Navy, U.S. Geological Study, and Arctic Contractors. The 
committee provided the operational guidance for the project and directed Arctic Contractors’ 
employees. On the ground, the project was now led by a civilian, Arthur Daily, who was 
appointed project manager. These changes were adopted without incident and soon the study 
found itself on track. Labor was divided between the Geological Survey which was overseeing 
aerial explorations and Arctic Contractors which took over the administration of the exploratory 
wells.15 The result was a far clearer administrative hierarchy, alleviating the infighting that had 
derailed work over the initial year.  
The next several years saw the expedition generate substantial volumes of data and yet 
massive oil fields still proved elusive. While the $9,000,000 granted to conduct the expedition 
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was extensive, it was not limitless and forced the project be prudent in drilling exploratory 
wells.16 Unfortunately for the contractors, while some wells showed indications of oil, there was 
no definitive identification of substantial oil-producing strata as the years rolled by. Still, 
optimism surrounding the region remained unabated and the Geological Survey put out a flurry 
of reports in 1945, ’46, and ’47 all of which painted the future of Alaskan oil in a positive light.17 
The largest coup for the Geological Survey during the 1940s was the Navy Department’s 
decision to publish geological information and initial findings regarding PET 4 in 1947.18 In 
addition to showcasing the work done by the Geological Survey and Arctic Contractors, the 
Navy’s decision also legitimized future explorations in Alaska, sparking commercial interest in 
the development of the region. 
By the early 1950s surveys of PET 4 were dwindling. The initial appropriation was 
intended to run only through 1950, and while it was extended to 1953, the lack of major oil 
strikes made it difficult to justify further extension of the project. The most substantial find was 
at Umiat Field in the southeastern part of the Reserve. Eleven wells were drilled at Umiat and 
while estimates varied wildly, the consensus was that the field contained roughly 70 million 
recoverable barrels of oil. This was a considerable amount of oil, and yet it appeared to be a bit 
of an outlier as the next most enticing site, Simpson Field, was estimated to contain only 12 
million barrels. Ironically, oil wasn't even the most common source of energy in PET 4. Natural 
gas deposits proved far more abundant in the region and by the time studies were ended, 
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projections suggested that Barrow Field alone contained between 5 to 7 billion cubic feet of 
recoverable gas. This quantity was dwarfed by the 22 billion cubic feet of gas projected to be at 
Gubik Field.19  
Despite the inconclusive findings in PET 4, the expedition was considered a success. Oil 
had been discovered and the geological qualities of the region indicated the potential of 
additional deposits that could be found with more extensive searches. Arctic Contractors 
employee E.W. Beltz summed up the feelings of many involved in the PET 4 surveys when he 
claimed "In the writer's opinion, similar structural conditions in any oil country would justify 
additional tests."20 The survey was careful to point out that it had carried out only 44 core tests, 
drilled only 36 test wells, and been forced to cover tens of thousands of miles of rugged 
landscape with only a modest supply of manpower and machinery.21 John Reed, a member of the 
U.S. Geological Survey who visited PET 4 in 1947, summarized this perspective, arguing, "If the 
present drilling program is unsuccessful, it can still be demonstrated that northern Alaska may 
well have petroleum possibilities and that the small number of tests were not sufficient to prove 
the possibilities."22 In addition, there were questions about the oil-bearing potential of the 
remainder of Alaska's North Slope. PET 4 only extended as far east as the Colville River. In a 
letter sharing his experiences, Reed insightfully noted that "The oil possibilities are by no means 
confined to the Reserve and some of the best structures may well be outside the Reserve."23 Reed 
didn’t realize how shrewd his assessment was.  
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Had the boundaries of PET 4 extended just 50 miles east of the Colville River and 
encompassed Prudhoe Bay, the findings of the survey may have been radically different. Lying 
just below the surface of the Prudhoe Region was a massive oil reserve that would redefine 
American energy production. It took another fifteen years before the Prudhoe Bay reserve was 
discovered, and yet PET 4 had already paved the way for the development of Alaskan energy. 
The survey not only assessed the region's potential as an energy producer but also identified 
some of the challenges that would be involved in getting Alaska North Slope oil to market. 
While Panama wasn't explicitly mentioned in conjunction with Alaskan oil in the 1950s and 
1960s, (largely because it was assumed most of the oil would be consumed and processed on the 
West Coast) there were rumblings of the important role the Isthmus would play in the expanding 
global energy market. 
Pipelines and Profits 
 Petroleum products had already been established as a staple of Panama Canal traffic prior 
to WWII thanks in large part to the need to transport oil from California to Gulf Coast refineries. 
Despite predictions that petroleum's importance to the Canal would wane over time, the 
emergence of WWII served to redouble the centrality of oil on the Isthmus, both as an important 
commodity and a component of American national security. These concerns led Americans and 
Panamanians alike to explore the potential of expediting the transportation and distribution of 
petroleum products in Panama. And yet the concerns of the two nations seemed to be 
fundamentally at odds. The American government and Panama Canal Company saw oil as a 
means of regulating traffic through the Canal by expeditiously fueling ships and preventing 
delays in transit times and ensuring that American Naval vessels could promptly refuel as they 




petroleum presented the promise of profits, a promise the Canal had never delivered on. In 
WWII and the decades following, both parties sought to bring their visions of the Isthmus’s 
potential to reality through the creation of pipelines. 
 The first pipeline to cross the Isthmus was created solely as a means of improving 
American national security. As WWII raged on in 1944 and the Panama Canal was utilized to 
transport men, materials, and military vessels between the oceans, the navy became increasingly 
cognizant of the need to provide a constant supply of oil for these ships. The Canal Zone 
presented the perfect site for the creation of a pipeline that could be used to move fuel between 
the coasts. The Navy hired Williams Brothers Corporation of Tulsa, Oklahoma to oversee 
construction. The structure consisted of four main lines: two twenty-inch pipelines designed to 
carry fuel oil, a twelve-inch pipeline meant to carry gasoline and a ten-inch pipeline for the 
transportation of light diesel oil. Designed primarily to transport oil from Atlantic to Pacific, The 
two twenty-inch lines could transport a maximum of 5,800 barrels per hour each from north to 
south and a maximum of 3,400 barrels per hour each from south to north.24 The relatively small 
volume of oil the pipeline could handle and the emphasis on transporting oil from Atlantic to 
Pacific suggests it was not meant to serve as a means to transport oil between ships en route to 
distant markets, but rather to transport oil to storage facilities on the Isthmus itself where it could 
then be used to fuel naval vessels at the Atlantic and Pacific docks.25 This was an approach 
meant not to generate a profit, but rather to improve national security.  
Through the early 1960s, the perception of pipelines in Panama tended to mirror the 
Navy’s approach of perceiving oil and fueling as supplemental to the effective administration of 
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the Canal. The Panama Canal Company (PCC) managed its oil fields and reserves in this same 
manner. The PCC operated four tank farms by the 1960s split evenly between the Atlantic and 
Pacific terminals. These facilities contained 87 tanks which held roughly 3,320,000 barrels of oil 
collectively. 55 of the tanks were owned by commercial interests, suggesting they were operated 
for profit. And yet over the course of a calendar year, the facilities only handled roughly 
18,300,000 barrels, a relatively modest sum, which suggested the continued preponderance of 
local consumption.26 To the PCC these oil fields were a means of ensuring efficient flows of 
traffic through the Canal. Delays in fueling forced ships to be delayed entering the locks, which, 
in turn, delayed the next vessel hoping to enter the locks, generating a traffic jam that diminished 
the Canal's already dwindling capacity.27 Neither the American government nor the PCC was 
concerned with the large scale commercial transportation of oil through pipelines in the 1960s 
and 1970s. In their mind, the Panama Canal remained an adequate solution to this problem. This 
was unsurprising as Americans had invested considerable resources into the Canal and, during 
these decades, particular the 1960s, still operated under the assumption that expanded canal 
facilities could increase the capacity of the Canal, allowing it to handle the global oil trade and 
the larger tankers that would accompany it. 
Panama exercised far more foresight in its interest in transisthmian pipelines, identifying 
their potential economic benefits far earlier than Americans. Panamanians explored numerous 
opportunities to realize this potential throughout the 1960s and particularly during the 1970s. 
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Indeed, Panama seemed to be interested in positioning itself as a major energy crossroads, 
developing refineries in its territory while it advocated for the creation of pipelines.28 Panama’s 
first forays into pipeline exploration were somewhat modest and never extended beyond 
preliminary surveys and discussions with contractors. Nonetheless, they displayed a far more 
concentrated interest in the potential of pipelines as a means not only of augmenting the 
operation of the Canal, but also generating a profit. 
Panamanian and commercial interests first explored the creation of a pipeline in 1962 
when Otra Costa Corporation pitched the creation of a twenty-inch and a thirty-inch pipeline 
across the Isthmus. Interestingly, the proposed route followed the Roosevelt-Boyd Highway and 
lay predominantly outside the Canal Zone, suggesting that Panama hoped to develop a pipeline 
that it could administer with minimal involvement from Americans or the PCC.29 A year later, 
this plan formed the foundation of a proposal put forward by the Colon Free Zone. The Free 
Zone sought to hire Williams Brothers, the creators of the Navy pipeline, to construct a 
transisthmian pipeline that could carry crude and bunker oil across Panama. The projected 
pipeline would be capable of transporting 100,000 barrels daily and would be connected to 
storage facilities of 860,000 barrels on the Atlantic and 1,210,000 on the Pacific.30 The Panama 
Canal Company was somewhat uncomfortable with the long-term implications of Panama’s 
ambitious position on the pipeline. Governor Robert Fleming noted, "We see little probability of 
a successful venture in the pipeline field in the near future, but we cannot dismiss entirely the 
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possibility of its eventual development."31 While the PCC was confident that a pipeline couldn’t 
immediately undermine the Canal’s role in international oil transportation, it was increasingly 
concerned about the long term consequences of a pipeline if future levels of petroleum 
consumption continued to rise or if tanker size continued to increase. 
These fears seemed to be realized as the 1960s came to a close. On July 18, 1968, 
Atlantic-Richfield Company (ARCO) Chief Executive Officer Robert Anderson announced that 
his company had found a historically massive oil field at Prudhoe Bay on Alaska's North Slope.32 
The dream of Foran, Moreell, and Reed had finally been realized and Alaska’s potential as a 
source of energy seemed limitless. This discovery radically altered global energy networks, and 
the Panama Canal soon found itself drawn into the burgeoning energy bonanza. 
Accessing Alaskan Oil 
 The discovery of ANS oil was met with near universal enthusiasm. Experts eagerly 
debated the size of the find with some estimates going so far as to suggest it would be the largest 
field ever discovered, even larger than the 62 billion barrel Greater Burgan Field in Kuwait.33 
More modest assessments established a safer (and extremely accurate), but still remarkable 
estimate of 25 billion barrels. As one industry insider put it “That, as I’m sure someone has 
remarked, is a lot of oil.”34 And yet the volume of the Prudhoe Bay Field would be for naught if 
it could not be accessed. Retired General L.J. Lincoln, a representative for energy speculator 
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Eugene Callis who sought to create a pipeline across Central American, argued "However, as 
great as is the challenge and achievement of oil production at the wellhead in the Alaska Arctic, 
the key to its use now becomes economical, reliable transportation to refineries and users."35 
This was no small task. 
 In the months following the announcement, a slew of proposals sought to provide a 
solution to the issue of getting ANS oil to refineries in the Gulf Coast. Among the most 
ambitious was the $50 million-dollar overhaul of the 115,000-ton tanker SS Manhattan to turn it 
into an icebreaker. The Manhattan would carve out the fabled Northwest Passage, allowing a 
fleet of six 250,000 deadweight ton (dwt) tankers to travel directly from Prudhoe Bay to east 
coast refineries. This would shorten travel time and allow for the use of the largest tankers in the 
world.36 In the United States, the debate swirled around the creation of a Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
System (TAPS) to connect Prudhoe Bay with the port of Valdez, 800 miles away.37 The flurry of 
activity surrounding potential routes for ANS oil naturally came to encompass Panama as well.  
 It was unsurprising that Panama was considered as a route for ANS oil. The Canal had 
long served as a crossroads of energy. In 1968, well before ANS shipments began, petroleum 
products accounted for 18% of the commercial tonnage that made its way through the Canal and 
generated 17.9 million dollars in tolls, roughly 21% of the tolls generated during that year.38 
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Given the substantial role petroleum products were already playing in the Canal it seemed 
natural that the potential of shipping ANS oil would be lauded by the PCC, yet this was not the 
case. The chief concern among PCC officials was the continued inability of the Canal to transit 
large tankers. A report assessing the economic impacts of ANS oil on the Canal noted "The oil 
cannot be competitive in that (global) market if the movement is restricted to tanker sizes that are 
capable of using the Canal."39 The most economical way of shipping the large quantities of oil 
would be in tankers of over 200,000 dwt. The largest ships capable of transiting the Canal were 
only 90,000 dwt, or the equivalent of roughly 450,000 barrels. Even these smaller tankers were 
subject to clear-cut daylight only transits (CCDO) which meant that they had to go through the 
Gaillard Cut individually during daylight, restrictions which further strained the Canal’s 
capacity.40 For these reasons, the PCC didn't actively pursue transportation of ANS oil beyond 
assurances that the Canal could handle some of the trade if it were transported in smaller vessels.  
Panama suffered from no such failures of imagination. A scant three months after ARCO 
announced the discovery of the Prudhoe Bay Field, the law firm Ragan and Mason submitted an 
unsolicited offer to the Navy, asking that their clients, Williams Brothers and National Bulk 
Carriers, be granted a fifteen-year lease to use the Navy pipeline to transport oil across the 
Isthmus. While the Panamanian government didn't formally make the offer, it had worked 
closely with both parties in the previous decade. In addition to constructing the Navy pipeline in 
1944, Williams Brothers had also been tapped to build the proposed pipeline in 1963, and 
National Bulk Carriers had signed a contract with the government of Panama to operate the 
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nation’s lone refinery.41 That Panama would benefit from the transportation of ANS oil under 
this contract was a foregone conclusion. The Navy and PCC, however, were reluctant to lease the 
pipeline. Governor Walter Leber expressed concern that using the pipeline to transport ANS oil 
between foreign ports might directly curtail traffic through the Canal.42 The Navy's chief concern 
wasn't economics, but rather security. The Navy mandated that they be able to repossess and use 
the pipeline at any time should there be a conflict, suggesting that such an arrangement was 
essential to national security.43 Negotiations failed to overcome these obstacles and gradually the 
Navy pipelines ceased to be considered as an option for the transportation of ANS. 
Panama's interest in moving ANS oil would not be extinguished easily, however. As the 
negotiations between the lawyers and the Navy stretched on, the government of Panama looked 
elsewhere to find parties interested in the creation of a transisthmian pipeline. They soon found 
their partners not in the United States, but rather in Europe. The English company International 
Management and Engineering (IMEC) would oversee the design of the pipeline while the West 
German firm Thyssen would be placed in charge of construction. The $76,000,000 project would 
create a 30-inch pipeline capable of moving 700,000 barrels of oil a day.44 The venture 
progressed rapidly and Panama explicitly tied to it ANS crude transportation arguing that they 
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would be able to meet the need for transportation as early as 1972.45 With this objective in mind, 
Panama appointed Dr. Eduardo Tejeira to oversee exploratory surveys and by August of 1970, 
the surveys were underway. Despite its enthusiasm, Panama realized that the success of the 
pipeline relied upon the creation of TAPS to turn a profit. One shrewd Panamanian government 
official noted that "the crucial decisions regarding the Panama pipeline will be made not by the 
PJG (Pueblo Junto Gobierno or United People’s Government of Panama), but rather by the U.S. 
government…"46 Unfortunately for Panama, their faith in America’s appetite for oil may have 
been misplaced. By the early 1970s TAPS was caught in a political quagmire as government 
officials, oil companies, and environmentalists battled over the future of the project. The 
European companies' interest in the project waned as TAPS negotiations dragged on and by 
November of 1970 they had pulled out altogether.47 Other companies expressed interest in the 
pipeline, but without assurances that ANS oil could even get out of Alaska, there was simply not 
enough enthusiasm to turn a Panamanian pipeline into a reality.  
A few projects sputtered into and out of existence over the first few years of the 1970s. In 
1972 the Litton Group proposed a slurry pipeline that would transport both coal and oil across 
the Isthmus, theoretically diminishing the potential financial risk presented by the debates over 
ANS oil. The pipeline would move coal from the Atlantic to the Pacific where it would be loaded 
onto massive 200,000 dwt freighters and shipped to Japan. These vessels would stop in Alaska to 
load up on ANS oil before making their way to Panama where the oil would be pumped from 
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Pacific to Atlantic en route to Gulf Coast refineries.48 Panama too continued to remain interested 
in the construction of a pipeline, working with several American companies to explore the 
financial and engineering viability of a pipeline.49 And yet Panama was patient in its approach, 
recognizing that until the TAPS project received approval there was no need to begin serious 
preparations.50 As the TAPS debate stretched over months and years, the economic potential of 
ANS oil grew increasingly suspect. This obstacle pointed to the complexity of the global energy 
network into which the Panama Canal had thrust itself. Domestic policy debates in the United 
States prevented Panama from being able to capitalize on its position as the crossroads of the 
world and emerge as a major player in the global energy trade. 
The slow progress of TAPS was not the only concern. The increasingly strained 
diplomatic relationship between Panama and the United States also complicated the creation of 
pipelines. Unless the two nations could find a way to deal with the tensions stemming from 
administration of the Canal, it would be impossible to fully explore the economic potential 
offered by ANS oil. As the 1970s progressed, the push for a new treaty between the two nations 
obtained an unprecedented level of support and brought with it the promise that Panama could 
finally capitalize on the economic opportunities presented by its location. 
A New Era Emerges 
 The Martyrs’ Day Riots of January 9th, 1964 were a clear indication that the existing 
relationship between Panama and the United States was unsustainable. Decades of animosity had 
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boiled over in Panama and the seemingly unlimited autonomy of the United States in the Canal 
Zone was no longer an acceptable reality to Panamanians. These clashes embodied a new 
diplomatic source of entropy that had to be dealt with in order for oil transportation to flourish. 
To this end, starting in 1964 and extending through the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter 
administrations, the United States and Panama conducted intermittent treaty discussions in hopes 
of alleviating these problems.51 Americans were chiefly preoccupied with obtaining continued 
access to the Panama Canal in a manner that alleviated the foreign policy issues stemming from 
the 1903 treaty. Panamanians, on the other hand, were irate over a provision of the 1903 treaty 
which allowed the United States to "act as if sovereign" in the Canal Zone.52 Underpinning these 
major grievances were smaller concerns that impacted the future of Panama as a center of the 
global energy trade. Americans were reluctant to invest in infrastructural networks in Panama if 
there was the potential that domestic upheaval could damage those assets. Panamanians argued 
that they were not allowed to develop economically under the provisions of the existing treaties. 
Solving these issues would both mitigate the international tensions between the two countries 
and provide an impetus for economic growth in the region through the distribution of ANS oil. 
 Throughout the 1960s, discussions between the two countries were far from amicable. In 
the immediate aftermath of the Martyrs’ Day Riots, Johnson set out to ease tensions and the 
President’s promise to renegotiate the treaties improved relations marginally, but the U.S. was 
reluctant to make substantial concessions in their authority in the Canal Zone. Indeed, the U.S. 
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seemed entirely unwilling to negotiate a fixed length treaty at this point in time, preferring to 
maintain control of the Canal indefinitely. Negotiations dragged on until 1967 when a treaty was 
put forward, however, the document's lack of engagement with Panamanian concerns made it 
highly unpopular and ultimately the Panamanian government took no steps to ratify it, an 
approach mirrored by their American counterparts.53 While the treaty negotiations contained the 
discontent spreading through Panama and provided a degree of stability, they failed to address 
the core disputes between the two countries. 
As the 1970s opened, the United States and Panama again sought to redefine their 
relationship. Under the leadership of Richard Nixon, the United States took a more moderate 
approach to their discussions. Nixon still desired a treaty that cemented indefinite US control 
over the canal but approved the negotiation of a treaty with a fixed date for Canal transition so 
long as it extended US control for at least thirty years and was accompanied by assurances that 
Panama would maintain canal neutrality. This was a major shift in American policy and 
suggested that treaty discussions may actually create a document acceptable to Panama. 
Additionally, Nixon committed to providing more economic opportunities to Panama.54 Of 
particular interest to Panama was taking over the harbors at Cristobal and Balboa. Among their 
chief interests was greater investment in commercial fueling. D.A. Dertien, the chief of Canal 
Zone Executive Planning Staff, noted that in his conversations with Panamanian government 
officials he had learned "The Government of Panama views marine bunkering as a profitable 
commercial operation and has expressed a desire that the Canal Administration cease 
                                                           
53 Department of State. “Background of US Decision to Resume Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” August 20, 
1971, pg. 1. 
54 Nixon, Richard. “National Security Decision Memorandum 131,” September 13, 1971. USNA, RG 185, Collection 
P11, Box 2: Folder: National Security Council & National Security Decision Memos: June 1970-August 1975, 




commercial bunkering operations under a new treaty."55 This idea, in conjunction with Panama’s 
plans for a transisthmian pipeline, suggested that Panama was acutely aware of the financial 
benefits that could come with greater involvement in the oil trade. A new treaty was crucial to 
recognizing this potential. While there was still considerable progress to be made, the Nixon 
administration's concessions created a foundation that later talks could expand on. 
 Despite Nixon’s insistence that the talks should be complete by 1972, in time for the 
general election, the difficulty in ironing out contentious issues between the two countries 
including control over specific Canal facilities and the timeline for Canal transition made the 
timeline impossible to meet. As a result, the treaty put forward by the United States in December 
of 1971 was ignored and in 1972 Panama adopted a nationalistic stance in which they attempted 
to apply international pressure to the United States. This tactic came to a head with the 
introduction of a motion before the UN Security Council in which Panama condemned the 
United States and its "colonialist" actions in the Canal Zone.56 By 1973, the hardline Panamanian 
approach seemed to be working and the United States felt compelled to adopt a new approach to 
negotiations. The appointment of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to lead negotiations and a series 
of meetings between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan 
Antonio Tack reflected the growing desire to find common ground. The announcement on 
February 7, 1974, of the Joint Statement of Principles between Kissinger and Tack outlined in 
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broad strokes the framework of an acceptable treaty and detailed the path negotiations would 
take. These eight principles included such longstanding issues as Panamanian sovereignty in the 
Canal Zone, enhanced economic benefits for Panama, increased Panamanian administration of 
the Canal, a fixed expiration date for U.S. control of the waterway, and promises of Canal 
neutrality under Panamanian administration. A new era in Canal relations was at hand.57  
 At the core of the agreement was a shifting position on the part of the U.S. government. 
Unlike negotiations under the Johnson government, and even the first years of the Nixon 
government, the Joint Statement of Principles suggested that the U.S. was willing to make 
concessions to mitigate Panamanian hostility to ensure long term access to the Canal. In some 
ways, this approach served as a diplomatic parallel to the construction efforts that shaped the 
early 1900s. While Goethals and his foremen had used concrete to hold the physical entropy of 
Panama at bay, Kissinger and his fellow negotiators used compromise and concessions to keep 
the diplomatic entropy of Panama at bay. In both cases the ultimate objective was the same: 
access to and use of an interoceanic waterway in Panama.  
 Despite the support for a new relationship with Panama at the executive level and in the 
State Department, the Nixon and later Ford and Carter administrations had no misgivings about 
the challenge of getting domestic support for a treaty. As early as 1973 the National Security 
Council acknowledged that "We are pessimistic about the possibilities of developing significant 
support for any policy involving important concessions to Panama."58 Consequently, while 
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negotiations progressed between 1974 and 1977, American politicians and diplomats launched a 
massive public relations campaign to prepare Americans for the concessions contained in the 
new Treaty. One of the most effective tactics implemented by Treaty lobbyists was emphasizing 
the economic shortcomings of the 1903 treaties. Bunker, in an overview of the Panama crisis, 
was careful to note that one of Panama's chief grievances with the existing treaty was the paltry 
annuity of $2.3 million dollars the country received from the Canal. Indeed, some Panamanians 
went so far as to suggest that they were effectively subsidizing the cost of the Canal. Bunker 
suggested that a new treaty could not only make this annuity more competitive for Panama, 
incentivizing the efficient operation of the Canal, but also encourage the economic development 
of the Canal Zone in general. "Already Panama has plans which call for the construction of an oil 
pipeline which would reduce the cost of transporting petroleum across the Isthmus," Bunker 
noted, suggesting that this development would modernize the Canal, allowing free market 
principles to increase competition and lower shipping and fueling costs.59 
 It wasn’t only attempts to build a new pipeline that came up during discussions. Panama 
once again expressed its desire to utilize the Navy Pipelines that ran through the Canal Zone, 
going so far as to discuss the potential for such a deal in the treaty negotiations. Americans were 
starting to warm to the proposal, but by 1975 the Navy pipeline was falling into disrepair and 
only two of the pipes were still in use.60 In addition, while the US was becoming more flexible in 
its positions, lingering concerns over a pipeline’s capacity to bypass the Canal made American 
negotiators cautious. It was one thing for Panamanians to create a new pipeline outside of the 
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Canal Zone. It was another thing entirely for them to bypass Canal traffic by utilizing a structure 
that had been created to facilitate Canal transit.61 In addition, there were some rumblings that the 
United States should maintain the pipelines and use them to transport ANS oil across the Isthmus 
themselves. Because Panama would have no access to the trade and would receive no benefit 
from it, the American government decided that this course of action might antagonize Panama 
and complicate treaty negotiations.62 While the pipelines weren't central to the Treaty 
discussions, the fact that both Panama and the United States were actively discussing pipelines 
indicated just how aware both parties were of the future economic potential of ANS oil 
shipments. 
In addition to discussing the direct economic benefits of a new treaty, advocates also 
often emphasized the value of American access to the Canal rather than American control of the 
Canal. While the Canal still certainly contributed to America’s economy, its significance had 
declined by the time treaty discussions reached a fever pitch. Ambassador Sol Linowitz, who 
was actively involved in negotiations, was careful to note in a speech before the American 
Legion, "Today approximately 8 percent of all US exports and imports by value pass through the 
canal each year. About 7 percent of US seaborne trade traverses the Isthmus. To a substantial 
extent, therefore, the canal, though still important, is obsolescent."63 This was not to say that the 
Canal was unimportant, but instead that it no longer was as instrumental to American economic 
and security concerns as it had been over the previous decades. This realization led many in the 
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State Department to adopt the perspective that maintaining access to the Canal was far more 
valuable to American interests than maintaining control over the Canal and indeed pushing for 
ownership of the Canal in the face of Panamanian resistance could undermine American use of 
the Canal altogether.  
The growing concern among many diplomats was that the discontent many Panamanians 
felt about the existing treaty would lead them to take substantial steps to eradicate relicts of 
American authority in the Canal Zone, perhaps going so far as to attack or sabotage Canal 
facilities. This was an ultimate manifestation of diplomatic entropy. Disaffected Panamanians 
could easily cripple the fragile locks or summit lake of the Canal with a single act of sabotage. 
Faced with this dilemma, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown bluntly stated, “Use of the Canal is 
more important than ownership.”64 In essence these concessions were an attempt to impose a 
diplomatic order that would allow American shipping to continue to use the waterway, albeit not 
with the same degree of authority it once had. This realization, in conjunction with a growing 
willingness to acknowledge the damage the Canal issue was doing to America's international 
image abroad, led American diplomats to finally accept a treaty with a fixed date for canal 
administration to transfer to Panama. With this concession in place, negotiations could finally 
reach their conclusion.  
On September 7, 1977, pen met paper and the Torrijos-Carter Treaties were signed. The 
treaties ceded control of the Canal to Panama through a gradual process that would come to 
fruition on December 31st, 1999, when Panama took over the administration of the Canal. In 
addition, they guaranteed that the Canal would remain neutral, a provision that ensured 
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America’s continued access to the waterway. While there was some discontent on the part of 
both countries, and indeed the treaties would not enter into force for another two years, the fact 
that Panama and the United States had renegotiated their relationship suggested that the Canal 
had a viable future, and, more importantly, could be used to explore long term solutions to the 
energy trade questions that had been percolating over the last decade. The fact that TAPS also 
came online in 1977 provided even more incentive for the two countries to explore the potential 
the Isthmus had for transporting ANS oil. As the 1980s emerged so too did a new and promising 
era for Panama and the United States, one in which billions of barrels of oil would flow through 
the Canal, and later a Panamanian pipeline, bringing wealth to both Panamanian and American 
companies. The only lingering question was how long this arrangement could last. 
The ANS Era Arrives 
 The successful negotiation of a new set of Canal treaties coincided with a new age of 
economic development in Panama. The erasure of the formal “Canal Zone” allowed Panama to 
pursue economic ventures in the Transit Zone, and the shift in the administration of the Canal 
also incentivized further exploration of energy transportation. Americans simultaneously 
recognized how beneficial it was to expedite transportation between Alaska and the Gulf Coast. 
As time went on and the sheer scope of the Prudhoe Bay Field became clear, it was increasingly 
apparent that this oil could not be consumed exclusively on the West Coast. As a result, even 
before the treaty entered into force, both Panama and the United States explored potential 
options for the most rapid means of transporting the material between the oceans. Initially, the 
Canal itself proved a viable means of transporting ANS oil and hundreds of thousands of barrels 
passed through the Canal daily. To help deal with the resulting increases in traffic, Panama 




been envisioned for decades finally came to fruition. The utility of the Panama route once again 
asserted itself to remarkable benefit, but the increasing concentration of oil in the Isthmus was 
not without challenges, some of which called into question the long-term viability of the route. 
 In the immediate aftermath of the treaties, both Panama and the United States agreed that 
ANS oil needed to move through Panama, and yet the new treaties complicated conversations 
that had been going on for a decade. Panama, long an advocate for the creation of a pipeline, 
preached patience in the late 1970s. The improved financial benefits they received from the 
Canal's operation led Panama to advocate, at least initially, that oil shipments should actually be 
routed through the Canal to maximize tolls.65 Americans on the other hand, recognizing the 
terminal nature of their administration of the Canal, were interested in exploring alternative 
arrangements to the Canal to expedite traffic. Harold Parfitt, the last governor of the Canal Zone, 
emphasized that even though an average of 450,000 barrels of ANS oil moved through the Canal 
daily in 1978, he predicted this figure would decline. He suggested that thanks to proposed 
alternatives to the Canal "There are still many variables in the West Coast supply/demand 
equation and pipeline alternatives to the Canal are not a closed issue. Further, there is still much 
talk about the advantages and possibility of swap arrangements with Japan. All of this leaves us 
pretty much up in the air as to the levels of our planning."66 Parfitt was so sure of the emergence 
of alternatives to the Canal that he completely removed ANS shipments from predictions of 
future canal traffic.  
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Despite the assumptions of Parfitt and others that the ANS oil boom through the Canal 
would be short-lived, the trade exploded in the early 1980s, generating tremendous revenue for 
the Canal and Panama. The trade began modestly enough upon the opening of TAPS. Oil made 
its way from Valdez on board large 120,000-260,000 dwt vessels. As it approached the mouth of 
the Canal it was transferred to smaller vessels that carried the oil through the Canal and on to 
Gulf Coast refineries. This wasn’t necessarily problematic during the first few years of the ANS 
trade as daily movements of oil averaged roughly 450,000 barrels, a volume which could be 
accommodated by one to two transits of the Canal depending on the size of the tanker. And yet 
the Canal route was not without limitations. Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC), massive 
200,000-320,000 dwt vessels, first started to emerge in earnest in the 1960s. Thanks to the 
economy provided by this style of bulk transportation, many oil companies began adopting these 
large tankers.67 The Canal simply could not handle these larger, cheaper ships, a reality 
exacerbated by the fact that the Jones Act forced oil companies to use American vessels, which 
were more expensive to build and crew then foreign vessels.  
Despite these concerns, the expansion of production in Alaska and a growing global 
demand for oil helped expand ANS shipments in the early 1980s. By November of 1980, there 
were over 500,000 barrels of oil transiting the Canal daily. Less than a year later, in May of 
1981, traffic hit its highest levels in over seven years. Canal Administrator Dennis McAuliffe, 
who oversaw the first ten years of the Canal transition process, was quick to note that "The most 
significant aspect of Canal traffic during May was the record Alaska North Slope crude oil 
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movement and its effect on total traffic and tolls revenue."68 Daily traffic exploded to well over 
600,000 barrels per day and generated $4.6 million dollars in tolls for the month. This trade 
continued to explode as the early ‘80s progressed. In March of 1982, the trade hit another 
milestone as, for the first time, ANS shipments averaged over 800,000 barrels per day. The $5.7 
million in tolls generated by this remarkable figure helped drive up the Canal’s earnings and 
McAuliffe once again excitedly reported "Canal traffic for the month of March was substantially 
above budget targets, primarily as a result of a record Alaska North Slope (ANS) oil 
movement."69 Thanks to the sheer volume of ANS oil transiting the Canal, the waterway was 
thriving, laying to rest concerns that the Canal administration’s transitionary period would be 
marked by inefficiency.  
The benefits reaped from the ANS oil trade did not come without challenges, however. 
ANS shipments were straining the limits of the Canal's capacity. March 1982 not only saw a 
record in ANS movement through the Canal but also an average traffic of 42 transits per day, a 
figure not seen in over a decade. This in and of itself was not problematic. The challenge lay in 
the increasing size of the vessels making the trip through the locks. In that same month, 51.7% of 
transits were made by ships with beams of 80' or wider.70 This limited the number of double 
lockages that could be undertaken and, more concerningly, led to a greater number of clear cut 
daylight only (CCDO) transits. CCDO’s placed a considerable burden on canal traffic as they 
substantially impacted the speed at which other vessels could transit the Canal. While the Canal 
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could manage to accommodate roughly 40 vessels with minimal delays, Canal administrators 
believed that they could only handle roughly sixteen to seventeen large vessels without 
substantially impacting traffic.71 The steady increases in ANS traffic between the signing of the 
treaty and March of 1982 suggested that this capacity might be reached sooner than the Canal 
could hope to manage.  
 In addition to straining the traffic capacity of the Canal, increasing ANS shipments also 
were accompanied by greater risk for oil spills. In a waterway as complicated as Panama any 
spill could have disastrous consequences and risked violating a treaty provision which charged 
Panama and the United States with minimizing the environmental impacts of Canal operations. 
Indeed, as the Panama Canal Commission (PCC, the organization that administered the Canal 
after the 1977 treaty went into force) was jointly administered by Panamanians and Americans, it 
was still operating under the purview of the Environmental Protection Act. These fears came to a 
head on June 7, 1980, when the 39,366 dwt Texaco Connecticut, laden with ANS oil and 
traveling north through the Canal, collided with the eastern bank of the Gaillard Cut, ripping 
holes in its number 1 and 2 cargo tanks. Roughly 4,000 barrels of oil were spilled over 35 miles 
as the ship made its way to Limon Bay where it could be anchored and repaired.72 While modest, 
the spill served as a sobering reminder of the hazards that accompanied the increase in tanker 
traffic thanks to ANS shipments. As more large vessels used the Canal there was an increasing 
risk that they too could spill their cargo, particularly when navigating the dangerous Gaillard 
Cut. 
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The combination of traffic limitations and concerns for oil spills led Panamanians to 
reconsider a pipeline as a means of moving ANS crude. A pipeline administered by Panama 
could still provide an immense financial benefit to the small country, allowing it to continue to 
serve its role as an energy crossroads, while also mitigating traffic and environmental concerns 
in the Canal. The negotiations into the construction of the pipeline progressed rapidly. Starting in 
1981, Petroterminal de Panama (PTP) and the Panamanian Government began negotiations for 
the construction of a $250 million pipeline project that would pump oil from Puerto Armuelles in 
the Pacific to Chiriqui Grande in the Caribbean. This project precluded the need to transfer oil 
from large 200,000 dwt in the Pacific to smaller vessels that could transit the Canal and would 
save an estimated $1 per barrel in shipping costs. In July of 1981 the two parties came to an 
agreement, and a month later, before an environmental impact study could be carried out, 
construction began. Despite the controversy surrounding the environmental impacts of the 
pipeline, construction progressed rapidly and fifteen months later, in October of 1982, the 
pipeline was completed at a cost of $365 million dollars.73  
The pipeline immediately proved its utility, fulfilling its promise of lessening canal traffic 
and providing a more cost-effective route for the movement of oil. With 40% of the pipeline 
owned by the government of Panama and the remaining 60% split between two American 
companies, the pipeline, like the Canal, suggested that both countries were acutely aware of the 
economic advantages offered by such infrastructure. The pipeline could transport 700,000 barrels 
daily, and the continued presence of the Canal provided a safety valve should volume surpass its 
capacity. Companies began utilizing the pipeline immediately and it soon became an essential 
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component in Panama’s emerging energy economy. By 1985 the pipeline had become so 
instrumental to the global energy trade that it generated 7.8% of Panama’s GDP.74 
By the middle of the 1980s, the sky seemed the limit for Panama's booming energy trade. 
The Canal Treaties appeared wildly successful as the waterway, thanks in large part to the 
stability created by ANS oil shipments, was thriving. Traffic in the Canal was lucrative, below 
capacity, and suggested that the transition from American to Panamanian control was 
progressing smoothly. The waterway’s success, in conjunction with the creation of the PTP, 
streamlined transportation of ANS oil across the Isthmus, allowing both oil companies and the 
Panamanian government to reap the rewards. There was optimism that the wealth offered by the 
energy boom would be there to stay, and yet, as had often been the case in Panama's energy 
history, domestic issues and conflict with the United States once again upset the status quo, this 
time with devastating consequences to Panama’s role in the burgeoning ANS oil trade. 
Evaporating Energy 
In August of 1981, a small plane flying over central Panama suddenly crashed, smashing 
into the dense forest below and killing all aboard. In normal circumstances this would have been 
tragic. Considering that one of the passengers in the plane was the de facto leader of Panama, 
Omar Torrijos, the accident was a national catastrophe. After a dozen years of relatively stable 
leadership, Panama found itself again amid a domestic crisis.75 The ensuing power vacuum 
created tremendous domestic conflict in Panama as military and governmental authorities sought 
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to assert themselves as the center of power in the small nation. For four years these machinations 
unwound behind closed doors, safely out of sight of much of the world.  
The rise of General Manuel Noriega, who later was accused of orchestrating Torrijos’ 
death, thrust the political infighting into the open. Noriega aligned himself with both Torrijos and 
the U.S. government in the 1960s and reaped the benefits of his partnerships, rising through the 
ranks of the Panamanian National Guard. By August of 1983, he had become commander of the 
Panamanian National Guard and arguably the most powerful figure in Panamanian politics.76 
Leveraging his military power, Noriega intimidated and brutally murdered his rivals, establishing 
himself as the strongman behind the Panamanian government. While the US was content to grant 
Noriega a long leash in the 1970s, the dictator’s increasingly blatant use of violence and growing 
relationship with Cuba led Americans to become hostile to his regime by 1987.77 Noriega was 
entropy embodied, a rogue element whose eccentric behavior and compulsive violence 
destabilized American and Panamanian relations. The stability imposed by the Carter-Torrijos 
Treaties eroded under the new regime and the next two years were overshadowed by the looming 
threat of military conflict. The age of oil was coming to an end in Panama. 
 Noriega’s increasingly erratic decisions sowed concern amongst global energy 
companies, particularly those involved in the ANS trade. While Noriega had established himself 
as the de facto leader of the country, the American government and dissident elements within 
Panama worked to withhold the $150,000,000 dollars generated directly and indirectly by the oil 
trade from Noriega’s forces. The funds were held in a trust that would be returned to Panama as 
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soon as a legitimate government was installed.78 While this arrangement may have eased the 
consciences of American government officials who had helped Noriega rise to power, it 
concerned business leaders who were worried that Noriega might order the Panamanian Defense 
Forces to seize the pipeline. John McDonald, the President of Standard Oil of Ohio, a subsidiary 
of BP that directed the company's operations in Alaska, wrote to Congress in March of 1988 to 
express his anxieties. McDonald argued that, should the pipeline be closed, it would be next to 
impossible for BP to continue shipments of ANS oil. McDonald suggested that the already 
strained Canal would be incapable of maintaining the flow of roughly 700,000 to 800,000 barrels 
that were going through the pipeline daily. Ultimately, McDonald concluded "it will not be 
possible to maintain full Alaskan production if the pipeline is closed and the canal has to be used. 
Producers would be forced, both physically and economically, to leave the incremental 400 
MBD of oil in the ground in Alaska unless waivers are obtained for either the use of 
CDS/foreign flag VLCC's around South America or for barrel-for-barrel exchange of ANS for 
oil delivered in the U.S. Gulf Coast from other parts of the world."79 Noriega was not only a 
threat to Panama but a threat to American energy security. Given that America had suffered 
energy shortages in 1973 and again in 1979 the threat of another crisis was taken seriously. 
At the crux of McDonald's argument was the old question of obsolescence. McDonald 
suggested that "Canal congestion is the most serious problem in maintaining the ANS flow."80 In 
his mind, the primary issue stemmed from the fact that if it used the Canal, BP would be forced 
to use smaller tankers of up to 90,000 dwts which could only carry roughly 450,000 barrels of 
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oil. This limitation necessitated a minimum to two additional Canal transits per day to meet 
demand. This created substantial financial burdens for BP. The company would have to transfer 
oil from large 200,000 dwt tankers to smaller vessels, a time consuming and expensive means of 
transporting oil, although admittedly one that had been common practice just a few years earlier. 
Even though these smaller vessels could fit through the Canal they were also forced to do so as 
clear-cut daylight only transits. McDonald argued that the addition of two or three more transits 
per day of this type would significantly slow traffic throughout the Canal. Finally, McDonald 
identified the Jones Act as a hardship. McDonald argued that there simply were not enough 
American tankers of adequate size to handle traffic if it were rerouted through the Canal.81 
Ultimately, McDonald echoed sentiments that had been harassing the Canal for half a century. 
The waterway was incapable of meeting the needs of modern maritime commerce, particularly 
the booming ANS oil trade. 
 Others were not convinced by McDonald’s apocalyptic proclamations. Panamanian 
Foreign Minister Juan Sosa argued that the Canal was more than up to the task of dealing with 
ANS shipments in the unlikely event that the pipeline should close. Indeed, he argued that 
McDonald’s claims were nothing more than an attempt to cut BP’s costs and would ultimately 
“undermine the economic future of the Republic of Panama."82 Michael Rhode, the Secretary of 
the Panama Canal Commission, argued that McDonald was gravely overstating the shortcomings 
of the Canal. Rhode pointed to the fact that Canal traffic had averaged 34-38 vessels per day 
during 1988 and that the Commission was confident the waterway could accommodate 40 
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vessels per day without delay, including sixteen to seventeen large vessels. With these figures, 
Rhode assured Congress that the Canal could handle up to four additional tankers carrying ANS 
oil.83 Perhaps the most scathing criticism of McDonald and BP came not from Panama or the 
Canal Commission, but rather American shippers. Ernest Corrada, the President of the American 
Institute of Merchant Shipping, accused BP of merely trying to cut costs by getting waivers for 
the Jones Act. Corrada suggested "It does appear from the letter that British Petroleum (BP, 
America Inc.) is using the unfortunate situation in Panama as a cover to suggest Jones Act 
waivers and Alaskan oil exports and exchanges it could not ordinarily hope to get through 
Congress."84 Indeed those two provisions were exactly what McDonald suggested to alleviate the 
impending energy transportation crisis. Although potentially unscrupulous, McDonald's methods 
pointed to the complexity of the energy trade. While useful, the Panama Canal was not well 
suited to the transportation of large quantities of oil. In the ANS trade, where bulk directly 
correlated with economy, the limitations imposed by the Canal were a considerable liability and 
led oil companies to view the Panama route with reluctance, particularly as oil fields in the 
Middle East continued to boom.  
 Despite this, the Canal remained important to American interests, both practically and 
ideologically. And it was not only oil interests that were assessing the Canal’s continued utility. 
As the Noriega crisis unfolded, the United States continued to assert the value of the Canal in 
hopes that they could use it as a justification to oust the dictator. American officials continued 
the age-old trend of oscillating in their assessments of the Canal’s importance, emphasizing its 
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significance, or lack thereof, to justify domestic and foreign policy agendas. Unlike Bunker’s and 
Kissinger’s arguments during the treaty negotiations of the 1970s, politicians in the late 1980s 
were asserting the indisputable importance of the Canal as justification for the removal of 
Noriega.  
The desire to oust Noriega led to a hearing on the strategic and commercial importance of 
the Canal in November of 1989. At the hearing, Canal proponents pointed to the sheer growth in 
the volume of goods that made use of the Canal, a figure that had expanded from 30 million tons 
in 1950 to 152 million in 1988.85 Administrator Dennis McAuliffe stated that "Although use of 
the Canal has changed over the years, I would argue that its overall value continues to be 
significant and that it will still be playing an important role in world transportation in the next 
century."86 These arguments carried a tremendous amount of weight and many politicians found 
themselves advocating for action in Panama, with some, such as Congressman Phillip Crane, 
going so far as to suggest that Noriega’s actions rendered the Carter-Torrijos Treaties null and 
void.87 Interestingly, however, the nature of assessing the Canal's value changed. While 
politicians still considered the waterway's importance to American interests, they were also 
increasingly tying its value to global markets. This marked a departure from the primarily 
domestic assessments that had shaped earlier discussions and perhaps reflected a growing 
willingness to acknowledge that the Canal’s value transcended its utility to America. 
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 Even as Noriega tried to resurrect the narrative of the Canal as a colonial construct, he 
shrewdly avoided closing down the Canal or the PTP during his authoritarian rule, recognizing 
that doing either would likely result in his immediate removal from power.88 Despite his 
measured approach to the Canal, as time went on the United States became increasingly 
intolerant of his rule. President George H.W. Bush finally found his justification for the removal 
of Noriega on December 16, 1989, when an American soldier was shot and killed outside PDF 
headquarters. Four days later, 24,000 American troops invaded the country and while Noriega 
briefly found refuge in the Apostolic Nunciature of the Holy See, he finally surrendered to U.S. 
authorities on January 3, 1990.89 
 By the time Noriega’s regime fell in January of 1990, it had done irreparable damage to 
Panama’s position as an oil crossroads. The combination of inept economic management and 
substantial American sanctions undermined much of the economic vibrancy of the country, but 
nowhere were these effects felt as acutely as in the oil industry. The PTP’s contributions to GDP 
fell by nearly half between 1985 when it peaked at 7.8% and 1989 when it contributed only 4.8% 
to a much smaller economy thanks to economic sanctions and a decline in ANS shipments. 
When measured in barrels the difference was much more precipitous. Flowthrough dropped from 
roughly 218 million barrels in 1987 to 116 million barrels in 1989. Revenue from the pipeline 
dropped from $122.6 million in 1988 to $78.6 million in 1989 before falling even further to 
roughly $59.4 million in 1990.90 The pipeline, which had seemed a central component of the 
burgeoning Panamanian economy just a few short years earlier, was on the verge of irrelevance.  
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The Canal, meanwhile, was only minimally impacted by the Noriega crisis. Its earnings 
dropped by about $5 million dollars in 1989 but recovered quickly.91 The joint American-
Panamanian Canal Commission continued to operate the waterway with remarkable efficiency in 
the aftermath of the Noriega crisis and on April 30th, 1990, President Bush nominated Gilberto 
Guardia Fabrega to be the first Panamanian to serve as Administrator of the Panama Canal 
Commission.92 While the Canal weathered the storm it too was impacted by the shifts in the 
global energy trade. Canal traffic decreased during 1988 thanks in large part to a 5.9% drop in 
petroleum and petroleum products. While tankers still made use of the waterway, the significant 
role petroleum products had played in the make-up of cargo was being usurped by manufactured 
products such as automobiles and agricultural bulk items including corn and wheat. Meanwhile 
ANS shipments were increasingly being sent to developing West Coast ports and harbors.93 The 
Canal recovered, but it seemed unlikely that oil would play as large a role as it had in the 
previous decades 
Booms and Busts 
 Between the end of WWII and 1990 few commodities shaped the Panamanian Transit 
Zone as much as oil, particularly ANS crude oil. Petroleum had long been a mainstay of Canal 
traffic, so much so that even before the discovery of the Prudhoe Bay field, speculators clamored 
at the opportunity to create a pipeline across the Isthmus. As Alaskan oil moved from a 
speculative endeavor to a very real source of tremendous wealth, Panama became a center in the 
transportation of ANS oil. Massive 200,000 dwt tankers carried hundreds of thousands of barrels 
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of oil to Panama daily where it was transferred to smaller vessels capable of transiting the 
Isthmus. Peaking in the 1982, this trade pushed the capacity of the Canal to its limit. No one 
complained. Millions of dollars' worth of revenue poured in, generating wealth for Panama and 
providing America with the energy security it craved. The creation of the PTP in 1982 created 
even more opportunities for economic growth and soon the energy trade formed a crucial part of 
Panama’s economy. 
And yet the energy trade was highly volatile by its very nature. “Surprises" came from a 
variety of sources. Initial searches for Alaskan oil proved relatively ineffective as the Navy, 
Geological Survey, and Arctic Contractors struggled to find the oil fields that were allegedly 
abundant in northern Alaska. When oil finally was discovered a new set of challenges arose. The 
size of the Prudhoe Bay field was meaningless without the capacity to remove the oil and get it 
to market. While the world was confident this would be feasible, the near decade long process of 
negotiating and constructing TAPS muted enthusiasm for the creation of a transisthmian pipeline 
across Panama. As if that weren't enough, the ongoing tensions between Panama and the United 
States threatened to undermine the Transit Zone's promise as a site for energy transportation. 
When treaties were finally negotiated, the Panama Canal had to reckon with capacity and the 
potential ecological devastation that could accompany an oil spill. While the creation of the PTP 
seemed to alleviate these concerns, even the pipeline could not withstand the entropy unleashed 
by the rise of Manuel Noriega. The energy trade in Panama, while productive, was incessantly 
haunted by the specter of missed potential. An energy boom always seemed just out of reach, and 
even when ANS oil movements peaked in the mid-1980s, domestic and foreign policy concerns 




 Panama recovered from the havoc wreaked by the Noriega regime, and while petroleum 
products returned to the region, it was the financial and service industry sectors, as well as the 
Canal, that came to define Panama’s economic rejuvenation. Thanks to the explosion of West 
Coast refineries and consumption, and domestic transportation of oil through American 
pipelines, ANS oil simply didn’t need to utilize the PTP or Canal to the extent that it had in the 
1980s. The energy trade then was chimera of sorts to the Panamanian economy and American 
energy interests. Panama had been able to capitalize on global energy trade and finally take 
advantage of its position as the crossroads of the world. Oil companies, while not thrilled with 
the limitations placed on the trade by the Canal's size and the Jones Act, were able to ship oil 
from Alaska to mainland America at considerably cheaper costs than they would if they were 
required to journey around South America. Conversely, however, the oil trade never quite 
delivered on the long-term economic growth it promised. The erratic nature of the energy trade 
and the looming threat of political and diplomatic entropy kept it from fully reaching its potential 
and becoming the centerpiece of the Panamanian economy.  
The Noriega Crisis and the ensuing decline in the ANS oil movement across Panama 
heralded the end of American energy in Panama. By 1990, the Canal's Administrator and the 
bulk of its workforce were Panamanian, a trend that would continue as the end of the millennium 
approached and Panama took over control of the Canal once and for all. For a century and a half 
Americans had attempted to use Panama's unique geographic position to facilitate travel around 
the world. In doing so they bound themselves to a variety of energy sources including human and 
animal muscle, fossil fuels, and even nuclear fission and fusion. And yet in doing so they often 
encountered limits to their ability to control the environment. Whether it was slides that 




workers, or even the international crises that squandered the potential of the ANS oil trade, 
control over Panama and the energy sources Americans brought to the Isthmus were never 
absolute. Entropy whether physical, diplomatic, or economic, always lingered, unrelentingly 







Epilogue: Energy, Entropy, and the 21st Century 
 On December 14th, 1999, former President Jimmy Carter led a delegation of Americans 
to the Miraflores locks for the ceremony celebrating the transfer of the Canal to Panamanian 
control. While the formal transfer didn’t take place until December 31st, the ceremony was held 
early amidst fears that the Y2K bug might make international travel dangerous on the official 
date. Potential technological apocalypses aside, the moment failed to garner the pageantry many 
thought it deserved. Carter celebrated the moment as “perhaps one of the most significant that 
has ever occurred in this hemisphere.” The Panamanian delegation, however, didn’t share 
Carter’s enthusiasm. Amidst concerns that Republicans would leverage domestic hostility 
towards the Canal transfer in the 2000 presidential election, both Bill Clinton and Al Gore stayed 
away from Panama. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was scheduled to go but backed out 
citing issues in the Middle East. Roberto Eisenmann, a senior advisor to Panamanian President 
Mireya Moscoso, voiced the anger of many Panamanians, claiming “It possibly shows a lack of 
class, a lack of political courage. It’s caving to the extremes in your domestic politics.”1 While 
Republican anxieties about the Canal transfer didn’t undermine the ceremony, they did point to 
the continued centrality of the Canal in American politics. Despite these challenges, the transfer 
went on as planned. As the new millennium dawned on January 1st, 2000, it did so on a Canal 
that was now entirely under the administration of Panama. 
In many ways, Panamanians proved more adept at managing the Canal than their 
American counterparts had. There were no major issues in the years following the transfer. On 
                                                           






the contrary, a little less than eighty years after it had first been proposed, the third locks project 
was finally completed, although not in the way American engineers had expected. On June 26, 
2016, the Chinese vessel Costco Shipping Panama, a container ship roughly 1000 feet in length 
with a 158-foot beam became the first ship to transit the new locks of the Panama Canal. This 
ended a ten-year, $5 billion-dollar project. The new locks, constructed adjacent to the existing 
locks at both the Atlantic and Pacific terminals, consisted of chambers 1400 feet long by 180 feet 
wide with a depth of 60 feet and were designed specifically to accommodate the newest neo-
Panamax vessels on the seas.2 The Panamanian public overwhelmingly supported the expansion 
of the locks, hoping that larger facilities would make the Panama route more enticing to large 
bulk carriers and allow the country to reassert the value of the Isthmus to global shipping.3 
Unlike previous eras of Panamanian history, there was no foreign power to usurp the prosperity 
that came with interoceanic travel. 
 And yet even the new locks were not exempt from the mandates of energy. In the original 
locks, boats were towed through by electric locomotives, but ships entering the new locks were 
guided entirely by tugboats. Pilots expressed their concern over the safety of this new 
arrangement as soon as it was announced.4 Shifting away from the fixed tracks of the 
locomotives increased the unpredictability of ship movements and could result in more 
accidents. assuming that these accidents would involve massive vessels powered by tremendous 
amounts of energy, the potential damages could be substantial. These worries proved well-
                                                           
2 Steve Mufson, “An Expanded Panama Canal Opens for Giant Ships.” Washington Post, June 26, 2016. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/an-expanded-panama-canal-opens-for-giant-
ships/2016/06/26/11a93574-37d1-11e6-af02-1df55f0c77ff_story.html.  
3 Karolina Zielinski, “The Panama Canal Expansion Project: A Historical Review and Lessons Learned.” Journal of 
Information Technology & Economic Development 9, no. 2 (October 2018): 1–11, 4. 






founded. In April of 2017, a tugboat helping vessels navigate the Canal collided with the US 
Coast Guard Vessel Tampa. The crash occurred when the tugboat captain fell asleep at the helm 
after working a twelve-hour shift. To accommodate the increased volume of shipping and 
manage costs, the Panama Canal Authority forced captains to work twelve to fourteen-hour shifts 
and many simply could not handle the demanding schedule.5 
In December of 2018, the International Transportation Workers Federation (ITF) and its 
affiliate representing tugboat captains in the Panama Canal, the Union de Capitanes y Oficiales 
de Cubierta (UCOC), released a study alleging that due to the excessive hours pilots were 
working they were incapable of meeting safety standards.6 They worried that because of the 
crucial role pilots played in transiting the new locks there was a significant potential that an 
accident of catastrophic proportions could occur unless a more reasonable schedule was adopted. 
Human energy, or lack thereof, still had the potential to undermine Isthmian transit over a 
century and a half after George Muirson Totten first set foot in Panama in hopes of constructing 
the Panama Railroad. While the landscape of the Transit Zone had been intricately altered to 
maximize Isthmian transit, uncontrollable energetic variables remained that challenged assertions 
of control over the natural world. 
This reality defined the experience of Americans in Panama. Americans' faith in their 
own infallibility came close to undermining numerous projects, and even when the Canal opened 
it was beset by claims of obsolescence. This is not to say that the Canal was a failure. Indeed, the 
waterway has generated billions of dollars in global revenue and played a crucial role in 
                                                           
5 Elida Moreno, “Tired Tugboat Captains Flag Accident Risk at Panama Canal.” Reuters, December 20, 2018. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-panama-canal-accidents-idUSKCN1OJ2P4.  






establishing America as a global superpower in the 20th century. However, it is worth noting that 
transit networks in Panama never operated as seamlessly as was hoped. Canal projects, both 
envisioned and realized, forced American engineers, and today force Panama Canal 
administrators, to recognize the limits of their control as much as the extent of it.  
 For much of the 20th century, American engineers reacted to this reality with an 
unflinching hubris. Americans had created the transcontinental railroad, they had built the Canal, 
they had developed the bomb. In each era of Panama’s energy history, American engineers in 
Panama justified massive infrastructural projects through self-righteous assertions that there was 
nothing that they could not accomplish with ingenuity and elbow grease. What they hadn’t 
counted on was the unrelenting persistence of entropy to undermine these efforts. Panama’s 
environment challenged Americans’ expectations at every turn. Its shifting soils and drenching 
rains eroded constructed landscapes and threatened to undermine the railroad and Canal projects 
entirely. In hopes of establishing and maintaining order in this landscape, Americans obtained 
and deployed tremendous amounts of energy, betting that this brutalist method would finally 
help them overcome Isthmian entropy. It did, but also deepened their dependence on even more 
powerful sources of energy: a Faustian bargain accompanied by unforeseen consequences. 
 The cyclical relationship between Panamanian transportation networks, entropy, and 
energy consumption came to a head in the 1960s with the discussion of a nuclear canal. This 
debate was remarkable, breaking the chain of energy escalation that defined American 
transportation networks in Panama for a century. For the first time, Americans decided not to 
deploy a new source of energy. The hazards that accompanied nuclear detonations, as well as the 
technical infeasibility of the technology, were too extreme to be ignored. It took a decade of 




and bureaucrats were finally beginning to understand their lack of control and the limits of brute 
force solutions to great problems. 
Nuclear power proved the exception to the rule however, and, in the decades following 
the nuclear canal discussions, Americans found themselves once again enamored with expanding 
energy sources and networks, this time in the form of Alaska North Slope oil. While the trade 
never quite reached the scale that energy speculators may have hoped, the billions of barrels of 
oil that moved through the Isthmus indicated that Americans were doubling down on their 
energy consumption. The dangers of nuclear energy were unambiguous and consequently could 
not be overlooked. Fossil fuels were accompanied by smoke and pollution, but the consequences 
of their deployment seemed to pale next to nuclear energy, appearing almost benign by 
comparison. And yet as Americans' energy consumption ballooned the pervasive fallout of 
burning billions of tons of coal and oil were laid bare. While Panama is not solely to blame for 
these challenges, it serves as a microcosm for their development. 
Panama is only one of the countless places where entropy and energy impacted human 
attempts to alter landscapes. The decline of America's domestic transportation network in the 
early decades of the 21st century forms an interesting parallel. While the Eisenhower Interstate 
Highway Act created a remarkable transportation infrastructure in the United States, it also 
created a landscape susceptible to seemingly marginal sources of entropy such as sinkholes, frost 
heaves, and erosion. These relatively minor occurrences, when taken collectively, require the 
investment of billions of dollars to hold at bay, and the crumbling bridges and potholed highways 





The electrical landscape of the United States also warrants examination. Our current 
centralized power grid, while it provides electricity to millions of people, also finds itself under 
threat from a variety of sources. Inclement weather has long wreaked havoc with power 
transmission as snow storms, high winds, and earthquakes are all easily capable of severing 
power lines. Increasingly, these natural sources of entropy are being joined by artificial threats. 
EMP bursts and cyber-attacks also have the potential to undermine these systems, allowing 
hostile entities to capitalize on the centralization of America’s energy network. A more diffused 
system of energy production may be able to mitigate these concerns, but fundamentally 
restructuring America's electrical distribution would require a massive investment of capital and 
energy. 
 Perhaps the most pervasive and damning source of entropy threatening not just the 
United States, but the world, stems from our commitment to fossil fuels. Coal and oil, those 
seemingly benign sources of progress that powered construction of the Canal and enriched the 
nation, are today creating the most pressing environmental crisis in human history. Global 
climate change, the product of our insatiable energy demand, is reshaping the global 
environment. Human hubris, an unquenchable thirst for wealth, and an overconfident infatuation 
with technological solutions to grand challenges have prevented society from taking meaningful 
steps to address this challenge. Instead, we once again are placing blind faith in the assumption 
that we can overcome any obstacles placed in our path. In the quest to establish control over the 
environment and bend it to our will we have merely unleashed entropy on an unprecedented, 
global scale.  
  Finding a way to deal with climate change (or not) will be the defining accomplishment 




require remarkable investments of energy and significant alterations of the natural world, and a 
willingness to accept the role that our insatiable appetite for energy has played in raising our 
vulnerability to entropy. As individuals we seek solace in our anonymity, assuming that our 
personal consumptions of energy are so minuscule as to be invisible. The collective impact of 
this belief catalyzes the constant increase in the energy appetite of the nation and consequently 
revitalized the positive feedback loop between energy and entropy that has defined the 20th and 
seemingly the 21st centuries. 
 What society needs is a sort of energetic détente; a willingness to cut personal energy 
consumption by exploring more energy efficient technologies and making behavioral changes in 
energy usage. This process will ideally be accompanied by the adoption of decentralized and 
localized energy infrastructures, shifting the burden of energy production away from massive 
centralized networks reliant on fossil fuels and embracing the flexibility that comes with smaller 
systems that can be adapted to meet the needs of localized energy consumption.  The relationship 
between energy and entropy suggests that the adoption of smaller, more localized solutions to 
entropic challenges mitigates the growth of entropy, containing it to manageable levels. If 
society can realize this objective it may be possible to minimize the impacts of climate change.  
 The relationship between energy and entropy mediated the relationship between 
Americans and Panamanians for a century and a half. The “control” that came from the 
consumption and deployment of unprecedented amounts of energy was an illusion, a siren luring 
unwary idealists towards an even more unstable environment. Our inability to resist the 
seduction of mass energy consumption has led us to the edge of a societal cliff. On October 8, 
2018, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released a special report arguing that to 




warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.7 The key to accomplishing this task is a substantial change in 
the way society thinks about energy. Consumption of energy is not an action free of 
consequences. And yet we have blindly accepted the fallout of our expanding energy palate 
without question, thanks to comforts it has conveyed. To paraphrase the world’s greatest 
fictional mathematician, Dr. Ian Malcolm, “we were so preoccupied with whether or not we 
could consume more energy that we didn’t stop to think if we should.” Unless we stop to think if 
we should consume more energy, and the way in which we should consume it, we stand doomed 
to reap what we sow, a world of increasing entropy in which stability is history. 
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